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ABSTRACT 
He Said, She Said: The Relationship between Reproach and Account Behavior in 
Organizational Conflict.  (August 2006) 
Gregory Dennis Paul, B. A., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee:  Dr. Linda Putnam 
 
 
 Current research on account behavior has focused on responses to failure events 
in which one person is the victim and another is the transgressor.  This study builds on 
this research by using a framing lens to examine account behavior in a conflict situation 
in which individuals are both actors and recipients of failures.  After establishing the 
relationship between organizational conflict and failure events, the study explored the 
relationship between account behavior and three aspects of issue development framing: 
conflict naming, conflict blaming, and intentionality.  Employees of nonprofit 
organizations were asked to read and respond to a vignette-based scenario depicting a 
conflict between two directors of a nonprofit organization.  The research findings 
indicated that conflict framing was a significant predictor of account strategies.  
Specifically, the use of mitigating statements was more likely when the event was cast as 
intentional and the reproacher accepted blame.  A clear interaction emerged between 
gender and conflict naming.  In all, this research indicated that more attention should be 
paid to conflict framing when studying individuals’ or corporations’ use of account 
strategies.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONFLICT AND FAILURE 
 Conflict seems to permeate Western culture (Barnlund & Yoshioka, 1990; Kolb 
& Putnam, 1992), particularly within organizations in which inherently different 
individuals are asked to work together in pursuit of common goals.  Whether working 
properly or characterized by dysfunctional behaviors, strategies, and structures, 
organizations and workgroups inevitably face conflict (Kolb & Putnam; Cloke & 
Goldsmith, 2000).  Such conflict either facilitates change by allowing groups and the 
organization as a whole to adapt to their environment or tears the fabric of the 
organization’s social networks (Putnam, 1988; Smith, 1966).  Any organization would 
serve its purposes well to manage these natural conflicts effectively, particularly 
relational conflicts (Simons & Peterson, 2000; Volkema, Bergmann, & Farquhar, 1997; 
Knapp, Putnam, & Davis, 1988; Littlejohn & Domenici, 2001; Putnam & Poole, 1987).  
Such effective management would allow an organization to preserve and strengthen 
relationships among its members (Putnam & Kolb, 2000). 
 The purpose of this study is to examine how individuals can pursue this goal of 
constructive conflict management.  However, unlike other studies that approach 
interpersonal conflict in organizations primarily through an analysis of conflict styles, 
the focus here is on the ways that conflict framing relates to responses to the disputing  
 
 
__________________ 
This thesis follows the style of Communication Monographs. 
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process.  Specifically, this study aims to shed light on how perceptions of framing, 
intent, and locus of blame during a conflict episode shape reactions to conflict.  This 
study draws on the dispute process (Morrill & Thomas, 1992) and the account process 
(Schonbach, 1980) literatures to examine how individuals react to other’s conflict 
claims.  Because the account process literature has focused on accounts following failure 
events, this study also draws on failure event research and its connection to 
organizational conflicts and disputes.  This chapter focuses on organizational conflict 
and its antecedents, arguing that a combination of the conflict and failure event 
literatures leads to a more complete understanding of the conflict process. 
Conflict 
 Putnam and Poole (1987) define conflict as “the interaction of interdependent 
people who perceive the opposition of goals, aims, and values, and who see the other 
party as potentially interfering with the realization of these goals” (p. 552).  This 
definition highlights a number of important attributes.  First, interaction provides the 
foundation for conflict.  Communication strategies provide clues to understand how each 
party attempts to manage the conflict (Putnam & Wilson, 1982).  Interaction also implies 
that conflict is a process that develops over time (Knapp et al., 1988; Thomas, 1976), 
growing from a single action into a series of actions by all involved (Goldman, Paddock, 
& Cropanzano, 2004).  Second, individuals in conflict are interdependent with each 
other.  This interdependence helps to explain how conflict emerges from individuals’ 
reactions to each other.  Interdependence also points to the inherent importance of 
relationships within conflict.   
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Third, conflict is grounded in perception.  Each party views the conflict through a 
unique set of lenses, opening the possibility for different interpretations of the same 
situation.  These divergent perceptions, in fact, may help to explain why conflict arises 
and grows in the first place (Bartunek, Kolb, & Lewicki, 1992).  Finally, conflict is 
marked by the perception of interference with the achievement of various goals, values, 
or aims.  These goals may be oriented toward task responsibilities or relational wants.  
Goals may include the desire to be seen as equal or to be treated with respect.  Values 
may include societal norms to which an individual adheres.  In all, conflict is a 
communicative process in which interdependent individuals perceive a frustration, 
caused by another party, in achieving certain goals.   
Conflict Characteristics 
 At least two types of conflicts can be identified within an organization (Simons 
& Peterson, 2000).  Task conflict centers on content and/or substance-related issues.  
Such conflicts may involve the inability to complete a task, the inability to obtain 
necessary resources with which to carry out a responsibility, or the interference of an 
individual in another’s attempt to do her or his job.  Relational conflicts result from 
interpersonal incompatibilities and interpretations.  Though they are treated as two 
distinct dimensions, the two are difficult to separate (Knapp et al., 1988).  Much like task 
and relational responsibilities within groups, these types are difficult to treat as two 
distinct areas (Keyton, 1999).  That is, task conflict often carries with it relationship 
frustrations.  Likewise, relational incompatibility may spring from frustrations with task 
  
4
performance.  Regardless of categorization, though, organizational conflict is shaped by 
a number of factors (Putnam & Poole, 1987). 
  One important factor encompasses relationship variables.  These variables, such 
as interdependence and organizational status, have been studied frequently as they relate 
to conflict management.  As mentioned above, interdependence of the parties refers to 
the way that each party’s behaviors are dependent on the other party.  Reciprocation of 
behaviors, as discussed previously, is but one example of this interdependence 
(McLaughlin, Cody, & O’Hair, 1983).  Individuals are mindful of the other party’s 
behaviors and conceptualizations of issues and respond to those behaviors.     
 Conflict variables are also important in shaping how the conflict develops 
(Putnam & Poole, 1987).  These variables include source, frequency, topic, and 
importance.  Although the last three variables are important considerations, source is of 
particular importance because it represents a possible site for attribution of causality and 
intent (Sillars, 1980a; Sillars, 1980b).  Thomas and Pondy (1977) argue that source 
attribution is an “existential assumption” (p. 1091).  They argue that attribution of 
agency (i.e., identification of the conflict’s source) is an integral part of the conflict 
process.  Of course, tied in with source identification is attribution of intent (Weiner, 
1985; Thomas & Pondy).  Attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Weiner; Sillars 1980a; 
Sillars, 1980b) argues that individuals look for agency (i.e., causality), control (i.e., 
intent), and expected outcomes and behaviors when assessing blame for the conflict.  
Thus, assessments of intentionality are coupled with assessments of the conflict’s source.  
Individual attribution is a key component in how conflicts emerge. 
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Disputing Process  
 Morrill and Thomas (1992) echo the view of seeing conflict as a process.  
Though they are focused more on how legal disputes develop within organizations, their 
argument is still useful for examining how conflicts begin and develop.  They argue that 
conflicts begin with a grievance.  A grievance occurs when “a person or group reacts to 
a real or perceived violation of a set of norms, rules, or individual or societal standards” 
(p. 404).  This definition reinforces the importance of interaction within conflict as 
discussed above.  Also important to a conflict is the set of goals, aims, and values that 
were violated.  This definition of grievance shares many of the same assumptions of the 
definition of conflict.  One party communicates with another party about the other’s role 
in blocking the other person’s attainment of a certain goal.  Such blockage may represent 
a violation of norms of equality or respect, or may violate rules of teamwork and 
cooperation.  Regardless of the nature of the conflict, the frustration of goals seems 
consistent with the violation of norms.   
 Morrill and Thomas (1992) argue that a conflict may ensue after the grievance 
stage when there is an “exchange of grievances either directly or indirectly” (p. 404).  
That is, conflict ensues when the other party responds to the one who presented the 
grievance.  This characteristic places a key importance on the discursive nature of 
conflict, in which parties respond to the claims (grievances) of the other regarding the 
perceived violation of goals, aims, or values.  This interaction highlights the 
interdependence of each party’s grievances.  As discussed previously, each party usually 
  
6
manages the conflict by responding to what the other said previously.  Such responses 
provide a rich site for understanding the evolution of conflict (Morrill & Thomas, 1992).   
 Of course, missing from this discussion of conflict is how conflicts develop and 
subside.  Although the conflict management literature addresses this point, it does not do 
so from an attribution standpoint.  For that, the body of literature on failure events might 
prove more helpful.  This study, though, does not examine the entire dispute process; 
rather, it focuses on the presentation of a grievance.  The following section establishes 
the connection between the two bodies of literature to set out a general theory for ebb 
and flow of organizational conflict.  
Failure Events and Conflict 
 The current literature on strategies such as apologies (e.g., Schlenker, 1980) is 
founded on individuals’ responses to failure events, defined as “deviant acts committed 
and obligations omitted” (Schonbach, 1980, p. 105).  This definition highlights some key 
characteristics.  First, the definition does not exclude accidents from being considered 
failure events.  Such attributions of intent are left to the individual perceiving the 
commission or omission.  Second, the definition implies that failure events may include 
departures from socially-accepted norms or behaviors.  That is, acts may deviate from 
what society has constructed as the proper action or the proper line of thought.  Finally, 
both action and inaction may be considered failures.  Again, the perceiver must discern 
whether or not the actor1 engaged in a failure.   
                                                 
1 Although the current literature has largely used “transgressor” and “victim” to refer to the parties to a 
failure event, the labels imply that a single party is at fault.  As was argued above, conflict involves the 
exchange of grievances by more than one party.  Frequently, conflict arises as a result of more than one 
person engaging in a failure event, resulting in the likelihood that a person may be both transgressor and 
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Definition of a Failure Event 
 A failure event may alter the way the recipient perceives not only the relationship 
with the actor but also the actor’s identity (Schlenker, 1980; Goffman, 1971).  As 
Hupka, Jung, and Silverthorn (1987) argue, “The socially inappropriate behavior of one 
of the partners may interfere not only with the image that the offending partner seeks to 
present, but also with the image that the innocent partner wants to maintain about 
himself or herself, and the image that both wish to convey about the quality of their 
relationship” (p. 304).  As a result, the failure extends from the specific action to the 
relationship between both parties.   
 Of course, central to a failure event is perception.  Goffman (1971) argues for the 
centrality of perception and alignment when he breaks the failure episode into a virtual 
offense, virtual offender, and virtual claimant.  This terminology connotes that the 
perception of the offense (i.e., failure event) – an imagination of the act’s “worst 
possible reading” – is central to how the offense is handled.  Thus, a failure event is not 
inherently a failure.  Rather, the receiver must judge the action to be deviant or 
irresponsible.  
 A failure event, then, is that which the recipient perceives to be an act counter to 
expectations of propriety or obligation.  How, though, is a failure event similar to a 
grievance or conflict episode?  Though the literatures have yet to be combined in 
                                                                                                                                                
victim.  As a result, this study intentionally avoids the use of such labels.  Instead, the individual engaging 
in the referenced action is termed the “actor,” whereas the person on the receiving end of the action is 
termed the “recipient” or the “other.” 
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previous literature, the concepts share similarities on many levels.  The following section 
outlines the coherent fit between failure and conflict. 
Failure as a Precursor to Conflict 
 A primary similarity between a conflict episode and a failure event is the 
centrality of perception for each.  Conflict is predicated on an individual’s perception 
that another is frustrating his or her ability to achieve certain goals.  It is immaterial 
whether or not the other actually is frustrating the achievement.  If the individual 
understands the other to be doing so, a conflict may ensue.  Failure events operate in 
much the same way.  For example, Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat (1980-1981) differentiate 
between “perceived injurious events” and “unperceived injurious events.”  Those events 
not perceived as injurious do not develop into disputes, whereas those events perceived 
to be injurious do.  In much the same way, those acts not perceived to be deviant or 
irresponsible will not be seen as failures, but as something else.  The key is that the 
recipient of the action must determine whether an act rises (or sinks, as the case may be) 
to the definition of failing.  For both conflict episodes and failure events then, perception 
is a central characteristic. 
 A second similarity is based on perception.  Both conflicts and failures may be 
perceived as either intentional or unintentional.  Putnam and Poole’s (1987) definition of 
conflict did not imply that an act must be intentional in order to initiate a conflict.  
Rather, assessments of intentionality emerge only after the initiating event.  Thus, a 
conflict episode may be based on an accidental or intentional act of interference by the 
actor.  Similarly, a failure event may be either intentional or accidental.  A manager, for 
  
9
instance, must decide whether her assistant’s failure to place a necessary phone call was 
accidental (i.e., forgetful) or intentional (i.e., subordination).  Of course, attribution of 
intent can be constructed and reconstructed through interaction. 
 A third similarity between a conflict episode and a failure event is that each 
communicates an opposition to goals or norms.  The very definition of conflict used here 
asserts that conflict involves the perceived frustration of the achievement of goals, aims, 
and/or values.  That is, the parties perceive that another is blocking them from carrying 
out duties or desires.  Morrill and Thomas’ (1992) definition of a grievance also points 
to the centrality of perceived norms or rules in a conflict.  Conflicting parties tend to 
assign labels of right or wrong, moral or immoral to each other’s actions (Pearce & 
Littlejohn (1997).  A failure event carries similar value connotations.  A failure may 
signal a disregard for socially accepted norms (Goffman, 1971) or disrupt the assumed 
equality of the parties’ relationship (Taft, 2000; Bolstad, 2000).  That is, actors blamed 
for a failure are perceived as not sharing values of equality and moral integrity, not 
pursuing socially accepted norms, and not being interested in goals that could potentially 
help the other party.  Both a conflict episode and a failure event, then, have moral 
qualities assigned to them by the parties and signal an opposition (whether intentional or 
not) to goals or norms. 
 A fourth similarity lies in the interactive foundation of each.  Conflict is naturally 
communicative.  Each party socially constructs his or her view of the other’s actions and 
the frustrated goals, aims, or values.  Each party communicates a grievance to the other, 
either verbally or nonverbally (i.e., avoiding the other).  Each party’s action may be 
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perceived as communicating a disregard for the other’s desire to achieve a certain goal.  
Similarly, a failure event communicates a disregard for the recipient by the actor.  A 
failure event may very well signal that a relationship is no longer important or that the 
way the recipient had viewed the actor was a mistake (Schlenker, 1980; Goffman).  
Although what is communicated may differ depending on each recipient’s perception, 
the fact remains that a failure event communicates a message of intentional or accidental 
opposition.  This communication, then, points to the fit of a failure event into a conflict 
episode. 
 According to Morrill and Thomas (1992), the dispute process begins when one 
person brings a grievance to the attention of another.  Understood in this process is that 
some event occurred which one party perceived as a violation of social norms or rules.  
That violation is a failure event.  As argued above, despite the variance in wordings, a 
failure event essentially communicates a divergence of values, norms, or goals.  A 
failure event, then, is seen as a violation of the recipient’s perception of what is proper 
(i.e., obligatory, and not deviant).  Thus, a failure event is what initiates the conflict 
process by which one party (the recipient) brings a grievance to actor.  That actor may 
then respond by bringing a grievance against the recipient, thus creating a conflict which 
must be managed by both parties with various strategies.   
Summary 
 Although not previously merged, conflicts and failure events seem to have a 
coherent fit with each other.  Much as conflict is based on the perceptions of 
interdependent parties attempting to accomplish certain goals, a failure event is what 
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initiates the conflict by communicating a divergent set of norms, rules, and 
responsibilities.  Now that the connection between the two bodies of literature has been 
established, the remainder of this literature review is dedicated to exploring the role of 
communicated responses to a confrontation in a conflict episode as seen through the 
lenses of framing.   
Chapter II discusses framing and responses to failure events in depth.  The 
chapter demonstrates the connection between issue development framing and the 
account phase while hypothesizing relationships between the differences in issue 
definition and the use of certain accounts.  Chapter III lays out the methodology used to 
test the hypotheses by discussing participants, research material, pilot tests, and 
statistical tests.  Chapter IV presents the detailed results broken down by the independent 
variables of naming, intentionality, blaming, and gender.  Finally, Chapter V discusses 
those results and offers possible future directions of communicative research on account 
strategies during conflict. 
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CHAPTER II 
FRAMING CONFLICT WITH ACCOUNTS 
 The importance of communication in the evolution of conflict is hard to 
overestimate.  A key strategy which parties use in conflict is framing (Putnam & 
Holmer, 1992; Gray, 2003; DeWulf, 2005; Felstiner et al., 1980-81; Benford & Snow, 
2000; Drake & Donohue, 1996).  By casting the conflict in a specific light, parties 
attempt to manage the conflict in various ways.  The following review briefly examines 
the role of framing in conflict situations.  The review pays special attention to issue 
development framing as a way to understand how a failure event may grow into conflict.   
Conflict Framing 
 Scholars define framing in a variety of ways, depending on their approaches to 
conflict episodes.  Gray (2003) defines framing as a “process of constructing and 
representing our interpretations of the world around us” (p. 11).  Frames of reference 
enable parties in conflict to construct and reconstruct interpretations of the issues at hand 
and make sense of the situation (Putnam & Holmer, 128).  Framing is an active process 
which is purposefully undertaken by all parties involved (Benford & Snow, 2000), 
indicating that parties are aware of framing strategies and desired goals.  Because 
framing can be identified in a number of ways, the study of conflict framing has taken a 
number of directions. 
 Putnam and Holmer (1992) identify three approaches to frame analysis: cognitive 
heuristics, frame categories, and issue development.  Cognitive heuristics is primarily 
concerned with how a party perceives a given situation in terms of gains and losses 
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(Putnam & Holmer; Drake & Donohue, 1996).  Research using this framing lens is 
interested in how concessions and trade-offs within a negotiation are related to 
perceptions of risk.  Perception, in turn, is affected by the parties’ personal 
characteristics, normative beliefs, and habits (Putnam & Holmer, 1992).  Framing 
appears to be concentrated on the task at hand.  The frame categories approach (Gray, 
1997; Gray, 2003) is primarily concerned with analyzing dominant frames used by 
various parties to organize their views of the situation.  According to this cognitive 
approach, conflict escalates and de-escalates based on frame matching.  Researchers 
would then focus on the frame type used by the parties to ascertain the likelihood of 
conflict emergence or abatement.  A final approach, issue development, focuses on the 
evolution of parties’ perceptions of the conflict during social interaction (Putnam & 
Holmer, 1992; Drake & Donohue, 1996; Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, 1980-1981).  
Researchers using this approach are interested in how the parties define and redefine the 
conflict issues. 
 Although there are a variety of approaches to framing, each identifies a number 
of common themes.  First, framing is an active exercise.  Individuals have a certain level 
of awareness when constructing how they view a particular situation.  Individuals put 
forth varying amounts of effort to construct their particular worldviews.  Second, by 
treating framing as a process, framing is not seen as static.  Rather, it is shaped and 
reshaped by the other’s responses.  Third, an interpretive view of framing accounts for 
the existence of multiple meanings of a single situation.  Differences in interpretations 
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indicate an increased likelihood of the persistence of the conflict.  In all, framing is an 
active way of constructive meaning of a given situation.   
 Framing’s impact on conflict management is hard to underestimate.  In 
developing their communicative framing theory, which draws on speech act theory, 
negotiated order theory, and communication accommodation theory, Drake and 
Donohue (1996) conducted an analysis of framing effects in mediation.  They argue that 
framing can be an integrative or distributive process depending on whether or not parties 
converge toward or diverge away from each other’s definition of the conflict issues.  
Their study includes a frame categories approach (i.e., factual, relational, value, and 
interest frames) within the issue development framework.  They observed that 
individuals were most likely to use factual frames (appraisals of reality) and least likely 
to use value frames (moral foundations of right and wrong) to advance their definitions 
of the situation.  Parties were almost equally likely to employ interest (future desires and 
goals) and relational frames (emotional ties between the parties).  They argue that frame 
convergence is a significant predictor of positive conflict management.  This study 
employs two of these frame categories within the issue development approach to 
discover the relationships between category types and responses to confrontation.   
 For the purposes of this study, examining responses to conflict through an issue 
development lens is most beneficial.  Cognitive heuristics does not examine how 
definitions of issues may influence another’s definition of the issues.  Although frame 
type might be beneficial, its assumption of cognition does not suggest a focus on the 
influence of social interaction on issue definition.  Issue development, though, argues 
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that individuals construct their perceptions of a conflict on a number of levels, and then 
communicate those perceptions to the other party.  Although similar to frame category 
analysis, issue development examines not the convergence of frame type but the creation 
of mutual definitions of the conflict episode.  It may be possible, for instance, for parties 
to use the same frame category but be in conflict on how to define the exact issues being 
considered.  In addition to examining the way issues are defined, issue development 
examines how relational issues are cast and recast through the parties’ interaction.  This 
lens, therefore, analyzes how parties interact on substantive and relational issues and 
how those issues, in turn, shape conflict.  This study uses issue development to examine 
the differences in how people respond to messages framed and defined differently.  
Framing, as used here, refers not to the responses of the participants, but to the message 
to which the participants are responding. 
 
Table 1 Issue Development Definitions (Felstiner et al., 1980-81) 
 
Component 
 
Definition 
Naming Determination of an action to be injurious 
or non-injurious 
Blaming Determination of responsibility for the 
action 
Claiming Presentation of the event to the one 
perceived to be responsible 
Explaining Accounting by the actor for the event 
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 As shown in Table 1, individuals define issues through a three-step process of 
naming, blaming, and claiming in the development of disputes (Felstiner et al., 1980-81).  
The first step – naming – involves the recipient determining whether or not an action is 
injurious (a “perceived injurious event” versus an “unperceived injurious experience”).  
In addition to the naming of an action as an injury (or failure event, as shown above), the 
naming step also involves determining the definition of the action (Sheppard, Lewicki, 
& Minton, 1992; Lewicki, Saunders, Barry, & Minton, 2003).  Sheppard et al. suggest 
that defining the action is akin to “framing” it in different ways (such as relationally or 
factually).  Because individuals may name an event differently depending on their 
position as actor or recipient (Baumeister, Exline, & Sommer, 1997) or their relationship 
with the other, the naming process may account for why certain similar actions are 
viewed as injuries and violations by some and not by others.  Once the event has been 
named in injury or failure, the injury may evolve into a grievance after the recipient 
proceeds to the blaming stage (Sheppard et al.). 
 Blaming entails the determination of two issues: intentionality and agency 
(Weiner, 1985; Sheppard et al., 1992; Felstiner et al., 1980-81; Thomas & Pondy, 1977; 
Sillars, 1980a; Sillars 1980b).  As discussed previously, attribution theory argues that 
individuals attempt to perceive who was responsible for the action (i.e., who was the 
agent), and whether or not that person or object engaged in the action intentionally or 
accidentally.  The theory argues that individuals have a basic motivation to understand 
the underlying causes of any event, which moves them to attribute causality to 
individuals, groups, systems, etc.  Allred (2000) offers a fairly comprehensive discussion 
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of the implications of attribution on conflict episodes.  He identifies three attribution 
biases that may play a role in interpersonal conflict: the fundamental attribution error, 
accuser bias, and the actor-observer bias.  The fundamental attribution error 
(McLaughlin et al., 1983), similar to the accuser bias, involves the tendency to attribute 
a person’s behavior to bad intentions or personality rather than to circumstances.  
However, the actor-observer bias involves the tendency for the person accused to 
attribute his or her behavior to circumstances rather than internal reasons.  In other 
words, individuals are not very likely to agree on what or whom to blame depending on 
their roles in the situation (Baumeister et al., 1997; Sillars, 1980b).   
 Recipients are much more likely to blame others for a failure than to blame 
themselves (Goldman, Paddock, & Cropanzano, 2004; Sillars, 1980b).  They are 
typically hesitant to blame a system unless there is significant and compelling evidence 
to do so (Goldman et al.; Sheppard et al., 1992).  If they perceive that they are to blame, 
they are more likely to attribute the action to situations outside of their control (Heider, 
1958).  If the recipient experienced a similar event in the past, that experience may help 
to determine who is blamed and whether or not the action is perceived to be intentional 
or accidental (Worthington, 1997; McLaughlin et al., 1983).  In all, the blaming stage of 
a dispute, individuals assess the intentionality and agency on the part of the recipient. 
 After the failure event has been named injurious and has been blamed on 
someone or some object, the recipient usually brings a claim against the actor.  During 
this stage, the recipient presents his or her perceptions and definitions of the issues at 
hand.  Though Felstiner et al. did not account for the actor’s response (because their 
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model was more linear and focused on the recipient), this response makes up the critical 
“explanation” period.  Each party is able to respond to the other’s perceptions by 
offering an explanation for the actions and by framing the other’s actions strategically 
(Goldman et al.; Sheppard et al.).  During this stage, the salience of different frame types 
ebbs and flows depending on the goals of the speaker.  How the parties respond, in turn, 
works to re-construct how the event is named and whom each blames.    
Framing and the Evolution of Conflict 
 Issue development framing emerges as an attempt to explain how perceived 
injurious experiences develop from grievances to disputes.  Recall that the previous 
chapter on conflict and failure events uses Morrill and Thomas’ (1992) model of dispute 
development as a lens through which to view the relationship between a failure event 
and a conflict episode.  A failure represents the action which leads to a grievance 
between actor and recipient.  Conflict ensues when the parties exchange grievances.  The 
issue development framework is a useful lens through which to examine this process. 
 A failure event is an action perceived by the recipient to violate social norms and 
frustrate the recipient’s desire to achieve certain goals or aims.  Once the recipient 
perceives the action, that recipient immediately decides whether or not that action is a 
failure.  In other words, the recipient determines whether or not she or he was injured by 
the action.  The recipient also attempts to define the action using any number of frames 
or lenses at her or his disposal.  The event may be viewed in terms of its objective 
characteristics (a factual frame), its impact on the relationship between the actor and 
recipient (a relational frame), its impact on futures goals (an interest frame), and/or its 
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rightness or wrongness (a value frame).  For instance, when a superior learns that her 
assistant failed to make an important phone call, she may define the failure in any 
number of ways.  She may view the failure as a direct neglect of duties and may examine 
the various responsibilities the assistant had for the day (a factual frame).  She may 
understand the conflict in terms of her emotions of frustration or exasperation with her 
assistant (a relational frame).  She may examine the failure as possibly having allowed a 
lucrative deal to have fallen through the cracks, and thereby costing the manager a 
chance at a promotion (an interest frame).  She may also think of the event in terms of 
the wrongness of the act (a value frame).  Recipients are not restricted to using only one 
frame with which to define an event.  Rather, they often use a variety of frames, 
typically using one as a dominant lens (Drake & Donohue, 1996).  The naming stage, 
then, represents the time during which an action is named a failure by the recipient. 
 If the event is not named a failure, conflict does not develop because no 
frustration occurred.  However, if the recipient perceives the event to be a violation, the 
person progresses to the blaming stage.  Here, he or she attempts to discern who the 
actor was and whether or not the action was intentional or accidental.  In the case of the 
forgotten phone call, the manager must discern who forgot the phone call and whether or 
not the omission was intentional.  She can examine a number of factors.  For instance, if 
she forgot to tell her assistant, the manager might blame herself or – more likely – the 
busy-ness of the day’s activities.  She may also blame a systemic problem – such as the 
crash of the organization’s electronic mail system – for failing to get the message to her 
assistant.  Finally, she may blame the assistant for neglecting her responsibilities.  All 
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the while, the manager is determining level of culpability.  If the manager perceives 
herself to be the one to blame, she will most likely see her actions as accidental.  If she 
perceives the e-mail system is to blame, she may attribute it to “bad luck” (unintentional) 
or to the laziness of the organization’s technicians (intentional).  If attributed to the 
assistant, the manager may look back into their history of working together to discern 
whether or not the assistant had forgotten to make previous phone calls.  If not, the 
manager may see the failure as an unintentional mistake; if so, the manager may be more 
likely to see the failure as controllable (and thus, intentional).  The blaming activity is 
thus a crucial period in the development of a failure event into a conflict (Felstiner et al., 
1980-81).   
 Once the recipient has named and blamed a conflict individually, the person may 
finally present his or her perceptions to the other party.  Morrill and Thomas define this 
as the “grievance” or claiming of the conflict.  The manager, for example, would ask the 
assistant into her office to explain that she was disappointed in the person’s mistake.  
The recipient’s definition of the conflict is presented to the actor for the first time when 
this occurs.  After the grievance has been presented, the actor may respond and attempt 
to explain the situation.  Here is where conflict may ensue.  If the assistant has a 
grievance with the manager, that grievance would be presented, marking the emergence 
of conflict between the parties.  Thus, though the manager may have been upset with her 
assistant, conflict did not emerge until a grievance (or claim) was asserted.  The assistant 
may respond to that grievance with a number of rhetorical strategies designed to manage 
the superior’s impression of him or her (Coombs, 1995; Benoit & Brinson, 1994).   
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 The issue development framework provides a useful lens for examining how a 
failure event escalates into a conflict episode.  The conflict is socially constructed as the 
recipient engages in naming, blaming, and claiming.  Thus far, though, the process has 
been examined from only the recipient’s “field of vision” (Follett, 1942, as cited in 
Putnam & Holmer, 1992).  It is important to remember that the actor is also most likely 
actively framing the event in his or her mind as well.  Much as the recipient attempts to 
discern whether an action represents a failure and who (or what) is to blame for that 
failure, the actor also attempts to define the action and cast responsibility for it.  If 
conflict ensues, the actor asserts his or her definition of the issues.  The two parties then 
attempt either to persuade each other to change his or her definitions or to integrate the 
definitions, or to develop mutual explanations together.    
 As disputants explain a conflict, verbal strategies called “accounts” are given 
(Goffman, 1971).  Accounts represent an active attempt to counter perceptions of 
wrongdoing and alter blameworthiness.  Accounts are impression management tools 
used in crisis situations (e.g., Benoit & Brinson; Coombs) or failure events.  The 
following section examines the current literature on accounts as responses to failure 
events.  It is important to note that the current research has largely focused on the actor’s 
responses to a failure.  This study, though, is interested in how accounts are shaped by 
the recipient’s grievance brought against the actor.  This study uses the current account 
literature to hypothesize a number of relationships with account strategies based on 
naming and blaming. 
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Failure Accounts 
 Scott and Lyman (1968) define an account as “a statement by a social actor to 
explain unanticipated or untoward behavior – whether that behavior is his own or that of 
others, and whether the approximate cause for the statement arises from the actors 
himself or from someone else” (p. 46).  Though the wordings are different, the 
“unanticipated or untoward behavior” represents a failure event.  Untoward behavior, for 
instance, may signify a behavior which deviates from accepted norms or frustrates the 
recipient’s attempts to accomplish a specific goal.  Accounts are typically required when 
a person violates a social norm by committing a failure (Fraser, 1981; Goffman, 1971; 
Schonbach, 1990; Schonbach, 1980).  This failure brings what Schonbach terms an 
account episode, in which a failure is followed by a reproach phase and an account phase 
before moving to an evaluation phase.  During the evaluation phase, the recipient judges 
the integrity and satisfaction of the account.   
 Account episodes share many similarities with issue development framing, as 
seen in Figure 1.  Once an individual names an event as a problem and blames it on 
another person, the individual brings his or her claim to that other person in reproach.  
After the grievance has been submitted, the actor offers an account of the situation.  The 
claimant evaluates the effectiveness of that account.  If judged satisfactory (i.e., 
appropriate and competent), the account episode ends; otherwise, the parties continue to 
interact and potentially reframe their views of the situation by developing a collective 
account.   
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Failure 
 
Naming 
 
Blaming 
 
Claiming / Reproach 
 
Explaining / Accounting 
 
Evaluating 
Figure 1 Framing and Accounting Processes 
 
Account Types 
 Accounts are similar in that they are performative speech acts (Austin, 1962).  In 
other words, accounts communicate more than whether something is true or false; they 
are active strategies that constantly frame a party’s definition of the situation.  Although 
Goffman (1971) and Schlenker initially separate remedial strategies into accounts and 
apologies, other scholars (e.g., Schonbach, 1980; Coombs, 1995; Benoit & Brinson, 
1994) provide a more comprehensive taxonomy of accounts.  Schonbach based his 
account categorization system, shown in Table 2, on that proposed by Sykes and Matza 
(1957) and Scott and Lyman.  Accounts are similar in that they can be ordered on an 
aggravating-mitigating continuum (McLaughlin et al., 1983; Holtgraves, 1989; 
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Gonzales, Manning, & Haugen, 1992).  The most aggravating accounts represent the 
largest threat to the hearer’s face and are most likely if a party perceives “the entire self 
as bad and…exposed” (Exline & Baumeister, 2000, p. 142).  The most mitigating 
accounts represent the least threat to the hearer’s face.  Schonbach’s system separates 
four account types into these categories: refusals, justifications, excuses, and 
concessions. 
  
Table 2  Account Definitions (Gonzales et al., 1992) 
Account 
 
Definition 
Refusal Denial of responsibility or right to 
approach 
Justification Acceptance of responsibility and recasting 
of the action as not as bad as was thought 
Excuse Acknowledgment of the offense and 
confession of partial responsibility 
Concession Acknowledgment of the offense and 
confession of responsibility 
 
 
 Parties use refusals to deny responsibility for the transgression or its 
consequences.  Essentially, when an actor uses a refusal, he or she is arguing that there is 
nothing to be explained and/or that he or she is not to be blamed.  Refusals are 
considered to be the most aggravating account strategy (Gonzales, Pederson, Manning, 
& Wetter, 1990; Gonzales et al., 1992; McLaughlin et al., 1983).  In terms of issue 
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development, the individual providing the account disagrees with the other party on 
naming and blaming.  Although the reproacher (i.e., the recipient of the action) believes 
that a failure occurred, a refusal communicates the belief that no failure occurred.  
Second, a refusal indicates that the actor is not to blame for the event, thus 
communicating a divergence on the issue of blame.  Finally, as stated above, a refusal 
asserts that the claim is illegitimate and unfounded.  Thus, the use of refusals by the 
actor aggravates the other party through divergence on naming and blaming the conflict.  
When refusals are used, the conflict continues to spiral until one or both sides alter their 
definitions of the situation (Allred, 2000). 
 Justifications are a second type of aggravating account (Gonzales et al., 1992; 
Gonzales et al., 1990).  An actor uses a justification to accept responsibility for an action 
but to deny that the action was a failure.  For example, an individual might assert that the 
claimant is “making a mountain out of a molehill” or even that the claimant benefited 
from the event.  Justifications communicate divergence in naming the event.  The 
reproacher views the situation as a failure event, whereas the actor does not.  In light of 
this, it may be a mischaracterization to say that the two parties agree on blaming, 
because the actor does not believe that he or she should be blamed at all.  Rather, 
because the event is not a failure, the accounter does not mind taking responsibility for 
it.  Thus, both refusals and justifications are aggravating because they signal issue 
divergence on naming and blaming the situation. 
 Excuses are much less of a threat to the hearer’s face than the previous two 
accounts.  A person using an excuse acknowledges the failure event while at the same 
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time attempting to lessen the amount of blame.  Most people attribute at least partial 
blame to outside circumstances rather than to personal bad intention (McLaughlin et al., 
1983).  Someone may assert that he or she “did not mean to do it” or that he or she was 
not aware that the other person would be hurt.  Excuses communicate to the recipient 
that his or her definition of the situation is correct and that the attribution of blame is at 
least partially correct.  That is, excuses communicate more convergence than do refusals 
and justifications.  Parties agree that a failure event occurred, thus agreeing on naming 
the situation as a problem.  Parties also agree that the accounter is to blame, even though 
they partially diverge on the level of blame.  Finally, parties agree that the claim is 
legitimate. 
 The most mitigating account type, concessions are “moves that in various ways 
admit blame for inflicting harm upon another” (Holtgraves, 1989, p. 2).  Although the 
term “concession” and “apology” are frequently used interchangeably in the accounts 
literature, all concessions are not apologies.  Rather, as Schonbach’s typology illustrates, 
concessions can come in the form of offering restitution, asking for forgiveness, 
browbeating oneself, etc.  Concessions are typically seen as the most mitigating because 
they attend the most to the other’s face needs (Holtgraves; Oetzel, Ting-Toomey, 
Yokochi, Masumoto, & Takai, 2000).  Much like justifications and excuses can be 
differentiated based on how each defines the situation, excuses and concessions differ 
based on how each assigns blame.  Concessions communicate convergence of naming, 
blaming, and claiming.  As Tavuchis (1991) argues, “apologetic discourse presupposes 
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cognitive and evaluative congruence in the form of shared definitions of the violation, its 
severity, history, and implications” (pp. 57-58). 
 Concessions do not always occur in “pure” forms (Holtgraves).  Often (over 
50%) they are coupled with excuses to manage the faces of both the actor and recipient.  
The recipient typically accepts both strategies at similar rates (42.5% for apologies and 
41.1% for excuses) (Braaten et al., 1993).  Both accounts may be acceptable because 
they signal a convergence of issue definitions. Concessions may be accepted at a slightly 
greater rate because they communicate slightly more frame convergence on blaming.  
Use of a concession signals that the two parties may share aims, goals, or values, thus 
indicating congruence on the moral and relational aspects of the conflict (Alter, 1999; 
Taft, 2000; Pearce & Littlejohn, 1997).   
 All in all, individuals use accounts in conflict situations for a variety of reasons.  
This study is primarily concerned with the ways that accounts function as issue 
development and conflict framing.  This investigation is not necessarily concerned with 
effects of organizational status, offense severity, and other variables that effect accounts.  
Rather, it is primarily concerned with the effects of naming, blaming, and claiming on 
account type.  Specifically, this study focuses on how changes in naming and blaming 
definitions are related to the likelihood of using certain types of accounts.  Therefore, the 
remainder of this section examines each variable, including gender, and offers 
hypotheses on the relationship between issue definitions and use of accounts.  Naming, 
blaming, and gender are the independent variables; the use of mitigating accounts and 
the use of aggravating accounts are the dependent variables, as shown in Table 3.  
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Table 3  Independent and Dependent Variables 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
Naming 
   Factual Frame 
   Relational Frame 
Use of mitigating accounts 
   Concession 
   Excuse 
Intentionality 
   Intentional 
   Accidental 
Use of aggravating accounts 
   Justification 
   Refusal 
Locus of blame 
   Other (respondent as actor) 
   Self (vignette-writer as recipient) 
   Board 
 
Respondent gender 
   Male 
   Female 
 
 
 
Accounting for Naming  
 Research on naming’s effect on accounting behavior is sparse.  Only Drake and 
Donohue (1996) come close to this arena.  They note that, “frame congruence itself is 
more critical to integrative conflict resolution that the use of any one particular frame” 
(p. 314).  Their apparent purpose was to examine final frame congruence rather than 
account behavior.  Their research indicates that frame type is not positively correlated 
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with successful conflict management.  They point out that Donohue, Lyles, and Rogan 
(1989) observed a prevalence of relational (and value) frames in failed divorce 
mediations.  One explanation for this observation is that relational frames are more 
personal and emotional than factual frames.  Another explanation is that parties may be 
able to agree on more (objective) factual information than on their (subjective) views of 
relationship quality.  In the end, the use of a factual frame may give disputants a better 
chance to elicit a mitigating response than does the use of relational frames.  Because 
individuals generate their own views of what makes a relationship “good” or “bad,” they 
may be less likely to admit that they are wrong about a relationship.  As a result, a 
conflict viewed through a relational lens may elicit more aggravating than mitigating 
accounts. 
 H 1a: Individuals will be more likely to use mitigating accounts if the conflict is  
  framed factually rather than relationally by the recipient. 
 H 1b: Individuals will be more likely to use aggravating accounts if the conflict  
  is framed relationally rather than factually by the recipient. 
Accounting for Blaming 
 Just as a conflict’s definition might elicit different account types from an actor, a 
recipient’s assessment of the actor’s agency is likely to alter which accounts the actor 
uses.  As noted above, individuals attempt to ascertain both agency and intentionality 
when assigning blame.  This section examines the relationship between perceived 
agency and account type. 
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 Research in this area has been extensive.  McLaughlin et al. (1983) observed that 
actors who felt guilt about a predicament tended to use more concessions than when they 
felt wrongly accused.  In the case of the latter, actors were more likely to use silence 
(i.e., ignore the other’s claim) and refusals.  Schlenker and Darby (1982) observed that 
individuals who felt guilt about an offense tended to offer more concessions than any 
other account type.  However, the direct relationship between mitigation and agency 
may not be present.  For example, some researchers (Gonzales et al., 1992; Hodgins, 
Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996) observed that actors who perceived themselves to be 
highly responsible tended to show “an increased willingness to use aggravating 
techniques (Hodgins et al., p. 306).  Individuals who felt a low to moderate level of 
blame tended to use more mitigating accounts.  In all, the research tends to show that 
people will mitigate the situation when they perceive that they are at fault.  However, 
those findings are contradicted by other studies showing the opposite results. 
 In a conflict situation in which many failures occurred and both individuals may 
be at fault (Kottler, 1994), both parties have a legitimate opportunity to assign blame to 
each other.  It seems likely that justifications and refusals will be more prevalent in 
conflict situations in which the recipient blames the actor for two reasons.  First, use of a 
mitigating account is essentially an admission of guilt.  The actor may be unwilling to 
admit guilt if he or she believes that the other party is also guilty.  Second, the actor-
observer bias may influence parties to blame something or someone else if they perceive 
themselves to be guilty.  As a result, they may use fewer concessions and excuses in a 
conflict.  Sillars (1980a, 1980b), for example, observed that actors were more likely to 
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use avoidance and distributive strategies when the recipient blamed him or her.  
Distributive strategies generally are equated with use of aggravating types of accounts.  
Thus, it seems fairly evident that blaming the other party will predict a higher frequency 
of aggravating account use. 
 The account literature, though, does not address what accounts the actor will use 
if the recipient blames himself or a third party.  From the available research, it seems 
that actors would use more mitigating accounts if the recipient blames himself.  The shift 
of responsibility allows the actor freedom to reciprocate acceptance of blame.  Even 
though he did not examine account use, Sillars (1980a) observed an increased likelihood 
of integrative conflict management strategies when the recipient blamed him or her self.  
This observation supports the hypothesis that blaming oneself will be associated with a 
greater use of mitigating accounts.  Likewise, a similar accounting behavior seems likely 
to occur if the recipient blames a third party or a system.  The shift in agency from the 
recipient to a third party also indicates that the recipient does not blame the actor.  Thus, 
the actor is likely to use the excuse given to him or her by the recipient, while at the 
same time offering concessions for the behaviors at issue.   
 H 2a: Individuals will be most likely to use aggravating accounts when they are  
  blamed by the recipient, and least likely to do so when the recipient either 
  accepts blame or blames a third party. 
 H 2b:  Individuals will be least likely to use mitigating accounts when they are  
  blamed by the recipient, and most likely to do so when the recipient either 
  accepts blame or blames a third party. 
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Accounting for Intentionality 
 Of course, assessments of intentionality are intertwined with judgments of 
agency.  Although the judgments of intent do not alter whether or not a failure has taken 
place (Gonzales et al., 1992), they allow the recipient to discern how to respond to that 
failure.  It is too simplistic to argue that individuals will label unintentional actions as 
accidents and intentional ones as failures.  As discussed earlier, assessments of intent 
may be shaped by a variety of factors (i.e., relationship history, context, and power).  
The recipient may examine any number of factors when constructing his or her view of 
the event in question.  Whether or not the action was accidental or not is not the 
question; rather, how the recipient and actor perceive and define the situation is of 
fundamental importance in how each attempts to frame and reframe the conflict. 
 Sillars (1980a; 1980b) has examined the relationship between conflict style and 
attribution.  He argues that attribution is a key predictor in an actor’s evaluation of and 
emotional responses to the recipient (Sillars, 1980a).  When examining roommates’ 
assessments of interpersonal conflicts, he observed that integrative conflict strategies 
were more likely when the conflict was attributed to unstable conditions.  That is, when 
the roommate believed that the conflict was accidental, integrative conflict strategies 
were more likely.  However, a follow-up study failed to observe the same relationship.  
Thus, research on attribution of intent does not provide a clear direction on the 
likelihood of account use.  
 Gonzales and others (1990, 1992) have researched the effects of intent on 
account behavior.  Much of their work centers on the interpersonal pressure that 
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individuals feel when they are at the center of a predicament.  Essentially, unintentional 
predicaments exert only a small amount of social pressure on the actor and recipient.  
Gonzales et al.’s (1990) observations of accounts following accidents support this claim.  
They found that more refusals and fewer concessions followed situations cast as 
accidents, possibly because neither party felt a need to give or receive concessions.  
However, if the act was judged to be intentional by the recipient, the actor might 
perceive that his or her actions threatened the recipient.  As a result, the actor may be 
more willing to mitigate the situation.  In contrast, the actor might feel pressured by 
social norms to act correctly and thus may perceive a threat to his or her identity.  To 
protect him or her self from this pressure, the actor might offer fewer concessions and 
more justifications and refusals.  Gonzales et al. (1992), for example, observed “a 
relative paucity” of concessions following actions seen by the actor as intentional (p. 
967).  According to these results, then, aggravating accounts are most likely when the 
action is cast as intentional or accidental.  Yet, these results are opposite those found in 
other studies of accounts following failure events. 
 Thus, the previous literature offers little cogent direction on the effects of 
perceived intentionality on account use.  Additionally, the previous research examines 
only the actor’s perception of intentionality.  What happens if the recipient expresses her 
or his assessment of intentionality to the actor?  Politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 
1987) suggests that individuals would be more mitigating in conflicts viewed by the 
recipient as intentional.  Yet, the failure event already runs counter to social norms.  The 
actor, who may feel defensive already, may become increasingly defensive if the 
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recipient believes the action to be intentional.  Thus, because of the increased 
defensiveness, an actor might be more likely to use aggravating accounts to bolster his or 
her identity even if the recipient views the conflict as accidental.   
 H 3a:  Individuals will be more likely to use mitigating accounts when the  
  recipient labels the conflict as intentional rather than accidental.   
 H 3b: Individuals will be more likely to use aggravating accounts when the  
  recipient labels the conflict as accidental rather than intentional.   
 Of course, interaction effects may occur between assessments of intentionality 
and agency because of their coupling.  For example, it is possible to blame a person but 
add that the situation was accidental.  Current research on blaming clusters judgments of 
intent with judgments of agency.  However, this review illustrates that both attributions 
involve distinct processes.  Therefore, a number of tentative hypotheses can be drawn 
based on the following assumptions.  First, actions perceived to be intentional are more 
threatening to the actor than are actions perceived to be accidental.  Second, blaming the 
actor is more threatening than is blaming oneself or a third party.  Yet, blaming a third 
party for an intentional failure may open the door for an actor to also blame that third 
party as well. 
 H 4: Individuals will be more likely to use aggravating accounts if the  
recipient blames a third party for an intentional action rather than frame it 
as an accident. 
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 Because the lens used to view the conflict may not be very dependent on 
attribution of blame, no interactions are expected to occur between frame type, agency, 
and intentionality.    
Accounting for Gender 
 As Putnam and Poole (1987) indicate, the results of gender effects on conflict 
styles are mixed.  For example, they note that studies suggest that males have a higher 
likelihood of using forcing strategies while females rely on compromising (e.g., 
Jamieson & Thomas, 1974).  However, they also note several other studies which 
suggest no consistent relationship between gender and conflict management style.  In 
fact, Henzl and Turner (1987) observe that women are very assertive in managing their 
respective conflicts.  Even though previous literature suggests such assertiveness is a 
compensatory strategy for perceived power differences, Instone, Major, & Bunker 
(1983, in Putnam & Poole, 1987) indicate that such a rationale is not likely.  In all, 
gender’s effect on conflict styles is mixed.   
 The accounting literature, meanwhile, also shows some mixed findings on the 
relationship of gender and account type.  For example, Schlenker and Darby (1982) 
observe no main or interaction effects of sex on account type.  However, Gonzales et al. 
(1990, 1992) report a significant main effect and interaction effect of gender on account 
types.  They note that women are more likely to use mitigating accounts whereas men 
were more likely to use aggravating accounts.  They observe that cultural differences 
might pressure men to be more concerned with task success whereas women might be 
pressured to be more concerned with interpersonal concerns.  Although the previous 
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literature has been mixed, a tentative conclusion can be drawn.  No studies have shown 
that men were more likely than women to mitigate or cooperate.  That is, women are 
either as likely as or more likely than men to apologize or cooperate with the other 
person.  As a result, it is possible that women will be more likely to use mitigating 
accounts than will men. 
 H 5a: Females will be more likely than males to use mitigating accounts. 
 H 5b:  Males will be more likely than females to use aggravating accounts. 
 No interaction effects between gender and assessments of intentionality should 
be present.   The previous literature purports that conflicts cast as intentional are more 
likely to be mitigated.  If women really do tend to be “disarming and appeasing” 
(Gonzales et al., 1992), they may be more likely to use mitigating rather than 
aggravating accounts if the recipient sees the conflict as intentional.  If women are 
blamed for an intentional conflict, they should be more likely than men to mitigate the 
situation. 
 The actor’s gender, though, might interact with conflict naming.  If women are 
more focused on the relationship, they may be more likely to use a concession or excuse 
when the conflict is perceived relationally by the recipient.  Men, on the other hand, 
might be expected to conceded or excuse their actions if the conflict is perceived 
factually by the recipient.   
 H 6a: Females will be more likely than males to use mitigating accounts if the  
  recipient uses a relational frame. 
 H 6b: Females will be more likely than males to use aggravating accounts if  
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  the recipient uses a factual frame. 
H 6c: Males will be more likely than females to use mitigating accounts if the  
 recipient uses a factual frame. 
H 6d: Males will be more likely than females to use aggravating accounts if  
 the recipient uses a relational frame. 
Summary 
 This chapter has discussed conflict framing and its application to account use by 
actors.  Various relationships between the recipient’s definition and blaming of the 
conflict and the actor’s use of accounts are proposed.  Viewing account use in light of 
issue development framing indicates that the likelihood of using a specific account will 
change depending on how the recipient defines the conflict, whether or not the conflict is 
perceived to be intentionality or accidental, and how the recipient assess blame for the 
situation.   
 Chapter III outlines the methodology used to examine the relationships between 
issue development and account use.  The chapter identifies the dependent and 
independent variables, how each were operationalized, and what statistical methods were 
used to analyze the data.  The chapter also discusses the results of the pilot tests used to 
ensure that the study functioned properly. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
 To test the hypotheses, this study employed vignettes to achieve the desired 
manipulations of the independent categorical variables of naming, assessed 
intentionality, and locus of blame.  Each of the variables, along with gender, was tested 
using logit for the relationships to respondents’ use of mitigating accounts and 
aggravating accounts.  Each dependent variable was operationalized as a categorical, 
binary variable.  T-tests and ANOVA were also used to examine the relationship 
between issue development framing and the frequency of each account used.   
Organizations 
Because the focus of the current research centered on the management of 
organizational conflict, this study recruited staff members of organizations to complete 
the survey instruments.  Although the present study feasibly could have been conducted 
using any type of organization, nonprofit organizations were chosen for two primary 
reasons.  First, individuals who work for a nonprofit organization may be committed to 
its overall mission, particularly if they have expressed satisfaction with their contribution 
to that mission (Aryee, Luk, & Sone, 1998).  As Brown and Yoshioka stated (2003), 
“The nature of nonprofits places an expectation on employees to work for the cause, not 
the paycheck” (p.7).  Given the budgetary constraints and the lack of fringe benefits 
offered by these organizations (Emanuele & Higgins, 2000), nonprofit employees often 
remain at their respective organizations for causes other than financial reasons.  
Additionally, given the mixed levels of employees, the various resource constraints, and 
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the large workload each staff worker must carry, conflict over the priorities and 
functions of the organization and over individual workload seem inevitable.  In light of 
the above points, staff workers should be more likely to actively resolve conflict rather 
than to walk away from the situation and the organization.  As such, nonprofit 
employees provided a satisfactory participant base from which to conduct the study.     
 Nonprofit organizations were identified using lists of nonprofit assistance 
organizations, such as the United Way and other management-assistance organizations 
(such as the Nonprofit Management Center) throughout the United States.  The 
organizations were based in the southwestern, midwestern, and northeastern United 
States.  A total of 36 organizations took part.  These organizations are classified in Table 
4 according to their status within the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE).  
Appendix A lists the definitions of each category.   
 Of the 36 organizations involved in this study, most (10) were health care 
organizations.  The relative size of these organizations was also varied.  Thirteen 
organizations had staff sizes between one and five; 9 between six and ten; 9 between 
eleven and twenty; 2 between twenty-one and fifty; and 3 organizations larger than 50.  
In all, organizations involved in the study varied by both type and size. 
Participants 
 All staff personnel within the nonprofit organizations were invited to participate.  
Volunteers and board members were excluded from completing a survey because of 
their lack of direct connections to everyday operations and their ability to withdraw from 
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Table 4  Types of Participating Organizations 
NTEE Code Type of Organization # of Organizations 
A Arts 1 
B Children’s Education 2 
E Health Care 10 
F Mental Health 2 
G Diseases & Disorders 1 
I Crime Prevention 3 
K Agriculture, Food, & Nutrition 1 
L Housing 4 
O Youth Development 1 
P Human Service 7 
S Community Service / Nonprofit   
Management 
3 
T Philanthropy 1 
 
the organization with little consequence.  Board members have the option to refrain from 
engaging in interpersonal conflicts, if they desire.  However, staff personnel have both 
the mission commitment and the financial incentive (though small) to work through a 
conflict situation.       
A total of 226 individuals took part in the study.  Average age was 42.6 years 
old.  Females made up most of the respondents (n = 167, 73.9%), males comprised 23% 
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(n = 52), and 3.1% (n = 7) provided no answer.  Reports of organizational position 
included CEO’s (n = 25, 11.5%), other directors (n = 52, 23.9%), supervisors (n = 4, 
1.8%), and staff (n = 137, 62.8%).  CEO’s included the organizations’ executive 
directors; “other directors” incorporated those who were identified as being directors of 
specific departments within the organizations without being the heads of the 
organizations; “supervisors” included those who identified themselves as assistant 
directors or managers of some branch or division; and “staff” members were identified 
as those who did not indicate managerial or director positions.  Participants held their 
current position for an average of 2 years and had worked in the nonprofit arena for an 
average of 5.11 years.  The demographic data showed a wide variety of ages, genders, 
respondent positions, and nonprofit experiences. 
Design and Measurements 
 This study employed a 2 (respondent gender) x 2 (conflict naming) x 2 
(intentionality) x 3 (conflict blaming) design.  The manipulation in this study held a 
variety of factors constant, including relational closeness, power over each other and 
within the organization, liability, level of blame, and accuser gender.  Relational 
closeness and position power were held constant through the conflict scenario.  Both 
parties to the conflict possessed a working relationship with the other, had identical job 
positions with separate divisions within the organization, and shared blame within the 
conflict.  Liability was controlled to prevent conflict management by lawsuit, which 
brings a host of other factors to bear, by ensuring that the actions of each were not 
punishable in the legal system.  Finally, the accuser’s gender was controlled by creating 
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an equal number of the scenarios in which a female or a male acts as the accuser.  In all, 
then, twelve different scenarios were utilized.   
Based on the proposed integration of issue development framing and conflict 
accounting, three independent variables were manipulated within the study: 
intentionality, conflict blaming, and conflict naming.  Intentionality was operationalized 
as intentional or accidental.  If the conflict was named intentional, the action was 
expressed as occurring on purpose or with the disputant’s awareness.  If the conflict was 
named as accidental, the action was cast as occurring without purpose or intention.  
Conflict blaming was operationalized with three levels: blaming the other, blaming the 
self, and blaming a third party.  Blaming the other occurred when the research 
participant was blamed completely.  Blaming the self occurred when the accuser (i.e., 
not the participant) placed the blame on himself or herself.  Blaming the third party 
involved completely blaming the organization’s board for initiating the conflict.   
Frame type (conflict naming) was operationalized based on two of the four 
frames identified by Drake and Donohue (1996): factual and relational.  They defined 
factual frames as “appraisals of reality…that highlight current, objective, unbiased 
factors of a topic” (p. 303).  Factual frames, then, focus on conflict substance or what the 
conflict was about.  Specifically, individuals using factual frames discuss in the conflict 
in terms of measurable, objective factors of a conflict.  For example, in a work conflict, a 
party might note that he/she worked three weekends in a row or put in 10 hours of 
overtime in the past two weeks.  The number of weekends worked or overtime hours 
relate to factual or documental problems.  Relational frames, on the other hand, “center 
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around the emotional tie between disputants” (p. 304).  Because relational frames were 
focused on emotional characteristics of the relationship, they were operationalized as 
frames which communicated relationship quality and emotional connection.  In the 
above example, a party would use a relational frame by pointing to the stress he was 
feeling or the lack of support she felt from the other person.  Both of these statements 
depend on each party’s perception.  In all, one frame type focused on objective factors of 
the conflict whereas the other frame type focused on emotional and relational ties 
between the disputants.  A fourth independent variable consisted of the respondent’s 
gender.  Respondent’s gender was operationalized as male or female, as specific on the 
survey form.  Except for the respondent’s gender, each of these variables was 
manipulated in the research vignette to create a total of twelve different research groups 
to which a respondent could belong.     
Research and Procedures 
Respondents were randomly assigned to one of twenty-four categories.  These 
categories were later collapsed into twelve categories on the basis of naming, 
intentionality, and blaming because no significant differences emerged with regard to the 
accuser’s gender.  After completing a brief demographic questionnaire (see Appendix 
B), respondents were instructed that they were either Steve or Alice and that they were 
directors in a local food distribution nonprofit organization.  They were given identical 
background information for the conflict between Steve and Alice.  The instructions in 
the packet directed them to read a letter (the vignette) that was written by the other 
person to them.  Participants were then asked to compose a letter responding to their 
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particular scenario.  After writing the response letter, participants were then instructed to 
complete an 8-item questionnaire assessing the overall manipulation effects of the 
variables.  Once the participant had completed his/her packet, the person handed it to the 
researcher.  Participants were debriefed about the goals of the research project and the 
vignettes.     
Vignette 
 A vignette, which Alexander and Becker (1978) define as “a short description of 
a person or a social situation which contains precise references to what are thought to be 
the most important factors in the decision-making or judgment-making processes of the 
respondents” was used to manipulate the independent variables.  Such a design has a 
number of benefits (Alexander & Becker, 2001).  First, impression-management bias is 
less likely to be a factor with vignette-based research than if the study was conducted 
based on interviews.  Specifically, mitigating accounts have been perceived as an other-
conscious response, and thus more socially acceptable (Gonzales et al., 1990).  
Therefore, it is self-defeating to ask an individual whether or not he or she would 
apologize or grant forgiveness for an offense.  Second, subtle manipulation of data 
without respondents’ notice is much more easily accomplished through the use of 
vignettes (Alexander & Becker).  Such subtlety keeps bias in check and enables 
researchers to measure slight variations of the independent variables.  In all, vignettes 
provide a useful way for measuring the relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables.   
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Each of the scenarios had word counts of between 202 and 218.  Mean word 
length was 210.92, with seven scenarios containing more than 210 words and 5 
containing 210 or fewer.  Each vignette was 16 lines long.  Directions and background 
(shown in Appendix C) given to each participant were common across all scenarios.  
Word length for the vignette background was 432. 
The type of failure event in the vignette was based on Volkema and Bergmann’s 
(1989) research into types of organizational conflict.  Their research identified “doesn’t 
carry workload” as the most dominant form of instigation (17.1%), ahead of personality 
(15.9%), different work ethics (12.2%), and downgrading a coworker (9.8%).  As such, 
the scenario involved two co-workers in a nonprofit who perceive the other as not 
carrying his or her own workload.     
A complete list of the vignettes used in this study is found in Appendix D.  The 
following basic vignette was used to add different manipulations.     
 Dear Steve, 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  But, unfortunately, I’ve seen a change over time in the 
amount of work being done, the amount of money being brought in, and the amount of 
effort being expended. 
 
I feel that you are not putting in as much work as you had done in the past.  
Instead, you have been intentionally passing more of your responsibilities off to me.  
Here is what I am seeing.  I am doing twice as much person-to-person correspondence 
than I did last year.  I have planned the events that you planned last year.  I am also 
always being backlogged and I have been getting more tasks from you. 
 
These are what I am seeing.  Your actions have changed how we do our jobs.  I 
know that you are aware of these problems and are intentionally redefining your job at 
my expense. 
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I anticipate your reply. 
 
Each vignette was introduced with an identical greeting, first paragraph, and last 
sentence.  Factual framing (as illustrated in the above vignette) was generated through 
the discussion of the amount of work each party does, the amount of money earned, and 
the amount of effort expended.  Each of elements could be objectively measurable 
through hours worked, numbers of letters written, planning responsibility, and number of 
tasks completed.  Each of these fit with Drake and Donohue’s (1996) definition of 
factual frame type as that which relied on current, objective, and unbiased factors of a 
situation.   
Relational framing (underlined in the following example) was achieved by 
altering the second, third, and fourth paragraphs.   
I enjoyed being able to work with you.  But, unfortunately, I have sensed a change over 
time in our relationship.   
 
I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to compete with 
me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I don’t blame you 
for this. I realize I was accidentally creating the problem by not understanding why our 
relationship changed.  Here was what I was sensing.  I felt that your reactions to me 
were straining how we relate to each other.  I did not feel you were very interested in 
creating a positive work environment between us. 
 
This was what I felt.  I realize I was the one accidentally hurting our relationship with 
my actions.  So I accept responsibility and fault for unintentionally causing the strain 
and competition of our relationship. 
 
The second paragraph created the initial focus on relationship.  As opposed to the factual 
frame type which communicated perceptions of work accomplished and money earned, 
the relational frame expressed concern over interpersonal issues.  Additionally, the focus 
of the vignette was on “strain” and “a positive work environment” – factors which were 
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difficult to measure objectively.  In all, frame type was manipulated on the basis of 
Drake and Donohue’s (1996) description of factual and relational frames by altering 
whether objective, measurable issues or emotional, relationship-focused issues were 
described 
   Intentionality was directly stated and manipulated in each vignette.   For 
example, the following excerpt from one vignette demonstrates a scenario in which the 
conflict was intentionally initiated (as noted by underlining). 
I feel that you are not putting in as much work as you had done in the past.  Instead, you 
have been intentionally passing more of your responsibilities off to me.  Here is what I 
am seeing.  I am doing twice as much person-to-person correspondence than I did last 
year.  I have planned the events that you planned last year.  I am also always being 
backlogged and I have been getting more tasks from you.  
 
These are what I am seeing.  Your actions have changed how we do our jobs.  I know 
that you are aware of these problems and are intentionally redefining your job at my 
expense. 
 
Both underlined sentences explicitly indicated a perception of the conflict as 
intentionally developed.  Conversely, the excerpt below illustrated a conflict that was 
cast as accidental.   
I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to compete with 
me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I don’t blame you 
for this. I realize I was accidentally creating the problem by not understanding why our 
relationship changed.  Here was what I was sensing.  I felt that your reactions to me 
were straining how we relate to each other.  I did not feel you were very interested in 
creating a positive work environment between us. 
 
This was what I felt.  I realize I was the one accidentally hurting our relationship with 
my actions.  So I accept responsibility and fault for unintentionally causing the strain 
and competition of our relationship. 
 
Again, the vignette explicitly stated that the conflict was “accidentally [created]” and 
that the letter writer was to blame for “accidentally hurting our relationship” and 
“unintentionally causing the strain and competition of our relationship.”  Intentionality, 
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then, was manipulated by explicitly stating within the vignette whether the conflict was 
intentionally or accidentally enacted. 
 Similar to the previous factors mentioned, conflict blaming was manipulated by 
explicitly stating who was seen as the cause for the conflict.  The following vignette 
specifies the scenario in which the “other” party (i.e., the research participant) was 
blamed (as noted by underlining). 
I feel that you are not putting in as much work as you had done in the past.  
Instead, you have been intentionally passing more of your responsibilities off to me.  
Here is what I am seeing.  I am doing twice as much person-to-person correspondence 
than I did last year.  I have planned the events that you planned last year.  I am also 
always being backlogged and I have been getting more tasks from you. 
These are what I am seeing.  Your actions have changed how we do our jobs.  I 
know that you are aware of these problems and are intentionally redefining your job at 
my expense. 
 
The vignette directly cast the participant as the one who caused the current conflict.  In 
all but three sentences in the above vignette, the letter placed the responsibility for the 
troubles completely on the other.   
This type of blame was contrasted with how the writer of the vignette (i.e., the 
confronter) blamed himself/herself. 
I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to 
compete with me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I 
don’t blame you for this. I realize I was accidentally creating the problem by not 
understanding why our relationship changed.  Here was what I was sensing.  I felt that 
your reactions to me were straining how we relate to each other.  I did not feel you were 
very interested in creating a positive work environment between us. 
This was what I felt.  I realize I was the one accidentally hurting our relationship 
with my actions.  So I accept responsibility and fault for unintentionally causing the 
strain and competition of our relationship. 
 
In this scenario, the vignette writer explained his/her perceptions of what he/she saw 
occurring, and that he/she originally thought that the other person was to blame.  
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However, the writer ultimately accepted blame through confessions in the four 
underlined sentences above.  Although the vignette still contained elements of blaming 
the other party for straining the relationship, in the next condition, the vignette-writer 
explicitly blamed himself/herself for the situation.  Including the sections which 
potentially blamed onto the other party  maintained uniformity of the vignettes.   
Finally, blaming a third party was manipulated by directly blaming the board of 
the nonprofit organization, as the following excerpt illustrates. 
I originally felt you were shifting your responsibilities to me.  However, I want 
to let you know that I do not blame you for this.  Instead, I realize the board has created 
the stress by changing how we work.  Here was what I saw.  I am doing twice as much 
person-to-person correspondence than I did last year.  I have planned the events that you 
planned last year.  I am also always being backlogged, and I thought I was getting more 
tasks from you. 
These were the facts I was seeing.  However, I realize the board’s intentional 
changes – not yours – changed our responsibilities.  Our new system seems mostly to 
blame for these changes. 
 
Like the scenario in which the vignette-writer blamed himself, this scenario explicitly 
blamed the board and the system that they created for the conflict.     
 In all, conflict framing, intentionality, and blaming were manipulated primarily 
in the last two paragraphs of the vignettes.  In fact, many of the sentences were used to 
manipulate more than one of the factors.  Vignettes were pilot tested in order to ensure 
that the manipulations worked. 
Pilot Testing 
Six pilot tests were conducted to determine the success of the manipulations of 
each variable and to assess usage of each account type.  Each pilot test was intended to 
test the reliability and realism of the manipulations.  Six tests were conducted in order to 
ensure the scenario’s realism and coherency as well as to correct ineffective 
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manipulations of the independent variables.  Whereas tests one and two undertaken to 
ensure the realism of the study, tests three through six were conducted to resolve 
complications with the various manipulations.  The tests involved samples of either 
nonprofit employees or undergraduate students.   The tests used the scale in Appendix E 
to check the effectiveness of the desired manipulations.  The scale asked respondents for 
their perceptions of naming, intentionality, and blaming in the vignette.  Manipulations 
of the conflict naming, intentionality, and conflict blaming variables were assessed with 
an 8-item questionnaire (see Appendix E) completed by each respondent at the end of 
the survey.  Each item was rated on a 5-point, Likert-type scale from 1 = not at all to 5 = 
to a great extent.  Three items measured perceptions of blame, two measured perceptions 
of intentionality, two measured perceptions of frame type, and the final measured gender 
stereotype.  The final item was dropped because of a lack of significant relationship to 
any of the above independent variables.   
 The goal of the initial pilot test was to receive feedback from respondents 
regarding different aspects of the vignette and to examine responses to the initial 
scenario.  Twenty-two undergraduate participants were asked to write a response letter to 
a vignette and to answer open-ended questions about the case, clarity of directions, 
clarity of the background, and identification with the respondents.  The feedback from 
the first round of pilot testing revealed several areas that needed improvement: changing 
names to be more gender-specific (from Chris and Morgan to Steve and Alice); 
clarifying the situation (clarifying job roles and responsibilities); equalizing blame for 
the conflict; and clarifying directions.  Even though the analysis of account styles 
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indicated no significant relationship among the independent variables, the researcher 
observed a negative correlation between mitigating and aggravating accounts (r = -.477, 
p < .05).  This negative correlation suggested that the conceptualization of mitigating 
and aggravating accounts as opposites surfaced in the study.  That is, the respondent 
would probably not apologize while stating that he/she was not to blame.  Based on the 
results of this pilot study, a follow up pilot study with twenty-three undergraduate 
students was conducted to test variable manipulations.   
 An independent sample t-test was used to assess perceived differences in conflict 
naming and intentionality.  Results of the t-test for factual frame type indicated no 
significant differences between factual (M = 4.33, SD = .888) and relational framing (M 
= 3.75, SD = 1.055), t (22) = 1.465, p = .157.  However, a significant difference was 
observed in the relational frame condition, t (22) = -3.37, p<.01.  Respondents perceived 
the vignettes in this condition as focusing more on relational ties (M = 3.83, SD = .71) 
than on objective facts (M = 2.67, SD = .985).  The results indicated that the factually-
framed vignettes did not sufficiently differentiate objective and subjective issues for 
each condition.  Rather, the conflict was seen as both emotional and factual.  However, 
in the relational-frame condition, respondents discerned an absence of objective facts, as 
evident in the higher observed means for relational ties.   
 The results of the t-test for intentionality in both conditions were both non-
significant.  Respondents reported no significant differences between intentional (M = 3, 
SD = 1.41) and accidental (M = 2.33, SD = 1), t (13) = 1.075, p = .302) for the 
intentional naming.  Likewise, they reported no significant differences between 
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accidental (M = 3.22, SD = 1.2) and intentional (M = 2.33, SD = .8165) for the accidental 
naming.  The results indicated that the manipulations of intentionality were ineffective 
and that the vignettes did not differentiate explicitly enough between intentional and 
unintentional scenarios.   
 A 1x3 ANOVA was run to assess respondent’s perceptions of blame in each 
vignette.  The only significant difference was in the blame self condition (F (2, 12) = 
6.343, p <.05, r2 = .102).  However, a test of Fisher’s least significant difference (LSD) 
post hoc analysis revealed that the primary significant difference was between the blame 
other and blame self condition rather than between the blame self and the other two 
conditions.  Results for blaming the third party were F (2,12) = 1.711, p = .212, and 
results for blaming the other were F (2,12) = .293, p = .751.  As with the previous 
manipulations, the scenarios did not explicitly state who was being blamed.  In all, this 
second pilot study indicated a need to recast the independent variables within the 
vignette by making them more explicit. 
 A third pilot study was conducted with five staff members of a local nonprofit 
organization in a focus-group setting.  Respondents were given the full packet of 
materials and asked to complete them.  Respondents were then asked for their feedback 
regarding what parts of the scenario were clear and what needed improvement.  They 
indicated that the job titles were appropriate and that the conflict was familiar and 
realistic.  They also indicated that they were able to differentiate between their roles and 
the accusers’ roles because of the gendered names, which was a concern with the first 
pilot study.  However, they said they needed more background on the characters’ roles 
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and jobs within the organization and clearer directions on what to do as they proceeded 
through the packet of materials.  Because members of a nonprofit organization reported 
that the conflict scenario was realistic and familiar, the basic scenario was not changed.  
Rather, the main task after this pilot study was to expand on the relational history and 
role responsibilities of each character in the scenario, as well as to clarify the directions. 
 A fourth pilot study with twenty-five undergraduates was conducted to test the 
manipulations.  Each respondent was given the background situation, a vignette, and a 
manipulation check questionnaire, and asked to report their perceptions of the scenario.  
Independent t-tests were used to test for differences in the conflict naming and framing 
factors.  A 1x3 ANOVA was used to test for differences in blaming.  Similar to the 
second pilot study no significant differences were observed in the intentionality variable 
(Intentional: t (22) = 2.926, p = .399; Accidental: t (22) = .89, p = .583).  Also, similar to 
the previous pilot study, a significant difference (t (22) = 1.214, p<.01) was observed in 
which relational ties (M = 3.83, SD = .72) were perceived as more significant than were 
objective facts (M = 2.67, SD = .98).  No significant differences were observed under the 
factual frame condition (t (22) = .506, p = .157).  Results indicated that changes in 
manipulations made in each vignette were insufficient to achieve the desired effect. 
 However, for the blame factor, significant differences were observed in all three 
conditions.  For the blame self condition (F (2,21) = 4.681, p < .05, r2=.05), an LSD post 
hoc test revealed significant differences between blame self and blame other (1.375, 
p<.05), and between blame self and blame third party (1.25, p<.05).  For the blame third 
party (the board) condition (F (2,21) = 13.936, p < .01, r2 = .1), an LSD post hoc test 
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revealed significant differences between blame board and blame other (2.125, p<.01), 
and blame board and blame self (1.25, p<.05).  Finally, for the blame other condition (F 
(2, 21) = 4.109, p < .05, r2 = .02), an LSD post hoc test was also used to determine 
significant differences.  This test revealed significant differences between blame other 
and blame self (1.125, p<.05), and between blame other and blame board (1.125, p<.05).  
The results from this pilot study indicated that manipulations of the blame variable 
achieved the desired effect; however, manipulations of conflict naming and 
intentionality still needed attention. 
 A fifth pilot study was conducted to test the changes made to the manipulations 
of conflict naming and intentionality.  Fifty undergraduates read through the scenarios 
and responded to questions using the manipulation check scale.  An independent sample 
t-test was again used to determine if respondents perceived significant differences 
between levels of intentionality.  Unlike the previous pilot tests, significant differences 
were observed in both the intentional (t (49) = 3.181, p < .01) and accidental conditions 
(t (49) = -2.637, p < .05).  Under the intentional condition, respondents perceived that 
the conflict was framed as intentional (M = 2.92, SD = 1.06) rather than accidental (M = 
2.07, SD = .83).  The opposite was true in the accidental conditions, with respondents 
perceiving the conflict to be more accidental (M = 3.814, SD = .83) than intentional (M = 
3.083, SD = 1.14).     
 For naming, a pattern similar to previous pilot studies emerged.  A significant 
difference emerged (t (48) = -3.531, p < .01) in the relational frame but not in the factual 
frame condition (t (49) = .753, p = .455).  In the relational condition, respondents 
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reported a higher degree of focus on relationship (M = 3.89, SD = .74) than on objective 
factors (M = 3.09, SD = .87).  In the factual condition, respondents reported similar 
levels of attention paid to both objective (M = 4, SD = .62) and relationship factors (M = 
3.83, SD = .93).   
 Similar to the previous pilot study, manipulations for conflict blaming also 
achieved the desired results.  Under the blame self condition, a significant difference 
emerged (F (2, 48) = 20.06, p < .001, r2 = .12).  LSD post hoc tests revealed significant 
differences between blame self and blame other (2.39, p<.01) and between blame self 
and blame board (2.21, p<.01).  Under the blame board (third party) condition, a similar 
significant difference was also observed (F (2, 48) = 31.594, p < .01, r2 = .1).  LSD post 
hoc tests showed a significant difference in perceptions of levels of blame between the 
blame board and blame other condition (2.167, p<.001), and the blame board and blame 
self condition (2.637, p<.001).  Finally, a significant difference was observed in the 
blame other condition (F (2, 48) = 18.695, p < .001, r2 = .11).  LSD post hoc tests 
showed a significant difference in perceptions of levels of blame between the other and 
the self (1.78, p<.001), and between the other and the third party (1.91, p<.001).  In all, 
the manipulations for both blaming and intentionality seemed successful.  However, 
conflict naming was still a concern. 
A final pilot study was conducted to examine the manipulations of frame type.  
Nine undergraduates were given two scenarios in a focus group and asked to report their 
observations qualitatively.  They were questioned regarding the realism, ease of 
directions, frame type, conflict naming, and conflict blaming.  They responded that the 
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letter and scenario appeared realistic, and that the directions were adequate to complete 
the research materials.  They also reported that they were able to discern differences in 
their vignettes between who was blamed and whether it was cast as intentional or 
unintentional.  Frame type was again a concern, but not as great as in previous studies.  
For the most part, the respondents were able to discern based on the questions from the 
manipulation check items what constituted a factual frame and what constituted a 
relational frame.  Their responses indicated that the manipulations of relational frame 
were functioning, and that the factual framing was discernable.  Adding the sentence, 
“These are the facts” for the factual frame type appeared to signal that the vignette was 
more focused on factual than relational frames.  However, given the inherent 
emotionality of conflicts in general (Jones, 2001), some level of perceptions of relational 
and emotional framing should be expected in any scenario.   
The pilot studies indicated that systematic changes to the vignettes were adequate 
to achieve the desired manipulations.  Through six pilot studies, significant differences 
were observed in perceptions of conflict blaming and intentionality (see Table 5).  The 
first pilot tests resolved confusions regarding the individuals in the scenario as well as 
the conflict at hand.  The second pilot test indicated that the situation had sufficient 
realism.  Pilot tests three through six built upon each other to indicate that the desired 
manipulations of naming, intent, and blaming would be found when the study was 
conducted.  Although conflict naming was still somewhat tenuous, the decision was 
made to proceed with the study based on the responses from the last pilot test. 
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Table 5  Synthesis of Pilot Test Results 
Pilot Test Naming Intent Blaming 
 Factual Relational Intentional Accidental Other Self Board 
1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
2 NS t (22) =    
-3.37, p < 
.01 
NS NS NS F (2, 12) = 
6.343, p < 
.05, r2 = 
.102 
NS 
3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
4 NS t (22) =    
-1.214, p 
< .01 
NS NS F (2, 21) 
= 4.109, 
p < .05, 
r2 = .02 
F (2, 21) = 
4.681, p < 
.05, r2 = .05 
F (2, 
21) = 
13.936, 
p < .01, 
r2 = .1 
5 NS t (48) =    
-3.531, p 
< .01 
t (49) = 
3.181, p < 
.01 
t (49) =    
-2.637, p 
< .05 
F (2, 48) 
=18.695, 
p < .001, 
r2 = .11 
F (2, 48) = 
20.06, p < 
.001, r2 = 
.12 
F (2, 
48) = 
31.594, 
p < .01, 
r2 = .1 
6 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes:  Pilots 1 and 3 were designed to test realism and appropriateness of vignettes and 
measurements.  Pilot 6 was a qualitative examination, yielding no statistical data.  
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Data Collection 
 Organizations were recruited through the use of local nonprofit assistance 
organizations and through a local nonprofit organization’s listing of area nonprofits.  
Each organization received an email that described the study in general terms and gave 
contact information for responding, if they were interested in participating.  
Organizations self-selected based on their interest in the study.  Based on their physical 
proximity to the researcher, the studies were either conducted in person or by mail.    
When the research was conducted in person (that is, when a researcher was 
present to conduct the study), participants were first informed that the purpose of the 
research was to examine how people in organizations handle potentially difficult 
situations with their coworkers.  Respondents were reminded that their answers would be 
completely anonymous and that they should be open and honest in their responses.  After 
signing the release form, the research packets were distributed to the participants.  They 
were instructed to refrain from talking during the study, as this might affect the usability 
of their results.  Respondents were given as much time as they needed to complete their 
research materials. 
 When the research was conducted by mail, each organization was given the 
identical research script that was used by the researcher when the study was conducted 
in person.  Each contact person for the organization (usually the executive director) was 
told what she/he would receive from the researcher and what was needed to complete the 
surveys.  Each organization received the requested number of packets and consent 
forms, along with a pre-stamped and addressed return envelope.  The contact person was 
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instructed to read the research script aloud and to make an oral request to his/her staff to 
refrain from speaking while they and others were completing the research materials.  
Organizations which participated by mail requested varying numbers of packets, from 1 
to 55.  Rate of return per organization totaled to approximately 60%.  However, rate of 
return per packet mailed totaled much lower, to approximately 30%.  Executive directors 
were not informed as to the nature of the study when they were recruited.     
Response Letter – Coding open-ended data 
 Schonbach’s (1980, 1990) account taxonomy, based on that of Scott and Lyman 
(1968), was used to analyze participants’ responses to the vignettes.  His taxonomy 
separated accounts into four categories: concession, excuse, justification, and refusal.  
Gonzales and colleagues (1990, 1992) also utilized Schonbach’s taxonomy in their 
studies of account types following various transgressions.  The complete taxonomy is 
included in Appendix F.      
Because the mutual exclusivity of each account category was questionable (see 
Schonbach, 1990), a separate operational definition based on conflict naming and 
conflict blaming was created for each account type, as shown in Table 6.  Concessions 
were operationalized as statements which cast the failure event as a true failure (a 
responsibility omitted or an untoward act committed) and the accounter as completely to 
blame.  That is, those statements which stated or implied that the event was a failure and 
that the respondent was completely to blame were coded as concessions.  Concessions 
included requests for forgiveness, admission of guilt, and expressed hope for a better 
relationship.  Excuses were operationalized as accounts which cast the failure as a 
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negative event, but which accepted only partial blame.  Excuses included confession of 
partial responsibility, denial of intent to harm, and identification of external causes.   
Justifications were operationalized as accounts that accepted blame or 
responsibility for an event and named the event as good or not as bad as originally 
thought.  Justifications included arguments for good intentions (rather than no 
intentions), minimization of harm, and arguments that the actions in question were 
moderated or restrained.  Finally, refusals were operationalized as accounts which 
accepted no blame and/or stated that the event never occurred.  Refusals included 
denying that the event took place and denying any responsibility.  The following table 
illustrates the differences among the four account types.  
 
Table 6  Account Operationalization 
 
 Concessions 
 
Excuses Justifications Refusals 
Responsible? 
 
Completely Partially Yes No 
Problem? 
 
Definitely Yes No No 
Miscellaneous Expression of 
regret 
Points outside 
him/herself 
Often 
comparative to 
other actions or 
other people 
Can’t be 
reproached 
 
The present research followed the lead of McLaughlin, Cody, and O’Hair (1983) 
and Gonzales et al. (1990, 1992) in collapsing these four account types into two 
categories: mitigating (concessions and excuses) and aggravating (justifications and 
refusals).  Mitigating accounts acknowledged the victim’s interpretation of the events (in 
whole or in part) as well as the victim’s correctness in approaching the accounter.  
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Aggravating accounts questioned the victim’s interpretation as well as the right of the 
victim to reproach the supposed transgressor (Gonzales et al., 1990).  Thus, it appeared 
legitimate, in light of past research, to consolidate Schonbach’s four categories into two 
categories of mitigating and aggravating. 
These dependent variables – mitigating accounts and aggravating accounts – 
were operationalized as dichotomous (1 = use of account, 2 = non-use of account), 
categorical variables to code the use (or non-use) of each general account type.  The unit 
of analysis was the sentence.  If either a concession or an excuse was used at least once 
in the participant’s response letter, respondents were coded as having used a mitigating 
account.  If a justification or a refusal was used in the participant’s letter, they were 
coded as having used an aggravating account.  To ascertain the numbers of mitigating 
and aggravating accounts per each respondent’s letter, each sentence was coded into one 
of five categories: concession, excuse, justification, refusal, and noncodable.  Each 
category was also collapsed and summed to arrive at the total numbers of account types 
used.   
 Coders were three undergraduate students who had expressed their interest in this 
study after participating in a pilot study.  They were not informed as to the specific goals 
and hypotheses of the research.  Rather, they were given a general overview of the 
research and how the data were to be collected so that they had an idea of the items they 
were coding.  Coders were compensated for their time spent in training sessions, 
completing agreement exercises, and coding responses.  Two coders analyzed written 
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responses to the vignettes and one analyzed and input data from the manipulation checks 
and demographic questionnaire.    
 Coders were trained using responses from pilot studies and from the sample 
exemplars.  They were given code books delineating and describing Schonbach’s 
taxonomy.  The code books gave examples of each type of account, along with 
operational definitions.  They were also given a code book detailing how to distinguish 
between a codable and a noncodable account.  They were instructed that they were to 
examine each sentence as the unit of analysis.  If multiple account types could be 
discerned in a single sentence, they were instructed to use the last account type noted in 
the sentence.  For example, if a respondent said, “I’m sorry you think that way, but it’s 
really not my fault at all,” the sentence could be coded as both a concession and a 
refusal.  Obviously, each account differs greatly in its mitigating or aggravating quality.  
Because the intent of this statement could be legitimately interpreted as the accounter 
refusing to accept blame, the final account stands as the appropriate type for the code.   
Training involved discussing each account type, coding sample responses, and 
discussing why coders categorized statements as they did.  Their responses were 
compared with each other and with the researcher.  Initial coder agreement was 
measured using Cohen’s Kappa.  Although Kappa levels were above the acceptable 
percent of .7 between the respective coders and the researcher, the agreement level was 
below .5 between the coders.  Additional training was conducted on differences between 
excuses and justifications.  After this training, coders achieved an agreement level of k = 
.81.  Coders were then given their first responses from the study to code. 
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 Kappa levels were measured weekly (after every 40 responses).  These levels 
ranged from .7 to .85 during the three weeks of coding.  Coders were instructed to 
categorize only those responses of which they were certain.  If a coder was unsure of the 
intent of a statement or how to code a particular response, she was instructed to refrain 
from coding until she consulted the other coder and the researcher.  Thus, uncertainties 
were resolved by discussion and agreement among the coders and the researcher.   
Method of Analysis 
 Loglinear analysis with logit was used to measure the predictive value of the 
independent variables on the dependent variables of mitigating and aggravating 
accounts.  DeMaris (1992) argues, “Logit analysis provides an interpretable linear model 
for categorical response, and thus offers a number of advantages over previous 
techniques” (p. 1).  Logit is similar to loglinear analysis and standard regression in that it 
allows researchers to examine the predictive power (as measured through the 
concentration coefficient and entropy) of various independent variables.  However, the 
main difference between logit analysis and standard loglinear analysis is the ability to 
define one variable as a dependent variable using logit.  Logit reveals the odds of an 
event occurring or not occurring during a specific situation, as well as the odds of an 
event occurring in different situations (DeMaris, 1992).  As a result, the hypotheses, 
which are concerned with the effects of independent variables and their interactions on 
the likelihood of using mitigating or aggravating responses, were measured with logit 
analysis.   
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 Account frequencies (number of mitigating accounts used and number of 
aggravating accounts used) were measured using a different set of tests.  Independent 
sample t-tests were used to examine differences in account levels with respect to conflict 
naming, intentionality, and respondent gender.  A 1X3 factorial ANOVA was used to 
study the differences caused by blaming and by the interaction of the four independent 
variables.  Significance levels for all tests were set at p < .05.  To account for the 
increased risk of Type II error due to multiple tests of significance, the Bonferroni 
correction was used, lowering the alpha level to p < .01.   
Summary 
 This chapter presented information about participant selection, research design 
and measurement, pilot data, and method of analysis.  Respondents were asked to 
envision what they would do in a conflict scenario within a nonprofit organization.  Six 
pilot tests were conducted to ensure the satisfactory manipulation of the independent 
variables before the actual data collection began.  Coders were trained to categorize each 
sentence in the respondents’ letter into account types.  Logit analysis, independent 
sample t-tests, and a 1X3 factorial ANOVA were utilized to assess the relationship of the 
independent variables to the use of mitigating and aggravating accounts.  The findings of 
these analyses are presented in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
RESULTS 
 
Manipulation Check 
As discussed in the previous chapter, manipulations of the conflict naming, 
intentionality, and conflict blaming variables were assessed with an 8-item questionnaire 
(see Appendix E) completed by each respondent at the end of the survey.  Manipulation 
of conflict naming was measured using an independent-samples t-test.  Results 
confirmed that the manipulations of conflict naming were successful in both the factual 
frame condition and the relational frame condition.  In the factual frame condition, 
respondents perceived more factual framing (M = 3.05, SD = 1.027) than relational 
framing (M = 2.32, SD = 1.122), t (207) = 4.908, p < .01.  Similarly, for the relational 
frame condition, respondents perceived the vignette to be more focused on relational 
issues (M = 3.62, SD = .965) than on objective factors (M = 2.56, SD = 1.126), t (209) = 
-7.306, p < .01.  Although it may be argued that the desired results, particularly for the 
factual framing condition, were average, the more important point is that respondents 
perceived more of the intended frame than the other.  It must be noted that the 
manipulations of one dimension might affect perceptions of the other dimensions.  
Because these results suggest a difference in framing in these respective conditions, the 
figures indicated that the manipulations were successful.   
 Manipulations of intentionality also were measured using independent-sample t-
tests.  Similar to the manipulations of frame type, results indicated that the manipulations 
were successful.  In the intentional condition, respondents perceived that the vignette 
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cast the conflict as more intentional (M = 2.95, SD = 1.316) than accidental (M = 2.44, 
SD = 1.202), t (209) = 2.977, p < .01.  In the unintentional condition, respondents 
reported that the vignette named the conflict as more accidental (M = 3.26, SD = 1.045) 
than intentional (M = 2.54, SD = 1.178), t (209) = -4.674, p < .01.  Again, as discussed 
above, the lower values in the intentional condition included the condition in which the 
accuser blamed him or herself rather than the respondent.  This operational difference 
may have confounded assessment of attribution, leading to a lower score on this item.  
Yet, a significant difference between the two conditions indicated that these 
manipulations were successful. 
 Finally, the manipulation of conflict blaming was measured using a 1X3 
ANOVA.  Results for the blame other condition (in which the respondent was blamed) 
indicated a significant difference, F (2, 209) = 65.562, p < .01, r2 = .386.  An LSD post 
hoc test revealed significant differences between the blame other (M = 4.28, SD = .944) 
and blame self conditions (M = 2.61, SD = 1.064), as well as between the blame other 
and blame board conditions (M = 2.68, SD = .964).  The results indicate that respondents 
observed a significant difference in levels of blaming the accuser, the respondent, or the 
board.  Likewise, results for the blame self condition (in which the actor blamed 
himself/herself) indicated a significant difference, F (2, 209) = 119.646, p < .01, r2 = 
.534.  An LSD post hoc test indicated significant differences between the blame self (M 
= 3.45, SD = .934) and the blame other (M = 1.42, SD = .74) conditions, and between the 
blame self and the blame board conditions (M = 1.65, SD = .936).  Finally, results for the 
blame board condition also indicated significant differences in perceptions of assigned 
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blame, F (2, 207) = 209.693, p < .01, r2 = .67.  An LSD post hoc test showed significant 
differences between the blame board (M = 4.24, SD = .962) and blame other (M = 1.36, 
SD = .635) conditions, the blame board and blame self (M = 1.91, SD = .947) conditions, 
and between the blame other and blame self conditions.  The results from all three blame 
conditions indicate that manipulations of blame were successful. 
 In all, then, manipulations for conflict naming, intentionality, and conflict 
blaming seemed successful.  Even though the reported results were not as great as 
desired, the significant differences observed in each condition were appropriate and 
acceptable.  The next section presents participants’ responses to these manipulations. 
Independent Variables 
 Naming, intentionality, and blaming were analyzed for main and interaction 
effects in the use of both mitigating and aggravating statements. Interaction effects refer 
to the specific combination of some or all of the independent variables.  To determine 
which main and interaction effects were significant for each account type, both 
hierarchical loglinear analysis and partial chi-square values were employed.  As 
Fienberg (1980) recommends, the margins were constrained and the values for the 
dependent variables were fixed.  For the use of mitigating statements, a model 
containing one four-way dependency and two three-way dependencies were produced, 
{BNGM, BING, BIGM, INM}.  The final model had a likelihood ratio X2 = 
2.81919.202, p = .728, indicating a good fit to the data.  For the use of aggravating 
statements, a similar model was produced, with one four-way dependency and one three-
way dependency, {IGNA, IGNB, BIGA}.  The likelihood ratio for this model suggested 
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a good fit to the data, X2 = 2.165, p = .976.  Each of these models were also compared to 
partial chi-square values for each interaction effect to determine which ones to include in 
the logit analysis. 
Tables 7 and 8 show the partial chi square values for each dependency.  For both 
the use of mitigating and aggravating statements, no significant main dependencies were 
found.  However, for respondents’ use of mitigating statements, three significant 
dependencies were observed: a three-way dependency of blaming, naming, and gender 
(p < .05); a two-way dependency of naming and intentionality (p < .05); and a two-way 
dependency of blaming and gender (p < .01).  The likelihood chi-square value indicated 
a reasonably good fit between the model and the data, X2 = .732, with 16.8% of the 
variance explained by the dependencies, e = .168.  For respondents’ use of aggravating 
statements, three significant dependencies surfaced: a three-way dependency among 
blaming, intentionality, and gender (p < .05); a three-way dependency among naming, 
intentionality, and gender (p < .05); and a two-way dependency between naming and 
gender (p < .01).  The likelihood chi-square also indicated a good fit with the data, X2 
=.986, e = .127.  Thus, both the model selection as well as the partial-chi square analyses 
indicated a good fit for the use of mitigation and aggravation.   
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Table 7 Partial χ 2 Values for Use of Mitigating Accounts 
 
Effect DF χ 2 Prob. 
 
 
UseMit x Blame x Intent x Name 
 
2 
 
2.728 
 
.2556 
 
UseMit x Blame x Intent x Gender 
 
2 
 
2.15 
 
.3413 
 
UseMit x Blame x Name x Gender 
 
2 
 
6.006 
 
.0496* 
 
UseMit x Intent x Name x Gender 
 
1 
 
.000 
 
1.00 
 
UseMit x Blame x Intent 
 
2 
 
.568 
 
.7526 
 
UseMit x Blame x Name 
 
2 
 
.812 
 
.6663 
 
UseMit x Intent x Name 
 
1 
 
4.668 
 
.0307* 
 
UseMit x Blame x Gender 
 
2 
 
9.329 
 
.0094** 
 
UseMit x Intent x Gender 
 
1 
 
1.038 
 
.3083 
 
UseMit x Name x Gender 
 
1 
 
.179 
 
.672 
 
UseMit x Blame 
 
2 
 
1.906 
 
.3856 
 
UseMit x Intent 
 
1 
 
1.275 
 
.2589 
 
UseMit x Name 
 
1 
 
.897 
 
.3437 
 
UseMit x Gender 
 
1 
 
.286 
 
.593 
 
UseMit  
 
1 
 
24.731 
 
.000*** 
 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 8  Partial  χ 2 Values for Use of Aggravating Accounts 
 
Effect DF χ 2 Prob. 
 
 
UseAgg x Blame x Intent x Name 
 
2 
 
.481 
 
.7864 
 
UseAgg x Blame x Intent x Gender 
 
2 
 
7.824 
 
.0198* 
 
UseAgg x Blame x Name x Gender 
 
2 
 
.596 
 
.7422 
 
UseAgg x Intent x Name x Gender 
 
1 
 
4.926 
 
.0265* 
 
UseAgg x Blame x Intent 
 
2 
 
1.759 
 
.4151 
 
UseAgg x Blame x Name 
 
2 
 
.045 
 
.9779 
 
UseAgg x Intent x Name 
 
1 
 
3.262 
 
.0709 
 
UseAgg x Blame x Gender 
 
2 
 
.483 
 
.7855 
 
UseAgg x Intent x Gender 
 
1 
 
.063 
 
.8016 
 
UseAgg x Name x Gender 
 
1 
 
9.534 
 
.002** 
 
UseAgg x Blame 
 
2 
 
2.995 
 
.2237 
 
UseAgg x Intent 
 
1 
 
.053 
 
.8182 
 
UseAgg x Name 
 
1 
 
.776 
 
.3784 
 
UseAgg x Gender 
 
1 
 
1.982 
 
.1592 
 
UseAgg 
 
1 
 
1.287 
 
.2565 
 
*p < .05 
**p < .01 
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Thus, respondents’ use of mitigating accounts was related to the following 
dependencies: blaming, naming, and gender; blaming, intentionality, and gender; 
blaming and gender; and naming and intentionality.  Even though the blaming-gender 
dependency was not explicitly listed in the final model of the stepwise analysis, it is 
implicitly included as a lower-order effect in the blaming-naming-gender interaction.  
Respondents’ use of aggravating accounts was related to the following dependencies: 
naming, intentionality, and gender; blaming, intentionality, and gender; and naming and 
gender.  As with mitigation use, the naming-gender dependency was included in the 
higher-order interaction.  Meanwhile, the blaming-intentionality-gender dependency, 
which includes the lower-order blaming-intentionality dependency, was significant as 
revealed by the partial chi-squares analysis.  Moreover, account use varied by different 
sets of dependencies, though naming, intentionality, blaming, and gender had significant 
dependencies for each account type.  This finding indicated that each combination of 
variables played a significant role in how people responded to confrontation, as 
suggested by issue development framing.    
The next step in the analysis involved ascertaining the parameter values of each 
main effect and dependency.  Though main effects were not found to be significant in 
the above analysis, they were used to determine the total logit values for interaction 
effects.  For example, when determining the total logit value for naming-intentionality in 
the use of aggravating statements, parameter values for aggravation, naming, 
intentionality, and the naming-intentionality interaction were totaled.  Because logit 
analysis displayed the likelihood of an event happening or not, the parameter values 
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were used to determine the odds of a participant employing the use of mitigating or 
aggravating accounts.  Tables 9 and 10 indicate the estimated parameters for each 
account.  Positive values revealed an increased likelihood to use a mitigating or an 
aggravating account, whereas negative values indicated a decreased likelihood to do so.  
The larger coefficients demonstrated a salient effect on whether or not a particular 
account type would be used.  Note, for instance, that the estimated parameter for use of 
mitigating accounts is .324, whereas the estimated parameter for use of aggravating 
accounts is -.152.  These values indicate that respondents were much more likely to use 
an apology or excuse rather than a justification or refusal, as seen in Table 11.  These 
values also suggested that respondents were much more likely to use a mitigating 
account than not to use one.  That is, respondents were more likely to use a concession 
or an excuse than to refrain from using one.  In other words, respondents were more 
reluctant to use an account which might aggravate the situation but were more likely to 
use an account which might mitigate the situation.   
To understand the likelihood of using a mitigating or an aggravating response for 
significant effects, the researcher summed relevant parameters to obtain the estimated 
natural log of using one or both of the account types.  The inverse of this natural log was 
respondent using a mitigating or aggravating account versus refraining from doing so.  
Values under 1 signified that the odds of a respondent using a certain account in that  
situation were less than 1:1.  That is, respondents were less likely to use a particular  
account in that situation than to not use one.  Conversely, values over 1 indicated that a  
respondent was more likely than not to use a particular account in that situation.   For  
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Table 9  Parameter Estimates for Use of Mitigating Accounts 
 
Parameter Λ Z SE 
 
 
UseMit 
 
.324 
 
2.96 
 
.109 
 
Blame  
 
-.007 
 
-.045 
 
.156 
 
 
 
.247 
 
1.61 
 
.153 
 
Name 
 
.061 
 
.559 
 
.109 
 
Intent 
 
.13 
 
1.19 
 
.109 
 
Gender 
 
-.127 
 
-1.16 
 
.109 
 
Blame x Name 
 
.025 
 
.158 
 
.156 
 
 
 
.038 
 
.251 
 
.153 
 
Blame x Intent 
 
-.034 
 
-.219 
 
.156 
 
 
 
-.012 
 
-.09 
 
.153 
 
Blame x Gender 
 
-.263 
 
-1.68 
 
.156 
 
 
 
.431 
 
2.81 
 
.153 
 
Name x Intent 
 
.118 
 
1.08 
 
.109 
 
Name x Gender 
 
-.037 
 
-.334 
 
.109 
 
Intent x Gender 
 
.057 
 
.531 
 
.109 
 
Blame x Name x Intent 
 
.208 
 
1.33 
 
.156 
 
 
 
-.165 
 
-1.08 
 
1.53 
 
Blame x Name x Gender 
 
-.25 
 
-1.6 
 
.156 
 
 
 
.212 
 
1.38 
 
.153 
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Table 9 Continued 
 
   
Parameter Λ Z SE 
 
 
Blame x Intent x Gender 
 
-.079 
 
-.505 
 
.156 
 
 
 
.1 
 
.654 
 
.153 
 
Name x Intent x Gender 
 
-.159 
 
-1.46 
 
.109 
 
Blame x Name x Intent x Gender 
 
.034 
 
.22 
 
.156 
  
-.118 
 
-.77 
 
.153 
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Table 10  Parameter Estimates for Use of Aggravating Accounts 
 
Parameter 
 
Λ Z SE 
 
UseAgg 
 
-.152 
 
-1.44 
 
.106 
 
Blame  
 
.121 
 
.781 
 
.155 
 
 
 
-.139 
 
-.998 
 
.139 
 
Name 
 
.031 
 
.291 
 
.106 
 
Intent 
 
.01 
 
.093 
 
.106 
 
Gender 
 
-.131 
 
-1.24 
 
.106 
 
Blame x Name 
 
.053 
 
.342 
 
.155 
 
 
 
.092 
 
.66 
 
.139 
 
Blame x Intent 
 
.078 
 
.507 
 
.155 
 
 
 
-.12 
 
-.859 
 
.139 
 
Blame x Gender 
 
-.039 
 
-.25 
 
.155 
 
 
 
.081 
 
.578 
 
.139 
 
Name x Intent 
 
.135 
 
1.27 
 
.106 
 
Name x Gender 
 
.204 
 
1.92 
 
.106 
 
Intent x Gender 
 
.01 
 
.096 
 
.106 
 
Blame x Name x Intent 
 
.163 
 
1.05 
 
.155 
 
 
 
.05 
 
.356 
 
.139 
 
Blame x Name x Gender 
 
.042 
 
.269 
 
.155 
  
.143 
 
1.03 
 
.139 
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Table 10  Continued 
 
   
Parameter 
 
Λ Z SE 
Blame x Intent x Gender .103 .664 .155 
 
 
 
.054 
 
.387 
 
.139 
 
Name x Intent x Gender 
 
 
.035 
 
.334 
 
.155 
 
Blame x Name x Intent x Gender 
 
.143 
 
.934 
 
.139 
  
.122 
 
.876 
 
.139  
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Table 11 Comparison of Use of Mitigating and Aggravating Accounts 
 Factual Relational 
 Other Self Board Other Self Board 
 Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Mitigat
-ing 
1 1
3 
0 12 4 7 5 6 1 9 1 6 1 6 2 9 5 7 2 8 - 9 1 5 
Aggra-
vating 
2 7 0 7 3 2 2 4 0 7 2 3 0 7 1 8 0 5 1 6 - 8 1 4 
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example, in Table 12, under the dependency of blame, name, and gender, the odds ratio 
of a male using an apology or a concession in a factual frame when he was blamed was 
.52.  In contrast, the odd ratio of a female in the same situation was 2.64.  Males, then, 
were half as likely to offer an apology or an excuse in this situation than they were to not  
 
Table 12  Log Odds for Use of Mitigating Accounts 
 
Dependency 
 
 λ Odds P < 
 
Blame x Name 
x Gender 
    
.05 
 Other x Factual x Male -.654 .52  
 Other x Factual x Female .971 2.64  
 Other x Relational x Male -.223 .8  
 Other x Relational x Female .207 1.23  
 Self x Factual x Male .451 1.57  
 Self x Factual x Female 2.53 12.58  
 Self x Relational x Male .756 2.13  
 Self x Relational x Female 2.46 11.7  
 Board x Factual x Male -.528 .59  
 Board x Factual x Female .329 1.39  
 Board x Relational x Male -.416 .66  
 Board x Relational x 
Female 
-.261 .77  
Blame x 
Gender 
   .05 
 Other x Male -.149 .862  
 Other x Female -.548 1.73  
 Self x Male .548 1.73  
 Self x Female 2.26 9.54  
 Board x Male -.431 .65  
 Board x Female .086 1.09  
Intent x Name    .01 
 Intentional x Factual .26 3.54  
 Intentional x Relational .548 1.73  
 Accidental x Factual .27 1.31  
 Accidental x Relational .501 1.65  
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Table 13  Log Odds for Use of Aggravating Accounts 
 
Dependency 
 
 
 
λ Odds P < 
Intent x Name 
x Gender 
   .05 
 Intentional x Factual x Male .278 1.32  
 Intentional x Factual x Female -.186 .83  
 Intentional x Relational x Male -1.35 .26  
 Intentional x Relational x 
Female 
-.041 .96  
 Accidental x Factual x Male -.478 .62  
 Accidental x Factual x Female -.734 .48  
 Accidental x Relational x Male -.868 .42  
 Accidental x Relational x 
Female 
.642 1..9  
Blame x 
Intent x 
Gender 
   .05 
 Other x Intentional x Male -.105 .9  
 Other x Intentional x Female .049 1.05  
 Other x Accidental x Male -.777 .46  
 Other x Accidental x Female -.01 .99  
 Self x Intentional x Male -1.02 .36  
 Self x Intentional x Female -.386 .68  
 Self x Accidental x Male -1.42 .242  
 Self x Accidental x Female .01 1.01  
 Board x Intentional x Male -.713 .49  
 Board x Intentional x Female -.223 .8  
 Board x Accidental x Male -.777 .46  
 Board x Accidental x Female -.223 .8  
Name x 
Gender 
   .01 
 Factual x Male -.094 .91  
 Factual x Female -.386 .68  
 Relational x Male -1.05 .35  
 Relational x Female -.094 .91  
 
use this account.  Females, though, were well over twice as likely to apologize or offer  
an excuse for their actions in the same situation.  Men were twice as likely to abstain  
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from mitigating the conflict, whereas women were more than twice as likely to mitigate 
the conflict.  (Table 13 indicates the odds ratios for the use of aggravating accounts.) 
The following sections explore in depth the relationships between each of the 
independent variables on respondents’ use of mitigating and aggravating accounts.  Odds 
ratios are discussed for each independent variable, drawing comparisons within and 
between categories.  The chapter concludes with a review of factors influencing the use 
of mitigating and aggravating accounts. 
Naming 
Name x Gender 
 As noted in Tables 7 and 8, naming the conflict as a factual or relational concern 
was linked to the respondents’ use of both mitigating and aggravating accounts.  
However, to understand the relationship of naming to account use, this section examines 
this interaction for the most significant effect: naming x gender.  Table 14 indicates the  
 
Table 14  Use of Mitigating & Aggravating Accounts – Name x Gender 
 Use of Mitigating Use of Aggravating 
N1G1 1.25 .91 
N1G2 1.73 .68 
N2G1 1.19 .35 
N2G2 1.42 .91 
N1 = Factual Frame 
N2 = Relational Frame 
G1 = Male 
G2 = Female 
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log odds of men’s and women’s responses to factual and relational frames.  (Tables 15 
and 16 show the frequencies of respondents’ use of mitigating and aggravating 
accounts.)  Although the significant interaction effect was only for use of aggravating 
statements, respondents’ use of mitigating statements also sheds light on overall effects 
of naming and gender on account use.  This description provides a picture of mitigating 
or aggravating effects of the interaction. 
 A 2x2 factorial ANOVA revealed a significant difference in the numbers of 
aggravating statements used by men and women in light of different frame types, F (1, 
171) = 8.789, p < .05.  Figure 2 illustrates the interaction effect between gender and 
frame type.  Men used far more aggravating accounts when confronted with a factual 
frame (M = 1.222) than they did when confronted with a relational frame (M = .222).  
Women, though, did the opposite, using far more aggravating accounts when confronted 
with a relational framing of the event (M =.1.273) than a factual framing (M = .753).  In 
all, for the two-way interaction of naming and gender on the use of aggravating 
statements, a significant difference existed in the way men and women reacted to 
different frame types. 
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Table 15  Frequency of Use and Non-use of Mitigating Accounts 
 Factual Relational 
 Other Self Board Other Self Board 
 Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Use 1 1
3 
0 12 4 7 5 6 1 9 1 6 1 6 2 9 5 7 2 8 - 9 1 5 
Non-
Use 
1 0 1 4 0 3 0 6 1 2 3 5 1 6 1 2 0 6 2 2 - 4 3 2 
Table 16  Frequency of Use and Non-use of Aggravating Accounts 
 Factual Relational 
 Other Self Board Other Self Board 
 Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
Intent Acci-
dent 
 M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F M F 
Use 2 7 0 7 3 2 2 4 0 7 2 3 0 7 1 8 0 5 1 6 - 8 1 4 
Non-
Use 
0 6 1 9 1 8 3 8 2 4 2 8 2 5 2 3 5 8 3 4 - 5 3 3 
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Figure 2 Frequency of Aggravating Accounts -- 
Name x Gender
1.222
0.222
0.753
1.273
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
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Factual Relational
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# 
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. A
cc
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.
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Females
 
 The logit data for the above interaction also showed a clear interaction effect 
between gender and naming on the use of aggravating statements.  Although the largest 
odds for aggravating statements was o = .91 for men and women, a comparisons of 
frame type for both men and women revealed that men were more likely to justify their 
actions or refuse blame when confronted with a factual framing (ofactual, male = .91) rather 
than a relational framing (orelational, male = .35).  In fact, men were more than 2.5 times as 
likely to use an aggravating account when confronted with a factual rather than a 
relationship frame.  Women, on the other hand, were more likely to use an aggravating 
statement when faced with a relational framing (orelational, female = .91) instead of a factual 
framing (ofactual, female = .68).  Even though the difference between relationship and factual 
framing is small (Ô = 1.34), the data suggested that different frame types influenced 
aggravating responses from men and women.   
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 This difference in reaction was also visible when considering the respondents’ 
use of mitigating in the same situation.  Although men were only slightly more likely (Ô 
= 1.05) to offer an apology or excuse when the conflict was framed factually (ofactual,  
male = 1.25) than relationally (ofactual, male = 1.19), the difference was essentially equal.  
Women, however, were slightly more likely (Ô = 1.22) to have used a mitigating 
statement when faced with a factual frame (ofactual, female = 1.73) rather than a relational 
frame (ofactual, female = 1.42).  In all, then, although males’ use of mitigating statements did 
not change much between factual and relational frames, their use of aggravating 
statements more than doubled when confronted with a factual than with a relational 
frame.  Women, though, were slightly more likely to use a mitigating statement when 
confronted with a factual frame, and were more likely to use an aggravating response 
when confronted with a relational frame.  Although this interaction was fairly consistent, 
it would be beneficial to examine it in relation to blaming and intentionality. 
 Blame x Name x Gender 
 Partial chi square analysis revealed a significant interaction among conflict 
blaming, naming, and gender on respondent’s use of mitigating accounts.  Similar to the 
previous analysis, the researcher examined respondents’ use of both mitigating and 
aggravating accounts to unpack the effects of frame type on account use.  The above 
discussion indicated that men used more aggravating accounts in factual conflicts, and 
were equally mitigating in relational situations.  The relationship held even when 
considering who was blamed for the conflict.  Table 17 indicates the odds ratios for both 
men and women in this four-way interaction.  For men, the likelihood of using 
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mitigating statements was increased to varying degrees when they were confronted with 
relational rather than factual frames.  For instance, even when male respondents were 
blamed, they were still 1.54 times as likely to use a mitigating account when the conflict 
was framed factually (oother, factual, male = .52) rather than relationally (oother, relational, male = 
.8).  That difference decreased to 1.36 when the actor blamed himself or herself.   Yet 
the data suggested that men were more likely to be mitigating when the conflict was 
framed relationally rather than factually.  When a third party was blamed, men were 
again more likely to be mitigating when faced with a relational frame (oboard, relational, male = 
.66), though the difference was only 1.12 (oboard, factual, male = .59).  In all, then, men were 
slightly more likely to use mitigating statements when confronted with relational than 
factual frames. 
The two-way interaction between naming and gender discussed previously 
suggested that female respondents were more likely to use a mitigating statement when 
faced with a factual frame, and more likely to use an aggravating statement when faced 
with a relational frame.  When blame was taken into account, the interactions held 
steady.  In women’s use of mitigation, female respondents were more likely to apologize 
or offer an excuse when the conflict was framed factually, no matter who was blamed.  
Table 17, for example, illustrates that women were twice as likely to offer a mitigating 
statement when they were blamed and the conflict was framed factually rather than 
relationally.  Similarly, they were 1.81 times as likely to do so when a third party was 
blamed and a factual frame was used.  Although the difference is very small, when the 
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Table 17  Use of Mitigating and Aggravating Accounts — Blame x Name x Gender 
 Use of Mitigating Use of Aggravating 
B1N1G1 .52 1.14 
B1N1G2 2.64 .78 
B1N2G1 .8 .46 
B1N2G2 1.23 .91 
B2N1G1 1.57 .57 
B2N1G2 12.58 .56 
B2N2G1 2.13 .45 
B2N2G2 11.7 1.39 
B3N1G1 .59 .67 
B3N1G2 1.39 .58 
B3N2G1 .66 .42 
B3N2G2 .77 .82 
B1 =  Blames Respondent 
B2 =  Blames Self 
B3 =  Blames Board 
N1 = Factual 
N2 = Relational 
G1 = Male 
G2 = Female 
 
 
actor accepted blame and used a factual frame, women were 1.08 times as likely to use 
mitigators rather than aggravators.  Though, as suggested earlier, this finding may be a 
function of the object of blame rather than the framing.  Women, then, were more 
mitigating when perceiving a factual frame rather than a relational frame, no matter who 
was blamed. 
 For factual frames, men were more likely to use aggravating responses, no matter 
who was blamed.  For instance, men were 2.48 times as likely to use an aggravating 
statement when they were blamed and they were confronted with a factual frame (oother, 
factual, male = 1.14).  In fact, the likelihood of male respondents using an aggravating 
statement with a relational framing when they were blamed was only .46.  That is, men 
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were more than twice as likely to refrain from using an aggravator to have used an one.  
When the actor blamed himself or herself, male respondents were 1.27 times as likely to 
use an aggravating statement when hearing a factual frame (oself, factual, male = .57, oself, 
relational, male = .45).  Although the overall likelihood of men using aggravating accounts 
was only .57, this finding may result from who was blamed, rather than frame type.  This 
difference will be discussed in the section on conflict blaming.  When a third party was 
blamed, male respondents were 1.6 times as likely to use an aggravating response when 
confronted with a factual (oboard, factual, male = .67) rather than relational (oboard, relational, male = 
.42) frame.  Similar to the above discussion of men’s perception of framing, men were 
more likely to use aggravating responses in factual situations regardless of who was 
blamed.  
 Women use more aggravating accounts in relational conflicts regardless of who 
was to blame.  For instance, when the actor accepted blame and used a relationship 
frame for discussing the conflict, female respondents were almost 2.5 times as likely to 
use an aggravating response than if the event was discussed in factual terms(oself, factual, 
female = 1.39, oself, relational, female = .56).  Women were more likely to use aggravating 
accounts than not when the actor accepted blame with a relationship frame.  However, 
the likelihood of female respondents using aggravating responses when the accuser 
accepted blame and framed the conflict factually was only .56.  That is, women were 
more likely to abstain from aggravating the situation with a factual frame.  When a third 
party was blamed, women were 1.41 times as likely to use aggravating statements when 
a person blaming a third party used a factual (oboard, factual, female = .82) rather than a 
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relational frame (oboard, relational, female = .58); they were 1.17 times as likely to do so when 
they were blamed using a factual (oother, factual, female = 1.14) rather than a relational (oother, 
relational, female = .91) frame.  All together, then, women appeared to use mitigators more 
when a factual frame was used and use aggravators more when a relational frame was 
used, regardless of who was blamed.  Even when blame was considered, the interaction 
between frame and gender held fairly constant.  However, an additional factor to 
consider was the role of intentionality in this interaction.  
Name x Intentionality x Gender 
 For males and females, the data (see Table 18) suggests that the actor’s 
assessment of intentionality did not significantly alter the interaction of naming and 
gender on use of mitigating and aggravating accounts.  Although the differences were 
rather small, the data still suggested that men were more likely to use a mitigator when 
confronted with a relational frame, even if the conflict was labeled an accident (Ô = 1.2, 
ofactual, unintentional, male = 1.08, orelational, unintentional, male  = 1.3) or intentional (Ô = 1.06, ofactual, 
intentional, male = 1.44, orelational, intentional, male =1.49).  Women were 1.32 times as likely to use 
an apology or an excuse, when a conflict was labeled accidental and was framed 
factually (ofactual, unintentional, female = 1.68) rather than relationally (orelational, unintentional, female = 
1.3).  Women were 1.54 times as likely to use a mitigating statement when the conflict 
was seen as intentional and framed factually (ofactual, intentional, female = 2.46) rather than 
relationally (orelational, intentional, female = 1.6).  Framing’s effects for male and female 
respondents, then, held constant for the use of mitigating statements when intentionality 
was taken into account, even though the odds differences were only moderate. 
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Table 18 Use of Mitigating and Aggravating Accounts – Intent x Name x Gender 
Effect Use of Mitigating 
Accounts 
Use of Aggravating 
Accounts 
 
I1N1G1 1.44 1.32 
I1N1G2 2.46 .83 
I1N2G1 1.49 .26 
I1N2G2 1.6 .96 
I2N1G1 1.08 .62 
I2N1G2 1.68 .48 
I2N2G1 1.3 .42 
I2 N2G2 1.27 1.9 
I1 = Intentional 
I2 = Accidental 
N1 = Factual 
N2 = Relational 
G1 = Male 
G2 = Female 
 
The differences for male and female respondents’ uses of aggravating statements, 
though, were more pronounced.  When the conflict was termed accidental, males were 
1.48 times as likely to use aggravators when framed factually (ofactual, unintentional, male = .62) 
rather than when framed relationally (orelational, unintentional, male = .42).  However, when an 
intentional act was framed factually rather than relationally, men were over 5.0 times as 
likely to use an aggravating statement (ofactual, intentional, male =1.32. orelational, intentional, male = 
.26).  Women were almost 4.0 times as likely (Ô = 3.96) to use an aggravating statement 
when an accident was framed relationally (orelational, unintentional, female = .1.9) rather than 
factually (ofactual unintentional, female = .48).  They were slightly more likely (Ô = 1.16) to use 
an aggravating account when an intentional act was framed relationally (orelational, intentional, 
female = .96) rather than factually (ofactual, intentional, female = .83).  In all, assessments of 
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intentionality did not significantly alter the way female respondents perceived frame 
type. 
 The above results indicated significant interaction effects between frame type 
and gender.  Regardless of the assessment of blame or intentionality, males were more 
likely to use aggravating statements in factual than in relational frames; women, though, 
were more likely to use aggravators in relational than in factual frames.  An examination 
of differences for use of mitigating and aggravating accounts also indicates that the 
frame/gender interaction was primarily significant on respondents’ use of aggravating 
statements.  Although there were a few differences in the use of mitigating responses for 
each gender, the most pronounced differences were with males’ and females’ use of 
aggravating statements.  Conflict blaming also showed differences in respondents’ use of 
mitigating and aggravating statements. 
Blaming 
 An analysis of partial chi squares indicated three interactions related to conflict 
blaming and the use of mitigation or aggravation: blaming and gender; blaming, naming, 
and gender; and blaming, intentionality, and gender.  The first two interactions were 
significant for respondents’ use of mitigating accounts at the p < .05 level.  The three-
way interaction among blaming, intentionality, and gender, though, was significant at the 
same level for respondents’ use of aggravating statements.  Because no chi square value 
was significant at the p < .01 level, this analysis begins with an examination of the 
simplest of the three interactions: blame and gender.  As with the previous discussions of 
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framings, examining the use of both mitigating and aggravating accounts presents a 
larger picture of the effects of blaming in this study. 
Blame x Gender 
 Across levels of blame, as shown in Table 19, use of mitigation appeared most 
likely when the actor accepted blame and least likely when a third party was blamed.  
Males, for instance, were twice as likely to use a mitigating statement when the actor 
accepted blame than if the respondents were blamed for the situation.  On the one hand, 
when male respondents were blamed, they were less likely to use a mitigating statement 
than to not use one (oother, male = .862).  On the other hand, they were 1.73 times as likely 
to use an apology or excuse when the actor (oself, male = 1.73) accepted blame.  Men were 
2.66 times as likely to apologize or give an excuse when the actor accepted blame than 
when a third party (oboard, male = .65) was blamed. 
 
Table 19  Use of Mitigating and Aggravating Accounts – Blame x Gender 
Effect Use of Mitigating Accounts Use of Aggravating 
Accounts 
B1 G1 .862 .82 
B1 G2 1.73 1.06 
B2 G1 1.73 .63 
B2 G2 9.54 .92 
B3 G1 .65 .74 
B3 G2 1.09 .96 
B1 =  Blames Respondent 
B2 =  Blames Self 
B3 =  Blames Board 
G1 = Male 
G2 = Female 
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For female respondents, the pattern was similar, but more pronounced.  Women 
were 5.51 times as likely to use a mitigating statement when the actor accepted blame 
(oself, female = 9.54) than when they were blamed for the situation (oother, female =1.73).  
Female respondents were even more likely (Ô = 8.75) to do so when a third party (oboard, 
female = 1.09) was blamed.  In fact, when the actor blamed his or her own self, women 
were over 9.0 times as likely to use a mitigator than to not use one.  When a third party 
was blamed, women were almost equally likely (Ô = 1.09) to use or not use a mitigating 
statement.  The results indicated that mitigation was most likely when the actor accepted 
blame, somewhat likely when the respondent was blamed, and least likely when a third 
party was blamed.  The results of the blame/gender interaction also suggested that 
women were more inclined to use mitigating strategies than were men.  Women were 
twice as likely as men to apologize or give an excuse when the respondent was blamed, 
5.51 times as likely when the actor accepted blame, and 1.68 times as likely when a third 
party was blamed. 
 A relationship between blaming and use of aggravating accounts was also 
evident, but not to the same extent as mitigating statements.  Regardless of gender, 
respondents were least likely to use an aggravating statement when the actor accepted 
blame (oself, male = .63, oself, female = .92), and equally likely when respondents were blamed 
(oother, male = .82, oother, female = 1.06) or when a third party was blamed (oboard, male = .74, 
oboard, female = .96).  Additionally, a single-factor (1x3)  analysis of variance indicated that 
total numbers of aggravating responses (see Table 9) used across genders varied 
significantly by who was blamed, F (2, 177) = 6.339, p < .0125, r2 = .067.  An LSD post 
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hoc test revealed a significant difference in numbers of aggravations used when the 
respondent was blamed than when the actor or a third party was blamed.  Consistent 
with the findings of the logit analysis, respondents made the most frequent use of 
aggravating accounts when they were blamed; they used the fewest accounts when the 
actor took the blame.   
Additionally, and curiously, just as women were more likely than men to use 
mitigating statements across all blame types, the results suggested that women were also 
more likely than men to use aggravating statements as well.  Yet, the relationship 
between females and use of aggravating statements was weaker than that involving 
mitigating statements.  Women (oother, female = 1.06) were 1.29 times as likely as men 
(oother, male = .82) to use an aggravating statement when they were blamed, 1.46 times as 
likely (oself, female = .92, oself, male  = .63) when the actor accepted blame, and 1.3 times as 
likely (oboard, female = .96, oboard, male = .74) when a third party was blamed.  Coupled with 
the findings from the respondents’ use of mitigation, the results suggest that women used 
both mitigation and aggravation.  Such a result is likely, considering the 
blameworthiness of both parties in this conflict scenario.  What is of note, however, is 
the magnitude of difference between male and female use of mitigating and aggravating 
accounts.  Odds of using mitigation varied to a greater extent due to gender differences 
(Ôother = 2, Ôself = 5.51, Ôboard = 1.68) than did the use of aggravation (Ôother = 1.29, Ôself 
= 1.46, Ôboard = 1.3).   
In addition to the relationship of blame to mitigation, the results suggest that, 
although respondents were likely to use both mitigation and aggravation, respondents 
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were more likely to use mitigating statements, a result borne out by the frequencies of 
each account type.  In general, then, respondents were more likely to employ mitigating 
statements and least likely to use aggravating ones when the actor accepted blame for the 
situation.  In contrast, respondents were least likely to use mitigating remarks and most 
likely to use aggravators when a third party was blamed.  To see if this pattern remained 
constant in relation to other variables, this analysis examines the effects of naming on 
the blame/gender relationship. 
Blame x Name x Gender 
Given the effects of naming and gender discussed in the previous section, the 
odds of a male respondent using a mitigating statement should be highest when the actor 
accepted blame and used a relational frame, and lowest when he or a third party was 
blamed and a factual frame was used.  The results, as were seen in Table 17, indicated 
that this was the case.  Men were more likely to apologize or excuse themselves when 
the actor accepted blame (oself, factual, male = 1.57, oself, relational, male = 2.13), and least likely to 
do so when either the participant (oother, factual, male = .52, oother, relational, male = .8) or a third 
party was blamed (oboard, factual, male = .59, oboard, relational, male = .66).  The stable effect of 
framing on the blame/gender interaction was also evident.  Males again were more likely 
to mitigate the situation when a relational frame was used than when a factual frame was 
used. 
For female respondents, the odds of using a mitigating statement should be 
highest when the actor accepted blame and used a factual frame.  In contrast, the odds of 
women using a mitigating statement would be lowest when a third party was blamed and 
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a relational frame was used.  Women were 12.58 times as likely to use a mitigating 
statement (oself, factual, female = 12.58) than to refrain from doing so when the actor accepted 
blame and discussed the conflict in terms of factual issues.  On the contrary, women 
were more likely to refrain from using a mitigating statement than to use one when a 
third party was blamed and the conflict was discussed in terms of relationship issues 
(oboard, relational, female  = .77).  In fact, similar to the above discussion, women were most 
likely to be mitigating when the actor accepted blame and framed the conflict factually 
(oself, factual, female = 12.58, oself, relational, female = 11.7), and least likely when a third party was 
blamed (oboard, factual, female = 1.39, oboard, relational, female = .77).  These results suggested that, 
although women were more likely to use a mitigating statement than not, they were most 
likely to do so when the actor accepted blame.   
A similar pattern emerged regarding the participants’ use of aggravating 
statements.  Men were least likely to use aggravating accounts when the actor accepted 
blame in a relational (oself, relational, male = .45) rather than a factual (oself, factual, male =.57) 
frame.  They were more likely to do so when a third party was blamed (oboard, relational, male 
= .42, oboard, factual, male = .67).  Men, though, were most likely to employ aggravating 
responses when they were personally blamed and a factual frame was used (oother, factual, 
male = 1.14).  Yet, when a relational frame was used, the odds of using a mitigating 
statement plummeted (oboard, relational, male =.46).  The results indicated that, although blame 
still played an important role in the likelihood of using aggravating statements, framing, 
perhaps, played a more direct and a more salient role.  This determination was especially 
likely for the women’s use of aggravating statements. 
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Although the results from the name/blame/gender interaction implied that 
aggravation should be least likely when the actor accepted blame, the results indicated 
that women were most likely (oself, relational, female = 1.39) to use aggravating accounts when 
an actor accepted blame in a relational frame.  In fact, compared to a factual frame, 
women were 2.48 times as likely to employ aggravating statements when an actor 
accepted the blame in a relational frame.  The results showed that blame was related 
more to mitigation whereas frame was associated with aggravation.  To test this premise, 
this study examined the relationship of blaming, intentionality, and gender on the use of 
mitigation and aggravation.  If the conclusion is true, then mitigation would be most 
likely for men and women when the actor accepted blame, whereas aggravation would 
be least likely for both in the same situation. 
 Blame x Intentionality x Gender 
To examine this relationship, the odds of using mitigation for men and women 
were compared to the assessed intentionality of the conflict.  Table 20 indicates the odds 
likelihood of using mitigation and aggravation.  When the conflict was seen as 
intentional by the actor, male respondents were most likely to use mitigating accounts 
when the actor accepted blame (oself, intentional, male = 1.63) and least likely when either the 
men were blamed (oother, intentional, male = 1) or a third party was blamed (oboard, intentional, male= 
1).  For females, the same pattern was observed.  Females were most likely to apologize 
or excuse their actions when the actor accepted blame (oself, intentional, female = 3.41), less 
likely to do so when the women were blamed (oother, intentional, female = 1.34) and least likely 
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Table 20  Use of Mitigating and Aggravating Accounts – Blame x Intent x Gender 
 Use of Mitigating Use of Aggravating  
B1I1G1 1 .9 
B1I1G2 1.34 1.05 
B1I2G1 .79 .46 
B1I2G2 1.26 .99 
B2I1G1 1.63 .36 
B2I1G2 3.41 .68 
B2I2G1 1.06 .242 
B2I2G2 3.13 1.01 
B3I1G1 1 .49 
B3I1G2 1.15 .8 
B3I2G1 .69 .46 
B3I2G2 1 .8 
B1 =  Blames Respondent 
B2 =  Blames Self 
B3 =  Blames Board 
I1 = Intentional 
I2 = Unintentional 
G1 = Male 
G2 = Female 
 
to do so when a third party was blamed (oboard, intentional, female = 1.15).  Similar to the 
above, then, mitigation was most likely when the actor accepted the blame.  
When the conflict was named accidental by the actor, a similar pattern held.  
Male respondents were most likely to use mitigating remarks when the actor accepted 
blame (oself, unintentional, male = 1.06) and least likely to do so when a third party was blamed 
(oboard, unintentional, male = .69).  Women were likely to act in the same way.  The odds of a 
female respondent using a mitigating account were greatest when the actor accepted 
blame (oself, unintentional, female = 3.13) and least likely when a third party was blamed (oboard, 
unintentional, female = 1).  For intentionality, then, a pattern of mitigating use similar to the 
blame/gender and the blame/name/gender interactions was observed. 
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For the use of aggravation, a similar pattern was observed.  Women were least 
likely to use an aggravating account when the actor accepted blame (oself, intentional, female = 
.68) and most likely to do so when the respondents were blamed (oother, intentional, female = 
1.05).  Interestingly, though, a slight variation occurred when the actor saw the conflict 
as accidental.  For males, the pattern remained the same.  Males were least likely to use 
aggravating remarks when the actor accepted blame (oself, unintentional, male = .242) and most 
likely to do so either when the respondents or a third party was blamed (oboard/other, 
unintentional, male = .46).  For females, when the actor blamed either himself/herself, though, 
the odds of the respondents using an aggravating account was equally likely (oother, 
unintentional, female = .99; oself, unintentional, female = 1.01).  In fact, when a third party was blamed, 
the odds of females using an aggravating account only decreased to .88, (oboard, unintentional, 
female = .88).  When the actor labeled the conflict as accidental, then, the 
mitigating/aggravating pattern that occurred previously was held constant.  Reasons for 
the possible rise in odds of female respondents using aggravating statements when the 
conflict was labeled accidental are explored in the next section. 
In all, then, the results for conflict blaming seem consistent with the previous 
literature on responses to perceived blameworthiness.  Respondents were more likely to 
use mitigators and least likely to use aggravators when the person confronting them 
accepted the blame for the conflict.  On the contrary, they were least likely to apologize 
and most likely to deny guilt or to justify their actions when either they or a third party 
was blamed.  Gender, also, played an important role in using mitigating and aggravating 
accounts.  Specifically, females were more likely than males in most situations to 
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mitigate the situation.  Also, curiously, they were more likely than males in almost all 
situations to aggravate the situation.  This result can be explained by the fact that people 
were not constrained to using only one account type or another.  Often, people used 
multiple accounting strategies to manage their faces and the other party’s face at the 
same time.   
Just as naming related to the respondents’ use of aggravating accounts, blaming 
was linked to using mitigating accounts.  The odds ratios indicated that most of the 
variance for locus of blame could be observed in respondents’ likelihood to mitigate the 
situation.  Although variance existed in the use of aggravating statements, the magnitude 
of variance was not as consistent as it was when examined in light of the respondents’ 
use of mitigating statements.  The following section explores the relationship between 
attributed intentionality and respondents’ use of mitigating and aggravating accounts.   
Intentionality 
 Previous discussions of naming and blaming focused on the interactions between 
gender and the use of mitigating and aggravating accounts.  Partial chi square analyses 
for both types of accounts, though, showed no low-order significant effects for the 
interaction between intentionality and gender.  Instead, a significant interaction was 
observed between intentionality and framing on respondents’ use of mitigating 
statements.  In fact, of the three significant interactions, the intentionality/framing was 
the only one related to the respondents’ use of mitigating statements.  The others – 
blaming/intentionality/gender and intentionality/framing/gender – were associated with 
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the use of aggravating statements.  This analysis examines the intentionality/framing 
interaction as a foundation for assessing the other higher-order interactions. 
Intentionality x Frame 
 Whereas naming appeared to be closely related to the respondents’ use of 
aggravation, the actor’s assessment of intentionality was related to their use of 
mitigation.  Table 21 shows the odds for the use of mitigation and aggravation when 
naming and intentionality were considered.  When the conflict was judged to be 
intentional and was factually framed, respondents were 2.7 times as likely to mitigate the 
situation (ointentional, factual = 3.54) versus when it was seen as accidental (ounintentional, factual = 
1.31).  Although the discrepancy was much smaller, conflicts viewed as intentional were 
also more likely to be mitigated when a relational frame was used (ointentional. relational = 
1.73) than if it was viewed as accidental (ointentional, relational = 1.65).  In fact, an 
independent-samples t-test on the differences in concessions used based on attributed 
intentionality revealed a significant relationship, t (178) = 2.637, p < .01.  Concessions 
were more likely when the actor saw the conflict intentionally (M = 1.01, SD = 1.1) than 
Table 21  Use of Mitigating and Aggravating Accounts – Intent x Name 
 Use of Mitigating Use of Aggravating 
I1N1 3.54 1.04 
I1N2 1.73 .54 
I2N1 1.31 .59 
I2N2 1.65 .89 
N1 = Factual 
N2 = Relational 
I1 = Intentional 
I2 = Unintentional 
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when it was viewed accidentally (M = .62, SD = .88).  The t-test as well as the observed 
odds indicated that conflicts perceived as intentional were more likely to be mitigated 
than were conflicts seen as accidental.  
When the use of aggravating accounts was considered, the relationship was not 
as strong.  When the conflict was framed relationally, use of aggravation was less likely 
than when the conflict was seen as intentional (ointentional, relational = .54) and not accidental 
(ounintentional, relational  = .89).  Respondents were 1.65 times as likely to use an aggravating 
statement when the conflict was believed to be accidental rather than intentional.  
However, when the conflict was named factually, the relationship inverted.  Just as 
mitigation was more likely when the conflict was seen as intentional, aggravation was 
also most likely (ointentional, factual = 1.04).  In fact, the odds of using aggravation when the 
conflict was seen as intentional rather than accidental (ointentional, factual = .59) increased by 
1.76 times.  The failure to observe a distinct pattern of relationship among naming, 
intentionality, and aggravation might stem from the relationship between naming and 
aggravation.  Therefore, the failure to find a coherent pattern might arise from the use of 
frame type and only partially from assessments of intentionality.  
Intentionality x Name x Gender 
The intentionality/naming/gender interaction on respondents’ use of aggravating 
accounts also suggested that naming, not intentionality, was primarily responsible for 
changes in aggravation odds.  For example, recall Table 18 in which the odds of 
aggravation and mitigation were given for this interaction.  Odds of aggravation were 
highest for males, regardless of the intentionality, if the conflict was framed factually 
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rather than relationally.  For females, the opposite was true.  Thus, the naming/gender 
interaction was still quite evident, despite attributions of intentionality.  Variations of 
intentionality, though, did reveal a coherent pattern.  For example, the odds of females 
having used an aggravating statement in a factually-framed conflict was 1.73 times 
greater when the actor viewed the conflict as intentional (ointentional, factual, female = .83) and 
not accidental (ounintentional, factual, female = .48).  For men, then same pattern was observed.  
The odds of males using an aggravating account when the conflict was framed factually 
was twice as great (Ô = 2.12) when the conflict was seen as intentional (ointentional, factual, 
male = 1.32) than when it was seen as accidental (ounintentional, factual, male = .62).  
If attributions of intentionality played a primary role in the use of aggravation, 
though, the same pattern would have held for the scenarios in which the conflict was 
framed relationally for both men and women.  In fact, the pattern did not.  Females were 
almost twice as likely (Ô = 1.98) to use aggravating approaches when the situation was 
cast as accidental (ounintentional, relational, female = 1.9) rather than intentional (ointentional, relational, 
female = .96).   Males were also more likely (Ô = 1.62) to be aggravated with a relational 
frame when the conflict was perceived by the actor as accidental (ounintentional, relational, male 
= .42) rather than intentional (ointentional, relationual, male = .26).   
The results suggested that naming had a stronger relationship than did 
intentionality to the respondents’ use of aggravation.  If intentionality were more 
important, the relationship would not have inverted as it did between frame types.  As a 
result, naming might play a more direct role than intentionality in people’s use of 
aggravation. 
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 With mitigating responses, a more direct pattern emerged.  Across all situations 
of the intentionality/naming/gender interaction, respondents were more mitigating when 
the conflict was cast as intentional rather than accidental.  Males, for instance, were 1.33 
times more likely to mitigate a factually-framed conflict when it was cast as intentional 
(ointentional, factual, male = 1.44) rather than accidental (ounintentional, factual, male = 1.08).  Though 
they were only 1.15 times as likely to do so when the conflict was framed relationally, 
the direction of the intentionality/mitigating relationship was still consistent.  Females, 
also, were more likely (Ô = 1.46) to mitigate a factually-framed conflict when it was 
seen as intentional (ointentional, factual, female = 2.46), not accidental (ounintentional, factual, female = 
1.68).  Mitigation was also more likely (Ô = 1.26) when the actor labeled a relationally-
framed conflict as intentional (ointentional, relationual, female = 1.6) rather than as accidental 
(ounintentional, relationual, female = 1.27).   
 The influence of intentionality on account types, then, depended largely on which 
accounts were presented.  A fairly coherent relationship existed between mitigation and 
intentionality as evidenced by the consistent pattern of likelihood ratios across changes 
to intentionality, as well as the independent-samples t-test.  However, a less clear 
relationship existed between aggravation and intentionality.  Although a clear 
relationship among frame-type, attribution of intentionality, and aggravation existed, the 
pattern was still murky.  Further examination of the relationship between naming and 
intentionality emanated from an analysis of the blaming/intentionality/gender 
interaction. 
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Intentionality x Blame x Gender 
 Partial chi square analysis revealed a significant relationship between the 
intentionality/blaming/gender interaction and respondents’ use of aggravating and 
mitigating statements.  Table 17 indicated a tenuous and unstable relationship between 
the likelihood odds of respondents’ use of aggravation and mitigation.  When 
respondents were blamed, both males and females were more likely to be aggravated 
when the conflict was seen as intentional (oother, intentional, male = .9; oother, intentional, female = 
1.05) rather than accidental (oother, unintentional, male = .46; oother, unintentional, female = .99).  
However, although the odds change for males was significant (Ô = 1.96), the change for 
females was virtually non-existent (Ô = 1.06).  Similarly when a third party was blamed, 
both male and female respondents were equally likely to use an aggravating account, 
whether the conflict was seen as intentional (oboard, intentional, male = .49; oboard, intentional, female 
= .8) or unintentional (oboard, unintentional, male = .46; oboard, unintentional, female = .8).  In fact, when 
the actor took the blame for the situation, the relationship was even less clear.  Males 
were 1.49 times as likely to use an aggravator when the conflict was cast as intentional 
(oself, intentional, male = .36; oself, unintentional, male = .242).  Females though, were 1.49 times as 
likely to use an aggravating account in the opposite situation (oself, intentional, female = .68; 
oself, unintentional, female = 1.01).  Perhaps male respondents were more frustrated with the 
actor for starting a conflict, and females were more frustrated when they perceived the 
actor as not owning up to his or her mistakes.  In all, though, a clear relationship 
between attribution of intentionality and respondents’ use of aggravation did not emerge. 
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 However, an interesting interaction emerged when examining the amount of 
aggravating accounts used by participants across blame.  A factorial 2 (intentionality) x 
2 (respondent gender) x 3 (conflict blaming) factorial ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference attributed to this relationship, F (2, 152) = 4.433, p = .013, r2 = .222.  (With 
the Bonferroni correction discussed in the previous chapter lowering the significant p 
value to .0125, the result was almost significant.)  The data, shown in Figures 3 – 5, 
indicated a clear interaction effect between intentionality and gender across locus of 
blame.  When respondents were blamed, males used more aggravating accounts when 
the conflict was cast as intentional rather than unintentional.  Females, on the other hand, 
used more aggravating accounts when the conflict was cast as unintentional.  When the 
actor accepted the blame, the interaction was consistent, with males being aggravated 
more when the conflict was cast as intentional, and females being aggravated more when 
it was cast as accidental.  However, when a third party was blamed, the interaction 
flipped.  Males used more aggravating accounts when the conflict was cast as 
unintentional, whereas females used more aggravation when it was cast as intentional.  
Consistent with the previous findings, fewer aggravating accounts were used when the 
actor took the blame, and slightly more were used when the respondents were blamed.  
The interactions, though, lead to an interesting addition.   
Although females were equally likely to use an aggravating account when they 
were blamed and the conflict was seen either intentional or accidental, they used more 
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aggravation when the conflict was cast as unintentional.  For males, not only were they 
more likely to use an aggravating statement when the conflict was cast as unintentional, 
Figure 3  Frequency of Aggravating Accounts -- 
When Actor Blamed Respondent
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Figure 4  Frequency of Aggravating Accounts -- When Actor 
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Figure 5  Frequency of Aggravating Accounts -- When 
Actor Blamed Board
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they were likely to use more aggravation if it was named accidental.  When a third party 
was blamed, although the odds of likelihood remained consistent, men used more 
aggravation when the conflict was unintentional, whereas women used more when the 
conflict was intentional.  When the actor accepted blame, males were more likely to use 
an aggravator in both an intentional and accidental situation.  The opposite was true for 
females. 
The implications were somewhat mixed.  Blaming played a partial role in the 
aggravation process, as discussed in the previous section.  Not only were fewer 
aggravating comments made when the actor accepted blame, but also the likelihood of a 
respondent using an aggravating comment was lowest as well.  However, intentionality 
was a key variable, especially in light of its interaction with gender.  The data indicated 
that males and females were likely to use aggravation with attributions of intentionality, 
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with males aggravated more by intentional conflicts and females aggravated more by 
accidental conflicts.  Although that pattern did not hold when a third party was blamed; 
hence, this finding might be a function of the blaming rather than the naming of the 
conflict.  In all, females were more likely to use an aggravating remark when perceiving 
an accident whereas males were more likely to use an aggravator when perceiving an 
intentional conflict.   
 For mitigation, an interesting pattern also emerged.  In all situations, conflicts 
seen as intentional were more likely to be mitigated than those seen as accidental.  Even 
though these odds changes were small, (ranging from 1.06 to 1.54), the direction of the 
relationship was still consistent. 
 Overall, then, the relationship between attributed intentionality and respondents’ 
use of mitigating and aggravation depended on which account type was being used.  
Mitigation and intentionality had stable – if, at times, weak – relationships.  Conflicts 
seen as intentional were more likely to be mitigated than were conflicts that were seen as 
accidental.  Aggravation and intentionality, though, had an unclear relationship that 
depended on the respondent’s gender.  Males were more aggravated by intentional 
conflicts, whereas females were more aggravated by accidental conflicts.  Thus, other 
variables, that is, naming, blaming, and gender, mediated the role of intentionality on the 
use of account types.     
Summary 
 Three significant four-way interactions and three significant three-way 
interactions were observed in the partial chi-square analyses.  Respondents’ use of 
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mitigating approaches was related to interactions among blaming, naming, and gender; 
blaming and gender; and naming and intentionality.  Uses of aggravation were linked to 
interactions among naming, intentionality, and gender; blaming, intentionality, and 
gender; and naming and gender.  The three respective interactions had a good fit to the 
data, as indicated by a non-significant goodness-of-fit test.  Conflict naming was related 
to aggravating more than to mitigating accounts, primarily through its interaction with 
gender.  Conflict blaming was linked to mitigating rather than to aggravating accounts, 
also observable through its interaction with gender.  Attributions of intent had a small 
but coherent relationship with mitigating accounts, as well as a gender-mediated 
relationship with aggravating accounts.  No main effects were observed for 
intentionality, blaming, or naming.  Gender was important when viewed in context with 
the previous three variables.  In all, significant and coherent relationships were observed 
among the four independent variables and respondents’ use of mitigation and 
aggravation. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 The results discussed in the previous chapter indicate that a significant 
relationship exists between conflict framing and account behavior.  This chapter offers 
explanations for those observations in light of the hypothesized relationships discussed 
in Chapter II.  Additionally, this chapter examines some implications and limitations of 
the study and suggests future directions for the examination of the framing-accounting 
relationship. 
Independent Variables 
The results indicate that all stages of issue development, as well as the 
respondent’s gender, have strong relationships with the use of mitigation and 
aggravation.  Conflict naming has a strong relationship with aggravating accounts, 
blaming has a strong relationship with mitigating accounts, attributed intent has a stable 
relationship with mitigating accounts, and gender is important only when interacting 
with the other stages of conflict definition.  The following discusses these findings in 
more depth.   
   Naming 
 Because of the interactions between naming and gender, the results did not 
support the proposed hypotheses (1a and 1b) for main effects.  Since there was minimal 
previous literature on which to base the framing-account relationship, this study 
expected that women would use mitigators in relationally framed conflicts whereas men 
would use mitigators for factual conflict.  Women, however, used more aggravating 
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accounts especially when they perceived a relational frame.  Yet, they used more 
mitigating accounts when they perceived a factual frame.  In contrast, men were more 
likely to employ aggravators in a factual conflict, and were more likely to use mitigators 
in a relational conflict.  Even when considering locus of blame and intentionality, this 
relationship was still evident.     
 The results point to an interesting phenomenon.  The (stereo)typical line of 
thought in Western culture is that women are acculturated to be more attuned to 
relational concerns and the needs of others, whereas men are socialized to be more 
focused on task issues (Eagly & Johnson, 1990).  As such, in a relational conflict, 
women were expected to use mitigators to restore order to the relationship.  Yet, this 
hypothesis proved false.  Without being gender stereotypic, it is difficult to explain the 
clear differences in reactions.  Perhaps women are frustrated by interpersonal conflicts 
because they are trained to be focused on the tasks at hand (Eagly & Johnson).  As such, 
women may perceive any discussion of relationship problems not only as a hindrance to 
doing their jobs but also as a gender stereotype which they are trying to overcome.  Men, 
on the contrary, clearly used more mitigating accounts in response to relational frames.  
Perhaps men, responding to the stereotypes as completely task-focused, want to show 
that they are relationally competent by using more mitigators.   
Each gender, though, responded quite differently to factual frames.  Men may 
perceive a threat to their task-performance ability when the confrontation involves 
discussion of objective conflict factors.  Thus, they may assert their innocence or 
justification to keep their reputations intact.  Women, though, may experience a higher 
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concern for the other’s task frustrations, and respond accordingly (Gonzales et al., 1992).  
Eagly and Johnson’s (1990) meta-analysis indicates that women in leadership positions 
display concern for how others approach various tasks, as evidenced by their general 
affinity for democratic decision-making processes.  Thus, use of mitigation may 
represent women’s concern for the other’s ability to carry out their assigned tasks. 
 The results point to the importance of considering an organization’s cultural 
norms when responding to conflict.  Though societal forces may encourage heightened 
sensitivity to task or relationship concerns, organizational norms of task accomplishment 
may exert a counter-force.  Individuals respond to a variety of pressures (such as task 
and relational pressures) when accounting for their actions and attempting to restore 
their public image (Benoit & Brinson, 1994).  Individuals need to account for a variety 
of audiences, such as the immediate other, a superior, or the board, when responding to 
an organizational conflict (Lee, Woeste, & Heath, 2004).  Perhaps men and women hold 
different levels of salience for different audiences when constructing their responses.  
Perhaps men and women are responding to different organizational and social pressures 
in their accounts.  With so many variables and pressures, the influence of the framing-
gender relationship on account behavior is more striking.   
 These results indicate a strong relationship between framing and the use of 
aggravating accounts.  Even though the results are consistent, they raise more questions 
than they answer.  Why was there such a stable relationship between gender and 
framing?  What cultural forces did respondents perceive when constructing their 
accounts?  What concerns are salient to staff personnel of nonprofit organizations?  
  
113
Future research should attempt to address these questions to uncover a deeper 
understanding of the gender-naming relationship for account behavior.     
   Blaming 
 Based on previous research on attribution theory and account behavior, this study 
predicted that individuals would be more likely to use a mitigating statement when the 
recipient accepted blame or blamed a third party (H 2b), and would be more likely to use 
an aggravating statement when the recipient blamed the other (H 2a).  The results 
partially support these hypotheses.  As expected, aggravating accounts are most likely 
used when respondents are blamed for the situation (H 2a).  Individuals may feel a 
compelling need to offer a competing interpretation of the conflict when they perceive a 
face threat (Hearit, 1994; Benoit & Brinson, 1994; Schlenker & Darby, 1981).  This 
competing interpretation comes in the form of justifications and refusals, which are 
typically aggravating.  Also as expected, mitigating accounts are most likely to be used 
when the respondent blames him or herself (H 2b).  Respondents may perceive a smaller 
face threat from the other, and thus attend to the other person’s face by stating that they 
share the blame for the conflict.  Additionally, the use of mitigation gives the general 
and desired impression of being likeable, competent, and polite (Tyler, 1997).     
These results fit past research findings on attribution and rebuke (Braaten et al., 
1993; Sillars, 1980a; Sillars, 1980b; McLaughlin et al., 1983).  However, they run 
counter to Schlenker and Darby’s (1981) observation that mitigation is more likely when 
individuals perceive high responsibility for a failure event.  The discrepancy, though, is 
expected when considering the circumstances of the findings.  In their study, the 
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accounters were the only ones to commit a failure event.  As such, they may not feel the 
pressure to apologize.  Yet, when each individual in a conflict accepts partial blame, he 
or she will use an apology or excuse, which mitigate the situation (Kottler, 1994; Sillars, 
1980a).  Individuals may feel the typical pressure to reciprocate the mitigating strategy 
that the party person uses.  Thus, mitigation by one party may be reciprocated by the 
other person.   
The results also indicate unexpected account behavior.  Namely, blaming a third 
party does not necessarily lead to using mitigating accounts.  In fact, blaming a third 
party had very mixed effects.  In some situations (such as when intent is considered), the 
likelihood of using mitigation parallels when the respondent admits blame.  In others 
(such as when agency and gender are considered), use of mitigating accounts is less 
likely.  One explanation may be that blaming the board is not a legitimate action.  After 
all, individuals are more inclined to blame a system when sufficient reason exists to do 
so (Goldman et al., 2004).  If individuals form opinions of what makes a legitimate and 
competent account (Schonbach, 1990), they may use their current organizational 
situation as a basis for acceptable explanations.  If they see a third party as a legitimate 
target for blame, they may reject the claim and be less likely to mitigate the situation.   
Respondents may also think that blaming a third party is a weak attempt to “pass the 
buck.”  That is, blaming a third party may imply that the recipient knows he or she is to 
blame, but refuses to admit it.  As a result, the respondents may see this attempt as 
shirking responsibility.  Thus, they may be more likely to use aggravating accounts, 
blame the recipient, and refuse to accept responsibility.   
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 Another surprise is the lack of a main effect for blaming.  Given past research, 
blaming should have a direct impact on the odds of mitigating or aggravating the 
situation.  Instead, a stable blaming-gender interaction emerged.  This interaction 
functions similarly to the naming-gender finding.  The interaction was consistent in 
predicting likelihood of mitigation, even when considering naming and perceived intent.   
Although this study reports a significant relationship among blaming, perceived 
intent, and gender, the results of that interaction seem to fit with the lower-order 
interaction between blaming and gender.  The results are interesting considering that 
attributions of intent are tied strongly with attributions of causality (Sillars, 1980a; 
Sillars 1980b; Weiner, 1979; Heider, 1958; Thomas & Pondy, 1977).  One explanation is 
that agency is more important than intentionality when individuals account for 
behaviors.  Sillars’ findings support such an argument.  He found mixed results when 
examining perceptions of conflict stability on satisfaction, yet found stable results when 
examining locus of blame (1980a).  In other words, perceptions of a conflict behavior as 
stable (i.e., internal and intentional) or unstable (external and unintentional) did not yield 
consistent results.  However, perceptions of locus of blame did return consistent results.  
Sillars’ findings as well as the findings from this study indicate that individuals may 
attend more to agency than to intentionality.   
Although intentionality may not alter the likelihood of using mitigating accounts, 
the type of frame does.  This study found that conflict naming enhances the interaction 
of blame and gender.  Though this enhancement was modest for men, it was extremely 
large for women.  In fact, the highest likelihood of mitigation occurs when women 
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perceive that the recipient accepts blame and defines the conflict in factual terms.  The 
second highest odds ratio of mitigation occurs, interestingly, when women perceive a 
relational frame of the conflict.  Thus, having a picture of what the conflict is about 
increases the odds of apologizing or offering an excuse.  That is, people respond better to 
“I feel hurt by this fact” rather than “I feel hurt.”  The results may indicate a 
convergence of frame definition between recipient and respondent.  Such convergence, 
in turn, leads to a greater likelihood of using mitigating accounts and a greater likelihood 
of positive conflict management (Drake & Donohue, 1996).  However, more research is 
needed to determine if convergence occurs and if it provides an explanation for the 
results.   
 In sum, hypotheses 2a and 2b received partial support.  Respondents are more 
likely to use a mitigating statement when the recipient accepts blame, and are more 
likely to use an aggravating statement when they are blamed.  Blaming a third party, 
though, does not result in a higher likelihood of using mitigating statements over 
aggravating statements.  Although perceptions of intentionality do not significantly 
enhance the likelihood of mitigation, naming does increase the odds of using mitigation.  
Similar to the relationship between frame type and use of aggravating accounts, 
attribution of agency is related strongly with use of mitigating accounts.     
   Intentionality 
 Hypotheses 3a and 3b predicted that individuals would be more likely to respond 
with mitigating accounts when the recipient labels the conflict as intentional but would 
be more likely to use aggravating accounts when it is labeled as accidental.  The results 
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somewhat support these hypotheses.  Mitigating statements are more likely when the 
recipient does not attribute the conflict to accidental factors, regardless of the blaming, 
naming or respondent’s gender (H 3a).  Attributions of intent are connected to the 
respondents’ use of mitigating rather than aggravating accounts (H 3b).   
 One explanation for the increased likelihood of mitigating accounts in a conflict 
perceived to be intentional is that respondents feel a stronger social pressure to answer 
these accusations.  As Coombs and Holladay (2002) assert, “crises with strong 
attributions of organizational crisis responsibility, such as organizational misdeeds, 
require strongly accommodative responses such as corrective action and full apologies” 
(p. 172).  If attribution of intent is indeed a vital component when considering image 
threat (Benoit & Czerwinski, 1997), then claiming that a conflict is accidental reduces 
the threat to the respondent.  These results fit with previous findings on the relationship 
between account behavior and perceived intent (Gonzales et al., 1990; Gonzales et al., 
1992).  Individuals could be less motivated to use mitigating statements for a conflict 
labeled by the other as accidental because they view the situation as non-serious and/or 
not their fault.  If they do not think the situation is serious or that they are not to blame, 
they could think that apologies are pointless.  On the contrary, they may perceive the 
conflict as more serious if the other person labels it as intentional.  They may feel more 
social pressure to be polite as well as to attend to their own image.  As such, conflicts 
labeled as intentional may elicit more of a mitigating stance from the other.   
 Hypothesis 4 was not supported.  The initial line of thinking was that both parties 
could create a “third story” by teaming up to blame a third party if one side blamed that 
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party for intentionally instigating a conflict.  Actors, then, would use more refusals by 
blaming that third party.  However, the data do not support this argument.  Individuals 
are equally likely to use aggravating accounts if a third party is blamed for intentionally 
or accidentally causing a conflict.  Individuals may have difficulty assessing the intent of 
a third party for a number of reasons, such as lack of familiarity and belief that the third 
party is not to blame.  Additionally, attribution of intent may lose its importance when 
the locus of blame is not one of the conflict parties.  As such, a third party’s intent does 
not play a role people’s motivation to use aggravating or mitigating accounts.   
 In sum, attribution of intent has a stable relationship with use of mitigating 
accounts.  Mitigation is most likely if the recipient labels the conflict as intentional 
rather than accidental (H 3a).  Intent’s relationship with aggravating accounts is less 
clear (H 3b).  Intent does not factor into individuals’ use of aggravating accounts when a 
third party is blamed (H 4).  Women are more likely to use an aggravating account when 
they are blamed for an intentional rather than accidental conflict.  Men are somewhat 
less likely to use aggravating accounts when the conflict is labeled as accidental.  When 
the recipient frames the conflict factually, use of aggravation is less likely when the 
conflict is labeled accidental rather than intentional.  However, when the respondent 
frames the conflict relationally, labeling the conflict as accidental increases the 
likelihood of aggravation.  In all, attribution of intent has a consistent relationship with 
the use of mitigation, and a mixed relationship with use of aggravation. 
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   Gender 
 Hypotheses 5a and 5b argued that females would be more likely than males to 
use mitigating accounts, whereas males would be more likely than females to use 
aggravating accounts.  The results partially support hypothesis 5a, but not 5b.  Gender is 
not directly associated with the use of mitigation or aggravation.  Instead, gender is 
relevant only when interacting with blaming, naming, and attributions of intent.  In 
general, females are more likely than males to use mitigating accounts regardless who is 
blamed.  Women are twice as likely to use a mitigating account when they are blamed, 
five and a half times as likely to do so when the recipient accepts blamed, and almost 
two times as likely to do so when the recipient blames the board.  As discussed earlier, 
the interaction of blaming and gender is quite consistent.  Additionally, women were 
generally more likely to use mitigation than men regardless of attributed intent.  Men 
and women, though, respond quite differently to frame type.  Whereas women are more 
likely to use a mitigating statement when the conflict is framed factually, men are more 
likely to use a mitigator when the conflict is framed relationally.   
Hypothesis 5b, on the other hand, was not supported.  Although women are 
generally more likely than men to use mitigation, they are also more likely to use 
aggravation no matter the attributed agency or intent.  This result, though unexpected, is 
understandable, given the strategic nature of accounts.  Hearit (1994), for instance, 
argues that management of a crisis involves an “attempt to provide a competing 
interpretation of the act and to label [one’s] wrongdoing in a way that displays sorrow 
but limits culpability, and use dissociations to distance [oneself] from the wrongdoing” 
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(p. 122).2  When responding to a conflict, then, individuals focus on their own face and 
the other’s face (McLaughlin et al., 1983).  People have a number of rhetorical strategies 
with which to persuade and/or identify with their target audience(s) (Sillince, 2004).  
Using both mitigating and aggravating accounts provides accounters with the means to 
limit blame and to display sorrow about the action.  By doing so, accounters manage the 
basic tension between concern for self and concern for other. 
In all, gender has a mixed relationship with account behaviors.  Though women 
are more likely than men to mitigate the conflict in some situations, they are less likely 
to do so in others.  Though these results do not shed a clearer light on the relationship 
between gender and account behavior, they do indicate that gender should be examined 
whenever account behavior is analyzed.  Although there may not be a significant main 
effect, gender does appear to be related to responses to all stages of conflict framing.   
Account Behavior 
 The results for use of mitigating and aggravating accounts indicate that use of 
mitigation is generally more likely than use of aggravation.  Respondents may feel a 
social pressure to be polite (Brown & Levinson, 1987) and to attend to the other’s 
concerns (McLaughlin et al., 1983).  (A social desirability bias may be present in these 
findings as well.)  Considering that the respondents work for organizations in which 
working bonds may be closer and relationships may be more important, it stands to 
reason that individuals may be more likely to use an account strategy which shows 
                                                 
2 Though Hearit is discussing organizational responses to crises, such responses are similar to individual 
response behaviors (Allen & Caillouet, 1994).  Crises are similar to failure events in that they both signal 
harm to one’s legitimacy (Allen & Caillouet), and public and social reputation (Ice, 1991). 
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concern for the relationship and the other.  They may realize the relational and task 
implications of aggravating a situation in which they may be required to work closely 
with the other conflict party.  There are a number of factors, though, that make 
mitigating and aggravating account behaviors more likely.   
The likelihood of using mitigation is enhanced by a number of factors.  First, 
acceptance of blame by the recipient increases likelihood of mitigation by the account-
giver.  Accounters may feel compelled to reciprocate a concern for the other after the 
recipient shows apparent concern by blaming him or herself.  Second, refraining from 
labeling the conflict as accidental is generally associated with a higher likelihood of 
using mitigating statements.  Respondents may feel a stronger need to excuse or 
apologize for their actions when the other views the situation as intentional.  Third, 
mitigation is more likely if the conflict is defined factually for females and relationally 
for males.  Respondents may perceive different tensions and concerns, leading to 
differing responses to frame types.   
 The likelihood of aggravation also increases with a number of factors.  First, 
aggravation is more likely when the recipient blames the other or a third party.  
Respondents do not appreciate the face threat when they are blamed, and do not feel 
compelled to apologize when a third party is blamed.  Second, aggravation is more likely 
when males perceive factual frames and females perceive relational frames of the 
conflict.  As discussed above, factual frames may threaten males’ desire to be seen as 
competent in their work, whereas relational frames may threaten females’ desire to be 
seen as a professional concerned with the task at hand.  Third, aggravation is more likely 
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if relational conflicts are labeled as accidental or factual conflicts are labeled as 
intentional. 
Implications 
 These findings have a number of implications for theory and research.  
Theoretically, these results point to a need to reconceptualize how the field currently 
thinks about accounting behavior.  Though a variety of theories address accounting 
behavior, they typically do not address the crisis from the viewpoint of publics.  The 
closest theory to have done so is Situated Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2002).  The theory argues that a “crisis manager begins by the selection of a 
crisis response strategy by identifying the crisis type, which we conceptualize as the 
frame that publics use to interpret the event” p. 167 [emphasis added].  Tests of this 
theory have indicated that three different clusters (frames) of crisis types.  In other 
words, people do identify conflicts and crises in different ways.  Coombs and Holladay’s 
results, along with the results of this study, indicate that theory regarding crisis 
communication should take publics’ and recipients’ definitional frames into 
consideration when examining the propriety and effectiveness of account strategies.  
 Additionally, these findings suggest that current theorizing of conflict framing 
can expand greatly.  Although theories such as communicative framing theory provide a 
fairly straightforward examination of framing and conflict behavior, these theories may 
limit the study of framing in conflict as a matter of convergence/divergence, and frame 
type.  These results indicate that, though studies of convergence and frame type are 
beneficial, a larger view of the framing process can generate additional details of how 
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parties manage conflict.  Theorizing about framing must not be limited to frame type and 
convergence, nor should it be limited to studies of only one party’s framework.  Instead, 
the field should look into the discursive elements of how conflicts begin and evolve over 
time.     
Finally, these results point to a need to further explore the antecedents to the 
forgiveness process (see Worthington, 1997; McCullough & Worthington, 1994).  
Current theory has tended to examine forgiveness processes and its antecedents largely 
from the recipient’s perspective.  Research (e.g., Girard, Mullet, & Callahan, 2002; 
McCullough, Rachal, & Worthington, 1997; McCullough et al., 1998) has indicated that 
mitigating account behaviors (such as apologies) are positively associated with the 
likelihood of forgiveness.  Yet, this research fails to examine the discursive processes 
(such as issue development framing) that go into attempts to persuade the other about 
how to define the event in question.  Finally, these results call into question certain 
forgiveness measures such as the Transgression Narrative Test of Forgivingness (Berry 
et al., 2001).  Each of the five vignettes involves some type of confrontation between the 
actor and the recipient.  This research has indicated that confrontation is associated with 
likelihood of mitigating and aggravating behaviors, which are in turn related with 
forgiveness and unforgiveness.  Thus, findings of trait forgiveness with such measures 
may be confounded by types of confrontations depicted. 
In addition to their implications of theory, these results have significant 
implications for research.  First, this study offers a link between the failure event and 
conflict literatures.  Current research examining only failure events or only 
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organizational conflicts would do well to consider the research findings of the other 
field.  Second, this research points to the need to examine discursive antecedents of 
account behavior.  Though some studies have examined confrontations and reproach as 
they relate to use of aggravating accounts (e.g., Braaten et al., 1997), these findings 
indicate that examining “reproaches” or “rebukes” may not be a fine-grained enough.  
There are a variety of factors that go into reproaching someone else, as this study has 
indicated.  This study points to the fact that rebukes cannot and should not be treated as 
monoliths.  Third, these findings have important implications for forgiveness research.  
These results indicate that forgiveness may not be so steeped in trait behavior after all. 
Limitations 
 Though these results have a variety of promising implications, the results must be 
taken with a grain of salt for a number of reasons.  First, the results may not be 
generalizable to a larger population.  Respondents were members of nonprofit 
organizations, which exhibit a variety of differences from for-profit organizations.  
Additionally, half of the participating organizations were either human service or health 
care organizations.  It is possible that these organizations have conflict management 
techniques which are unique to their field.  Because this study did not test for differences 
by type of organization, it is difficult to assess whether organizational differences played 
a significant role in the results.  Also, organizational personnel may behave differently 
than individuals operating outside of an organization’s culture.   
However, there is an increasing blurring of distinctions between nonprofit and 
for-profit organizations (Emanuele & Higgins, 2000).  Individuals who were former 
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executives of for-profit organizations are frequently turning to the nonprofit world to 
find work.  As such, the distinctions between for-profits and nonprofits may not be as 
apparent as once believed.  Additionally, it should be noted that there were several types 
of organizations which participated in this study.  Although half of the organizations 
came from two fields, the other half came from a variety of fields.  As a result, the 
variation of fields (36 organizations from 12 fields) may make up for the prominence of 
two particular fields.  Additionally, there is no guarantee that organizations within the 
same field have similar conflict management habits.  Two human service organizations, 
for instance, may approach conflicts differently depending on their personnel and the 
leadership styles of their respective directors.  As a result, though half of the 
organizations came from two particular fields, this may not have had a significant effect 
on the results in and of itself.   
 A second limitation is the failure to maintain consistency and control in 
conducting the research.  Although the researcher conducted the study in person on a 
number of occasions, some research packets had to be mailed in order to achieve the 
desired number of participants and the desired amount of organizational diversity.  There 
was little way to conduct this research in person while the participants were in different 
regions and states.  However, those taking part in the research by mail were given an 
introduction script identical to the one used when the research was conducted in person.  
Organizational contacts were given specific details about how to conduct the study 
sessions and how to protect respondents’ confidentiality.  Yet, the lack of control and 
consistency is a clear limitation. 
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 A third limitation is the number of usable responses.  Despite the directions read 
at the start of the research session and at the top of each section, some individuals 
described the conflict rather than replied to the conflict.  Some also returned blank 
response pages.  These situations reduced the number of usable responses to 178.  This 
number may be too small when working with twenty-four conditions.  Yet, despite the 
smaller-than-desired sample size and the diminished power, the ability to discover 
significant findings suggests that the findings would be consistent even with a larger 
sample size. 
 A fourth limitation was the operationalization of the dependent variables.  Use of 
mitigation and use of aggravation were operationalized as binary variables.  Thus, if one 
individual used 1 mitigating account whereas another used 5, they would be treated 
equally.  Though this may pose a limitation for magnitude of mitigation or aggravation, 
this study was not interested in those results.  Rather, the study’s focus was on general 
likelihood of using either account type.  Magnitude, as will be discussed next, may be 
examined in future research. 
 A final limitation relates to the interaction of context and selected medium.  
Previous work has focused largely on interpersonal failure events occurring in places 
such as malls whereas this study focused on behavior in organizations.  If people’s 
behavior changes as they move from one context to another, these results may not 
necessarily be generalizable to other contexts.  Additionally, people may react 
differently to confrontations through email, hand-written letters, and face-to-face 
interaction.  These results show how individuals use certain accounts in an 
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organizational context when confronted with a letter.  Research should examine the 
effects of different contexts and media on account use. 
Future Directions 
 Despite these limitations, the results point to a variety of promising future 
research directions.  First, researchers can continue to explore the relationship between 
conflict framing and account behavior.  This study, as an initial study with a variety of 
limitations, needs replication to confirm its findings.  Researchers can also continue to 
examine the relationship between discursive shaping of attribution and account behavior.  
What effect does intentionality have?  Does the theorized interaction between agency 
and intentionality have an effect on account behavior?  These questions necessitate 
answers as we continue to explore accounting behavior. 
 Second, researchers can explore the discursive antecedents of forgiveness.  
Current research has treated failure events too simplistically.  Rather than examining 
only one person’s perception of a failure event, researchers should examine how the 
framing and reframing of definitions relate to the likelihood of forgiveness.  If 
confrontation (even imagined confrontation) plays a vital part of forgiveness by 
encouraging empathy and understanding of the other, why have we not examined its 
relationship to forgiveness? 
 Third, researchers can explore the effect of conflict framing on multiple account 
use.  This study has treated mitigation and aggravation as simple, binary variables.  Yet, 
research into crisis management has indicated that individuals and organizations use a 
variety of impression management strategies to restore their public image.  What effect 
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does the use of multiple account types have on perceptions of the actor?  Is the use of 
multiple account types related to some aspect of conflict framing? 
 Finally, researchers should continue to work on methods of analyzing responses 
to conflict that minimize crucial biases.  Of primary concern is the social desirability 
bias inherent in this research.  Researchers will have a difficult time examining the 
relationships between framing and accounting as long as participants know that their 
words will be analyzed by someone else.  Will organizational records of disputes 
provide less biased samples?  Are vignettes and the critical incident technique really the 
most effective ways of analyzing conflict behavior?   
Summary 
 This study has examined a previously neglected field of research into the 
connection between conflict framing and account behavior.  This study has indicated that 
conflict and failure events share a number of commonalities, such that failure events are 
the actions that instigate a conflict.  This study has applied an issue development lens 
through which to view account behavior, indicating that mitigation and aggravation can 
be understood by how much issue convergence each communicates.  By examining how 
variations of conflict naming, blaming, and attributing of intentionality associate with 
the likelihood of using mitigating or aggravating accounts, this study represents an 
additional step toward understanding the discursive environment of account behaviors 
and forgiveness.  Despite its limitations, this examination illuminates a variety of 
implications for theory, current and future research, and practice.  Future research should 
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look to replicate this study to confirm its results and build off of these findings as we 
work toward more constructive ways of managing organizational conflicts. 
  
130
REFERENCES 
Alexander, C. S., & Becker, H. J. (1978). The use of vignettes in survey research.   
Public Opinion Quarterly, 42, 93-104. 
Allred, K. G. (2000). Anger and retaliation in conflict: The role of attribution. In M.  
Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), The Handbook of Conflict Resolution (pp. 236-
255). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
Alter, S. (1999). Report for the Law Commission of Canada (n.d.). Apologizing for  
 serious wrongdoing: Social, psychological, and legal considerations. Retrieved 
 on July, 7, 2004, from http://www.lcc.gc.ca. 
Aryee, S., Luk, V., & Stone, R. (1998). Family-responsive variables and retention- 
relevant outcomes among employed parents. Human Relations, 51,73-87. 
Austin, J. L. (1962). How to Do Things With Words (2nd Ed.). J. O. Urmson & M. Sbisà  
(Eds.). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP. 
Barnlund, D. C., & Yoshioka, M. (1990). Apologies: Japanese and American styles.  
 International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 14, 193-206. 
Bartunek, J. M., Kolb, D. M., & Lewicki, R. J. (1992). Bringing conflict out from  
behind the scenes: Private, informal and nonrational dimensions of conflict in 
organizations. In D. M. Kolb & J. M. Bartunek (Eds.), Hidden Conflict in 
Organizations: Uncovering Behind-the-Scenes Disputes (pp. 209-228.).  
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Baumeister, R. F., Exline, J. J., & Sommer, K. L. (1997). The victim role, grudge  
  
131
theory, and two dimensions of forgiveness. In E. L. Worthington (Ed.), 
Dimensions of Forgiveness: Psychological Research and Theological 
Perspectives (pp. 79-104). Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation. 
Benford, R. D., & Snow, D. A. (2000). Framing processes and social movements: An  
overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611-639. 
Benoit, W. L., & Brinson, S. L. (1994). AT&T: “Apologies are not enough.”   
Communication Quarterly, 42, 75-88. 
Benoit, W. L., & Czerwinski, A. (1997). A critical analysis of USAir’s image repair  
discourse. Business Communication Quarterly, 60, 38-57. 
Berry, J. W., & Worthington, E. L., Parrot, L., O’Connor, L. E., & Wade, N. G. (2001).  
 Dispositional forgiveness: Development and construct validity of the 
 transgression narrative test of forgiveness (TNTF). Personality and Social 
 Psychology Bulletin, 27, 1277-1290. 
Bolstad, M. (2000). Learning from Japan: The case for increased use of apology in  
mediation. Cleveland State Law Review, 48, 545-578. 
Braaten, D. O., Cody, M. J., & DeTienne, K. B. (1993). Account episodes in  
organizations: Remedial work and impression management. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 6, 219-250. 
Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena.   
In E. N. Goody (Ed.), Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction 
(pp. 56-289). New York: Cambridge UP. 
Brown, W. A., & Yoshioka, C. F. (2003). Mission attachment and satisfaction as factors  
  
132
in employee retention. Nonprofit Management and Leadership, 14, 5-18. 
Center on Nonprofits & Philanthropy. The Urban Institute. National taxonomy of  
exempt entities (NTEE) (n.d.). Retrieved on February 1, 2006, from  
http://nccs.urban.org/. 
Cloke, K., & Goldsmith, J. (2000). Resolving Personal and Organizational Conflict:  
Stories of Transformation and Forgiveness. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Coombs, W. T. (1995). Choosing the right words: The development of guidelines for  
the selection of the “appropriate” crisis-response strategies. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 8, 447-476. 
Coombs, W. T., & Holladay, S. J. (2002). Helping crisis managers protect reputational  
assets: Initial tests of the situational crisis communication theory. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 16, 165-186.  
DeMaris, A. (1992). Logit Modeling: Practical Applications. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
DeWulf, A. (2005). Disentangling approaches to framing: Mapping the terrain. Paper  
 presented at International Association of Conflict Management Conference, 
 Seville, Spain. 
Donohue W. A., Lyles, J., & Rogan, R. (1989). Issue development in divorce mediation.   
Mediation Quarterly, 24, 19-28. 
Drake, L. E., & Donohue, W. A. (1996). Communicative framing theory in conflict  
resolution. Communication Research, 23, 297-322. 
Eagly, A. H., & Johnson, B. T. (1990). Gender and leadership: A meta-analysis.   
Psychological Bulletin, 108, 233-256. 
  
133
Emanuele, R., & Higgins, S. H. (2000). Corporate culture in the nonprofit sector: A  
comparison of fringe benefits with the for-profit sector. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 24, 87-93. 
Exline, J. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Expressing forgiveness and repentance:  
 Benefits and barriers.  In M. E. McCullough, K. I. Pargament, & C. E. Thoresen 
 (Eds.), Forgiveness: Theory, Research, and Practice (pp. 133-155). New York: 
 Guilford Press. 
Felstiner, W. L. F., Abel, R. L., & Sarat, A. (1980-81). The emergence and  
transformation of disputes: Naming, blaming, claiming….  Law and Society 
Review, 15, 631-654. 
Fienberg, S. E. (1980). The Analysis of Cross-classified Categorical Data. Cambridge,  
 MA: MIT Press. 
Fraser, B. (1981). On apologizing. In F. Coulmas (Ed.), Conversational Routine:  
Explorations in Standardized Communication Situations and Prepatterned 
Speech (pp. 259-271). New York: Mouton. 
Girard, M., Mullet, E., & Callahan, S. (2002). Mathematics of forgiveness. American  
Journal of Psychology, 115, 351-375. 
Goffman, E. (1971). Relations in Public: Microstudies of the Public Order. New York:  
Basic Brooks, Inc. 
Goldman, B. M., Paddock, E. L., & Cropanzano, R. (2004). A transformational model  
 of legal claiming. Journal of Managerial Issues, 16, 417-441. 
Gonzales, M. H., Pederson, J. H., Manning, D. J., Wetter, D. W. (1990). Pardon my  
  
134
gaffe: Effects of sex, status, and consequence severity on accounts. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 610-621. 
Gonzales, M. H., Manning, D. J., & Haugen, J. A. (1992). Explaining our sins:  
Factors influencing offender accounts and anticipated victim responses. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 958-971. 
Gray, B. (1997). Framing and reframing of intractable environmental disputes. In R. J.  
Lewicki, R. Bies, & B. Sheppard (Eds.), Research on Negotiation in 
Organizations, Vol. 6. Greenwich, NJ: JAI Press. 
Gray, B. (2003). Framing of environmental disputes. In R. J. Lewicki, B. Gray, & M.  
Elliott (Eds.), Making Sense of Intractable Environmental Conflicts (pp. 11-34).  
Washington, DC: Island Press. 
Hearit, K. M. (1994). Apologies and public relations crises at Chrysler, Toshiba, and  
Volvo. Public Relations Review, 20, 113-125. 
Heider, F. (1958). The Psychology of Intergroup Relations. New York: Wiley. 
Henzl, S., & Turner, L. (1987). Rationalizing conflict choices: Do women and men 
 speak the same language? In L. B. Nadler, M. K. Nadler, & W. R. Todd-
 Mancillas (Eds.), Advances in Gender and Communication Research (pp. 175-
 188). Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
Hodgins, H. S., Liebeskind, E., & Schwartz, W. (1996). Getting out of hot water:  
Facework in social predicaments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  
71, 300-314. 
  
135
Holtgraves, T. (1989). The form and function of remedial moves: Reported use,  
psychological reality and perceived effectiveness. Journal of Language and 
Social Psychology, 8, 1-16. 
Hupka, R. B., Jung, J., & Sliverthorn, K. (1987). Perceived acceptability of  
apologies, excuses, and justifications in jealousy predicaments. Journal of Social  
Behavior and Personality, 2, 303-313. 
Jamieson, D. W., & Thomas, K. W. (1974). Power and conflict in student-teacher  
relationships. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 10, 321-336. 
Jones, T. (2001). Emotional communication in conflict: Essence and impact. In W. F.  
Eadie & P. E. Nelson (Eds.), The Language of Conflict and Resolution (pp. 81-
104). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Keyton, J.(1999). The relational side of groups. Small Group Behavior, 29, 57-84. 
Knapp, M. L., Putnam, L. L., & Davis, L. J. (1988). Measuring interpersonal conflict in  
organizations: Where do we go from here? Management Communication 
Quarterly, 1, 414-429. 
Kolb, D. M., & Putnam, L. L. (1992). Introduction. In D. M. Kolb & J. M. Bartunek  
(Eds.), Hidden Conflict in Organizations: Uncovering Behind-the-Scenes 
Disputes (pp. 1-31). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Kottler, J. A. (1994). Beyond blame: A new way of resolving conflicts in relationships.   
San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Lee, J., Woeste, J. H., & Heath, R. L. (2004). Organizational excellence and crisis  
  
136
management: Effects of open communication system, leadership, strategic 
planning, and social information disclosure. Manuscript submitted for 
publication in Management Communication Quarterly. 
Letts, C. W., Ryan, W. P., & Grossman, A. (1999). High Performance Nonprofit  
Organizations. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Lewicki, R. J.,  Barry, B., Saunders, D. M., & Minton, J. W. (2003). Essentials of  
Negotiation. Chicago: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Littlejohn, S. W., & Domenici, K. (2001). Engaging Communication in Conflict:  
Systemic Practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
McCullough, M. E., & Worthington, E. L., Jr. (1994). Models of interpersonal  
forgiveness and their applications to counseling: Review and critique. 
Counseling and Values, 39, 2-14. 
McCullough, M. E., Worthington, E. L., Jr., & Rachal, K. C. (1997). Interpersonal  
forgiving in close relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
73, 321-336. 
McCullough, M. E., Rachal, K. C., Sandage, S. J., Worthington, E. L., Jr., Brown, S. W.,  
& Hight, T. L. (1998). Interpersonal forgiving in close relationships: II.  
Theoretical elaboration and measurement. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 75, 1586-1603. 
McLaughlin, M. L., Cody, M. J., & O’Hair, H. D.(1983). The management of failure  
events: Some contextual determinants of accounting behavior. Human 
Communication Research, 9, 208-224. 
  
137
Morrill, C., & Thomas, C. K. (1992). Organizational conflict management as disputing  
process: The problem of social escalation. Human Communication Research, 18, 
400-428. 
Oetzel, J. G., Ting-Toomey, S., Yokochi, Y., Masumoto, T., & Takai, J. (2000). A  
typology of facework behaviors in conflicts with best friends and relative 
strangers. Communication Quarterly, 48, 397-419. 
Pearce, W. B., & Littlejohn, S. W. (1997). Moral Conflict: When Social Worlds Collide.   
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Putnam, L. L., & Wilson, C. E. (1982). Communicative strategies in organizational  
 conflicts: Reliability and validity of a measurement scale.  In M. Burgoon (Ed.), 
 Communication Yearbook, Vol. 6 (pp. 629-652).  Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Putnam, L. L., & Poole, M. S. (1987). Conflict and negotiation. In F. M. Jablin, L. L.  
Putnam, K. H. Roberts, & L. W. Porter (Eds.), Handbook of Organizational 
Communication: An Interdisciplinary Perspective (pp. 549-599). Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Putnam, L. L. (1988). Communication and interpersonal conflict in organizations.   
Management Communication Quarterly, 1, 293-301. 
Putnam, L. L., & Holmer, M. (1992). Framing, reframing, and issue development. In L.  
L. Putnam & M. E. Roloff (Eds.), Communication and Negotiation (pp. 128-
155). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.  
Putnam, L. L., & Kolb, D. M. (2000). Rethinking negotiation: Feminist views of  
  
138
communication and exchange. In P. M. Buzzanell (Ed.), Rethinking 
Organizational and Managerial Communication from Feminist Perspectives (pp. 
76-104).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Schlenker, B. R. (1980). Impression Management. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. 
Schlenker, B. R., & Darby, B. W. (1981). The use of apologies in social predicaments.   
Social Psychology Quarterly, 44, 271-278. 
Schonbach, P. (1980). A category system for account phases. European Journal of  
Social Psychology, 10, 195-200. 
Schonbach, P. (1990). Account Episodes: The Management or Escalation of Conflict.   
New York: Cambridge UP. 
Scott, M., & Lyman, S. (1968). Accounts. American Sociological Review, 33, 46-62. 
Sheppard, B. H., Lewicki, R. J., & Minton, J. W. (1992). Organizational Justice: The  
Search for Fairness in the Workplace. New York: Lexington Books. 
Sillars, A. L. (1980a). Attributions and communication in roommate conflicts.   
Communication Mongraphs, 42, 180-200. 
Sillars, A. L. (1980b). The sequential and distributional structure of conflict as a  
function of attributions concerning the locus of causality and stability of 
conflicts.  In D. Nimmo (Ed.), Communication Yearbook 4 (pp. 217-235). New 
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press. 
Sillince, J. A. A. (2004). Integrating resource-based and identity-theories: A theory of  
organizational rhetoric. Manuscript submitted for publication in Management  
Communication Quarterly. 
  
139
Simons, T. L., & Peterson, R. S. (2000). Task conflict and relationship conflict in top  
management teams: The pivotal role of intragroup trust. Journal of Applied  
Psychology, 83, 102-111. 
Smith, C. G. (1966). A comparative analysis of some conditions and consequences of  
intra-organizational conflict. Administrative Science Quarterly, 10, 504-529. 
Sykes, G., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization: A theory of juvenile  
delinquency. American Sociological Review, 22, 664-670. 
Taft, L. (2000). Apology subverted: The commodification of apology.  The Yale Law  
Journal, 109, 1135-1160. 
Tavuchis, N. (1991). Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation. Stanford,  
CA: Stanford UP. 
Thomas, K. W. (1976). Conflict and conflict management. In M. Dunnette (Ed.),  
Handbook of industrial and organizational psychology (pp. 889-936). Chicago: 
Rand McNally. 
Thomas, K. W., & Pondy, L. R. (1977). Toward an “intent” model of conflict  
management among principal parties. Human Relations, 30, 1089-1102. 
Tyler, L. (1997). Liability means never having to say you’re sorry: Corporate guilt, legal  
constraints, and defensiveness in corporate communication. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 11, 51-73. 
Volkema, R. J., & Bergmann, T. J. (1989). Interpersonal responses at work: An  
analysis of behavioral responses. Human Relations, 42, 757-770. 
Volkema, R. J., Bergmann, T. J., & Farquhar, K. (1997). Use and impact of informal  
  
140
third-party discussions in interpersonal conflicts at work. Management 
Communication Quarterly, 11, 185-216. 
Weiner, B. (1985). An attributional theory of achievement motivation and emotion.   
 Psychological Review, 92, 548-573. 
Worthington, E. L., Jr. (1997). The pyramid model of forgiveness: Some  
interdisciplinary speculations about unforgiveness and the promotion of 
forgiveness. In E. L. Worthington (Ed.), Dimensions of Forgiveness: 
Psychological Research and Theological Perspectives (pp. 107-137).  
Philadelphia: Templeton Foundation. 
 
  
141
APPENDIX A 
NATIONAL TAXONOMY OF EXEMPT ENTITIES CODES 
 
Code Category Description 
A Arts & Culture Private nonprofit organizations whose primary purpose is to 
promote appreciation for and enjoyment and understanding 
of the visual, performing, folk, and media arts; the 
humanities (archaeology, art history, modern and classical 
languages, philosophy, ethics, theology, and comparative 
religion); history and historical events; and/or 
communications (film, video, publishing, journalism, radio, 
television). 
 
B 
 
Education 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to educate  
citizens, support educational institutions, or educate  the 
public regarding specific policies. 
 
E 
 
Health Care 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide health 
care, including hospitalization, family planning, and health 
consultation. 
 
F 
 
Mental Health 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide  
mental health care and to research mental health issues. 
 
G 
 
Diseases & 
Disorders 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide health 
services to those dealing with diseases or disorders. 
 
I 
 
Crime & Legal-
Related 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide legal 
services and work to address crime-related issues. 
 
K 
 
Agriculture, Food, 
& Nutrition 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to support the 
education, growth, and delivery of food and nutrition 
services. 
 
L 
 
Housing & Shelter 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide and 
maintain housing and shelter for individuals. 
 
 
O 
Youth  
 
Development 
 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide services 
for the purpose of enhancing the development of youth. 
 
P 
 
Human Service 
Organizations 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to provide social 
services (such as rehabilitation, adoption, hospice care) to 
youth, adults, and families. 
 
S 
 
Community 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to educate about 
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Improvement & 
Capacity Building 
and engage in projects regarding community improvement 
(such as block associations, economic development, and 
business development). 
 
T 
 
Philanthropy, 
Voluntarism, & 
Grantmaking 
Foundations 
 
Organizations whose primary purpose is to support and 
advocate for the growth of philanthropic (nonprofit) 
organizations. 
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APPENDIX B 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
Study Cover Page 
 
To protect your anonymity, please do not include your name or other identifying marks 
on any pages of this study.  The information on this page is used to collect demographic 
data and to match your response to your individual packet.  When completed with this 
packet.  Please separate your responses from the first part of this packet.  
 
Age:       
 
Gender:     Female   Male 
 
Have you had any experience in the corporate sector?    Yes      No 
  
If yes, how many years total have you worked?  ______________________ 
  
If yes, for how many organizations have you worked? _________________ 
 
Have you had any experience in the government sector?    Yes      No 
  
If yes, how many years total have you worked?  ______________________ 
  
If yes, for how many organizations have you worked? _________________ 
 
How long have you worked in the nonprofit sector?  _________________________ 
  
For how many organizations have you worked as a staff person? _________ 
 
How long have you been with this organization?  ___________________________ 
  
What is your current position? ____________________________________ 
  
How long have you held this position?  _____________________________ 
 
 Do you volunteer with other organizations?   Yes      No 
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APPENDIX C 
BACKGROUND SCENARIO 
For the past year, Alice and Steve have worked together on the fundraising 
committee for a local community food pantry that provides meals to the homeless in the 
area.  Alice, who was the first to arrive at the Pantry and the last to leave on most days, 
had previously served in similar nonprofit organizations in other communities, and she 
felt she had a good understanding of what the community needed.  She was perceived 
around the organization as not only very committed to the organization in her position as 
Assistant Director of Finance but also very confident in what she felt was the right 
course of action.  Steve, who is also active in other community groups, had been 
involved in the organization for a number of years and felt that he had a good 
understanding of his role in fulfilling the organization’s mission.  He was typically seen 
as a fairly friendly person to work with and as a person who knows a great amount about 
the community, given his extensive service and position as Assistant Director of 
Community Relations.   
The two worked together to create and coordinate various fundraising activities.  
At first, both worked well together.  They quickly formed a nice working partnership 
that netted a variety of financial growth opportunities.  Typically, Steve would use his 
contact information to find potential donors, with Alice making the actual pitch to the 
various individuals and corporations.  With the organization going through increasing 
growth, they were able to come up with very creative and successful ideas.  However, as 
their time together lengthened, their situation seemed to deteriorate.  Each was becoming 
frustrated by what they saw as the other one passing off personal responsibilities.  Alice 
was upset that Steve was slowing down work production by arriving late, taking longer 
breaks, and not returning some phone calls.  Steve was upset that Alice was asking him 
to do more work and apparently trying to be his boss.  The board, meanwhile, was 
asking them to do more work with fewer resources.  The organization began to notice a 
drop-off in the success rate of the fundraisers. 
A few days after their latest event raised fewer funds than the organization 
expected, Alice and Steve confronted each other in the hallway.  Alice told Steve that he 
wasn’t doing his job like he should.  Steve replied that Alice was piling her work onto 
him and trying to act like his boss.  This type of dialogue continued for about 5 minutes, 
with each accusing the other of being the chief instigator of the conflict.   
Two days later, Alice placed the following letter on Steve’s desk. 
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APPENDIX D 
VIGNETTES 
Frame Type (Factual, Relational) / Name (Intentional, Unintentional) / Blame (Other, 
Self, Board) 
Factual / Intentional / Other 
 
 Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  But, unfortunately, I’ve seen a change over time in the 
amount of work being done, the amount of money being brought in, and the amount of 
effort being expended. 
 
 I feel that you are not putting in as much work as you had done in the past.  
Instead, you have been intentionally passing more of your responsibilities off to me.  
Here is what I am seeing.  I am doing twice as much person-to-person correspondence 
than I did last year.  I have planned the events that you planned last year.  I am also 
always being backlogged and I have been getting more tasks from you. 
 
 These are what I am seeing.  Your actions have changed how we do our jobs.  I 
know that you are aware of these problems and are intentionally redefining your job at 
my expense. 
 
I anticipate your reply. 
 
Factual / Intentional / Self 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
 When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  But, unfortunately, I’ve seen a change over time in the 
amount of work being done, the amount of money being brought in, and the amount of 
effort being expended. 
 
 I originally felt you were shifting your responsibilities to me.  However, I want to 
let you know that I blame myself for this.  I realize I was creating the problem by giving 
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you more work because I did not fully understand the reasons for the changes.  Here was 
what I saw.  I am doing twice as much person-to-person correspondence than I used to.  I 
am doing much more event planning and contacting sponsors, which you did.  I am also 
always being backlogged, and I thought I was getting more tasks from you. 
 
These were the facts I was seeing.  I realize I was wrong, so I accept 
responsibility and fault for my actions toward you and my misunderstanding of the 
situation.   
 
I anticipate your reply. 
 
Factual / Intentional / Board  
 
 Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
 When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  But, unfortunately, I’ve seen a change over time in the 
amount of work being done, the amount of money being brought in, and the amount of 
effort being expended. 
 
 I originally felt you were shifting your responsibilities to me.  However, I want to 
let you know that I do not blame you for this.  Instead, I realize the board has created the 
stress by changing how we work.  Here was what I saw.  I am doing twice as much 
person-to-person correspondence than I did last year.  I have planned the events that you 
planned last year.  I am also always being backlogged, and I thought I was getting more 
tasks from you. 
 
 These were the facts I was seeing.  However, I realize the board’s intentional 
changes – not yours – changed our responsibilities.  Our new system seems mostly to 
blame for these changes.   
 
 I anticipate your reply. 
 
Factual / Unintentional / Other 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a letter.  I 
want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
 When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  But, unfortunately, I’ve seen a change over time in the 
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amount of work being done, the amount of money being brought in, and the amount of 
effort being expended. 
 
I originally felt you were shifting your responsibilities to me.  However, I want to 
let you know that I don’t blame you for this.  I just think you were unaware of how your 
actions have accidentally affected my work.  Here was what I saw.  I am doing twice as 
much person-to-person correspondence than I used to.  I am doing much more event 
planning and contacting sponsors, which you did.  I am also always being backlogged, 
and I thought I was getting more tasks from you. 
 
These were the facts I was seeing.  However, I don’t think you were intentionally 
trying to redefine your job.  Your changes just unintentionally changed the way I was 
doing my job.   
 
 I anticipate your reply. 
 
Factual / Unintentional / Self 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a letter.  I 
want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
 When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  But, unfortunately, I’ve seen a change over time in the 
amount of work being done, the amount of money being brought in, and the amount of 
effort being expended. 
 
 I originally felt you were shifting your responsibilities to me.  However, I want to 
let you know that I don’t blame you for this.  I realize I was accidentally creating the 
problem by giving you more work because I did not fully understand the reasons for the 
changes.  Here was what I saw.  I am doing twice as much person-to-person 
correspondence than I did last year.  I have planned the events that you planned last year.  
I am also always being backlogged, and I thought I was getting more tasks from you. 
 
These were the facts I was seeing.  I realize I was wrong, so I accept 
responsibility and fault for this accidental misunderstanding.   
 
 I anticipate your reply. 
 
Factual / Unintentional / Board 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a letter.  I 
want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
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 When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  But, unfortunately, I’ve seen a change over time in the 
amount of work being done, the amount of money being brought in, and the amount of 
effort being expended. 
 
 I originally felt you were shifting your responsibilities to me.  However, I want to 
let you know that I don’t blame you for this.  Instead, I realize the board – not you – 
unknowingly created the stress by changing how we work.  Here was what I saw.  I am 
doing twice as much person-to-person correspondence than I used to.  I am doing much 
more event planning and contacting sponsors, which you did.   I am also always being 
backlogged and I thought I was getting more tasks from you. 
 
These were the facts I was seeing.  However, I realize the board’s changes – not 
yours – unintentionally changed our responsibilities.  That is, I think our new system is 
accidentally causing these changes.   
 
 I anticipate your reply.  
 
Relational / Intentional / Other 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  I enjoyed being able to work with you.  But, 
unfortunately, I have sensed a change over time in our relationship.   
 
 I feel that you are the one who is harming our work relationship by your actions.  
You have been intentionally trying to compete with me rather than work together with 
me.  Here is what I am sensing.  I feel that your cold reactions to me have been straining 
how we relate to each other.  I also feel that you are not at all interested in creating a 
positive work environment between us.   
 
Rather, your resentment of me has constantly been straining our ability to 
positively work together.  It is your intentional competitiveness and disregard for me that 
is preventing us from having a normal and productive work relationship like everyone 
else has. 
 
I anticipate your reply. 
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Relational / Intentional / Self 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  I enjoyed being able to work with you.  But, 
unfortunately, I have sensed a change over time in our relationship.   
 
 I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to 
compete with me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I 
don’t blame you for this.  I realize that I never fully understood why our work 
relationship had changed.  Here was what I was sensing.  I at first felt that your reactions 
to me were straining how we relate to each other.  I also did not feel you were very 
interested in creating a positive work environment between us. 
 
This was what I felt.  However, I realize I was the one hurting our relationship 
with my actions.  So I accept responsibility and fault for causing the strain and 
competition of our relationship. 
 
I anticipate your reply. 
 
Relational / Intentional / Board 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  I enjoyed being able to work with you.  But, 
unfortunately, I have sensed a change over time in our relationship.   
 
 I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to 
compete with me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I 
don’t blame you for this.  I realize the changes knowingly made by the board have 
created stress in our work relationship.  Here was what I was sensing.  I felt that your 
reactions to me were straining how we relate to each other.  I did not feel you were very 
interested in creating a positive work environment between us. 
 
  This was what I felt.  I realize the board, though, is the one hurting our 
relationship with its actions.  This new system is to blame for creating strain and 
competition in how we relate. 
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 I anticipate your reply. 
 
Relational / Unintentional / Other 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  I enjoyed being able to work with you.  But, 
unfortunately, I have sensed a change over time in our relationship.   
 
 I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to 
compete with me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I 
don’t blame you for this.  I just think you were unaware of how you have altered how we 
work together.  Here was what I was sensing.  I felt that your reactions to me were 
straining how we relate to each other.  I did not feel you were very interested in creating 
a positive work environment between us. 
  
 This was what I felt.  However, I don’t believe you were intentionally 
disregarding me.  You were just unaware of the strain and competition you were 
accidentally creating for our work relationship.  
 
 I anticipate your reply. 
 
Relational / Unintentional / Self 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  I enjoyed being able to work with you.  But, 
unfortunately, I have sensed a change over time in our relationship.   
 
 I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to 
compete with me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I 
don’t blame you for this. I realize I was accidentally creating the problem by not 
understanding why our relationship changed.  Here was what I was sensing.  I felt that 
your reactions to me were straining how we relate to each other.  I did not feel you were 
very interested in creating a positive work environment between us. 
 
  
151
This was what I felt.  I realize I was the one accidentally hurting our relationship 
with my actions.  So I accept responsibility and fault for unintentionally causing the 
strain and competition of our relationship. 
 
I anticipate your reply.  
 
Relational / Unintentional / Board 
 
Given the recent events between us, I thought it would be best to write you a 
letter.  I want to present my side of the story and the way I see the situation. 
 
When we first started working together last year, we developed ideas together 
and functioned as a team.  You and I coordinated a large number of activities that raised 
sufficient money for the Pantry.  I enjoyed being able to work with you.  But, 
unfortunately, I have sensed a change over time in our relationship.   
 
 I originally felt that you were harming our work relationship by trying to 
compete with me rather than work together.  However, I want to let you know that I 
don’t blame you for this.  I realize the changes made by the board accidentally caused 
stress in our work relationship.  Here was what I was sensing.  I felt that your reactions 
to me were straining how we relate to each other.  I did not feel you were very interested 
in creating a positive work environment between us. 
 
This is what I was sensing.  I realize the board, though, is the one accidentally 
hurting our relationship with its actions.  This new system is to blame for unintentionally 
creating stress and competition in our work relationship. 
 
I anticipate your reply. 
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APPENDIX E 
 
MANIPULATION CHECK 
 
Directions: Please circle the appropriate answer to the following questions as you 
perceived them. 
 
1.  To what extent does Alice’s letter suggest that she blames herself for the situation? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
           extent           extent            extent          extent 
 
2.  To what extent does Alice’s letter suggest that she blames the board for the situation? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
           extent           extent            extent          extent 
 
3.  To what extent does Alice’s letter suggest that she blames you for the situation? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
           extent           extent            extent          extent 
 
4.  To what extent does Alice’s letter indicate that she sees your actions as intentional? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
           extent           extent            extent          extent 
 
5.  To what extent does Alice’s letter indicate that she sees your actions as unintentional? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
           extent           extent            extent          extent 
 
6.  To what extent does Alice’s letter focus on the objective factors of her job that she 
sees? 
 
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
           extent           extent            extent          extent 
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7.  To what extent does Alice’s letter focus on the emotional or relational ties between 
you and her?  
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
           extent           extent            extent          extent 
 
8.  To what extent does Alice's reaction parallel what you think a woman might do in 
this situation? 
1  2  3  4  5 
     To a minimal   To a small      Somewhat       To a large      To a great 
          extent           extent            extent          extent 
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APPENDIX F 
ACCOUNT TAXONOMY (CODING SCHEME) 
 
From Gonzales, M., Manning, D., & Haugen, J.  (1992).  Explaining our sins: Factors 
influencing offender accounts and anticipated victim responses.  Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 62, 958-971.  (Also used in Holtgraves, 1989).  (Adapted from 
P. Schonbach, 1980) 
 
Concession 
C1 Explicit acknowledgment of own responsibility or guilt 
C1.1 Full confession of guilt without reservations 
C1.2 Partial confession of guilt, with reservations 
C2 Explicit abstention from excuse or justification; acknowledgment that they are 
inappropriate 
C3 Expression of regret concerning failure event (commission or omission) 
C3.1 Expression of regret concerning own responsibility for the failure event 
C3.2 Expression of regret concerning the consequences of the failure event 
C4 Offers restitution or compensation 
C4.1 Appeal to restitutions or compensations already performed 
C4.2 Other restitutions or compensations 
C5 Pleas for forgiveness, or expressed hope for continuation of fruitful relationship 
C5.1 Expressed hope for restoration or improvement of “victim’s” situation 
C6 Acknowledgment of an appropriate response (e.g., “I should have….”) 
C7 Self reproach for failure event, consequence of failure event, or responsibility for 
it 
 
Excuse 
E1 Appeal to own human shortcomings 
E1.1. Appeal to insufficient knowledge or skill 
E1.2 Appeal to impairment of will 
E1.3 Appeal to lack of intention (e.g., “I didn’t mean to….”) 
E2 Reasons for appeal to own shortcomings 
E2.1 Appeal to biological factors (e.g., arousal, fatigue) 
E2.2 Appeal to illness, addiction, drunkenness 
E2.3 Appeal to one’s own negative past 
E2.4 Appeal to provocation by other people 
E2.5 Appeal to duress by powerful agents 
E2.6 Appeal to loyalties 
     E2.7 Appeal to the specific external circumstances of the situation 
 E2.7.1  Appeal to accident 
 E2.7.2  Appeal to inability  
to resist situational pressures 
E3 Appeal to own effort and care before and during the failure event 
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E4 Appeal to shortcomings or misdeeds of others as a frame of reference for 
evaluation 
E4.1 Appeal to shortcomings or misdeeds of the accuser as a frame of 
reference 
E4.2 Appeal to shortcomings or misdeeds of the victim as a frame of reference 
E5 Appeal to the participation of other persons in the failure event 
E5.1 Appeal to the participation of the accuser in the failure event 
E5.2 Appeal to the participation of the victim in the failure event 
E6 Appeal for a noncorrespondent  
reference (e.g., “This isn’t like me…”) 
 
Justification 
J1 Denial of damage 
J2 Minimization of damage 
J2.1 Minimization of damage in view of circumstances that demanded the 
failure event 
     J2.2  Appeal to the positive  
consequences of the  failure event 
J2.3 Minimization of damage to victim in view of consequences for the 
accused (e.g., “You think you’ve got it bad,” “They think they’ve got it 
bad…”) 
     J2.4  Appeal to detection or  
apprehension as cause of negative consequences (e.g., “It wouldn’t be 
such a big deal if I didn’t get caught…”) 
J2.5 Minimization of damage in light of possible future improvement 
J3 Appeal to role of the victim 
J3.1 Using qualities of the victim to justify the damage 
J3.2 Using acts of the victim to justify the damage 
J4 Appeal to the right of self-fulfillment 
J4.1 Appeal to the right of self-fulfillment in view of one’s own negative past 
J5 Appeal to loyalties 
J6 Appeal to good intentions 
J7 Appeal to shortcomings or misdeeds of others as a frame of reference for 
evaluation – offender’s moderation should be acknowledged 
J7.1 Appeal to shortcomings or misdeed of the accuser as a frame of reference 
J7.2 Appeal to shortcomings or misdeeds of the victim as a frame of reference 
 
Refusal 
R1 Claiming that the failure event has not occurred 
R2 Explicit refusal of a confession of guilt 
R3 Unrestricted attribution of guilt to others 
R3.1 Unrestricted attribution of guilt to the accuser 
R3.2 Unrestricted attribution of guilt to the victim 
R4 Denial of right to approach 
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R4.1 Denial of right based on offender’s identity or role in relation to the 
accuser 
R4.2 Denial of right in view of negative qualities or deeds of the accuser 
R4.3 Denial of right in view of negative qualities or deeds of the victim 
R5 Referral to other sources of information 
R6 Evasions or mystifications 
R7 Denial of self as agent of mishap 
R7.1 Explicit denial of responsibility (e.g., “I didn’t do it….”) 
R7.2 Attribution to inanimate object or force (e.g., “The car….” “The 
computer….”) 
R8 Refusal to provide an account, period 
R9 Refusal to provide an account or restitution because the failure event occurred in 
the past and is unalterable (e.g., “It’s done, and there’s nothing I can say or do 
now…. 
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